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INTRODUCTION
The judicial lien, in New York and elsewhere, is the very
telos of in personam liability in private law. In personam
liability stands for the noble proposition that debtors ought to
pay. When they don't, the law stands ready, in its fashion, to
award a creditor with a judicial lien on the debtor's assets (if
any). Its creation is the transubstantive miracle by which
mediocre in personam rights apotheosize into in rem right in the
debtor's property.
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 45
As important as the judicial lien is,1 the law surrounding it is
in bad repair. The reason for this is obvious. Federal
bankruptcy law has proved a fearsome competitor to the
enforcement of in personam liability outside of bankruptcy.
When Wall Street can't pay, it files for chapter 11 protection (or
obtains a federal bailout). It doesn't wait for the sheriff to levy a
bank account. Ironically, the bankruptcy trustee is a judicial lien
creditor on the day of the bankruptcy petition.2 This has been
called the very organizing principle of federal bankruptcy law.'
Yet the law of the judicial lien is underdeveloped all the same.
As attractive a competitor as federal bankruptcy law is, it
still basically requires the debtor to commence the proceeding.
Involuntary bankruptcies exist, but they are rare4 and dangerous
for creditors.' So if a creditor faces a contumacious debtor who
simply declines to pay (common enough in divorce cases) and
does not file for bankruptcy, recourse must often be had to the
ungainly mechanisms by which courts liquidate assets of the
debtor in order to "make" the judgment.6 Hence the necessity of
this study of the New York judicial lien, the first ever since New
York enacted the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), that
un-Herculean effort that woefully failed to scrub clean the
Augean stables of New York civil procedure.
1 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996) ("Unless
that [money] judgment can be enforced, liability is merely symbolic.").
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 549, 549-50 (1999).
4 See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary
Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804-05
(1991) (discussing the reasons why creditors are reluctant to file involuntary
bankruptcy petitions).
I If the petition is rejected, the wronged debtor gets attorney fees, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(i) (West 2005); see also Isabella
C. Lacayo, Note, After the Dismissal of an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition:
Attorney's Fees Awards to Alleged Debtors, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 1949, 1950-52
(2006).
' Lawyers used to speak of" 'mak[ing]' the judgment out of the debtor's personal
property." Isadore H. Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments in New York:
Supplementary Proceedings, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (1935) [hereinafter
Cohen, Supplementary Proceedngs]. The phrase relates to the ancient name for the
writ of execution-feri facis or fi.fa., so named because the writ's opening words
were "quod fieri facias de bonis et catallis" (that you cause to be made of the goods
and chattels). Am. Fin. Corp. v. Webster, Civil Action No. 034-08-1980, 1982 Del.
C.P. LEXIS 3, at *2 (Del. Ct. C.P. Nov. 18, 1982).
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In contemplating the collection mechanism as it exists in
New York, one cannot but react with horror and disgust, not to
mention bafflement, that New York dares to flatter itself the
premier venue of commercial litigation.7  Just prior to the
enactment of the CPLR, two authors wrote, "[iut is doubtful
whether any area of the law is as complex, confused, uncertain,
and devoid of rational justification as that which relates to the
priorities and liens on personal property that are acquired by
procedures to enforce money judgments."' One author has
proclaimed the lien arising from the writ of execution to be a
"solemn and ancient farce."9 Yet, based on my study of forty-five
years of jurisprudence in this area, it is my sad duty to report
that the introduction of new articles 52 and 62 in 196310 has done
little, perhaps nothing, to simplify or rationalize the law in this
area. Mostly, the CPLR simply repeats the absurdities of prior
law. When it innovates, it does not palliate but compounds the
absurdity. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that these portions
of the CPLR are among the worst written statutes in the history
of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
This Article, an installment of an unpleasant but necessary
in-depth study of New York judicial liens,11 examines judicial
liens on personal property arising from articles 52 and 62 of the
CPLR. The focus is on the judicial lien as a personal property
interest. Procedural niceties unconnected to judicial liens are
largely neglected in the interest of space and personal
inclination.12 My analysis divides judicial liens into two types.
7 Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 581, 404 N.E.2d 726,
730, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1980) (referring to New York's "undisputed status as the
preeminent commercial and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world").
8 Daniel H. Distler & Milton J. Schubin, Enforcement Priorities and Liens: The
New York Judgment Creditor's Rights in Personal Property, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 458,
458 (1960); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice,
60 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 89 (1960) ('Most law offices have thousands of dollars in
unpaid judgments in their files .... [TIhis ... is the worst offender in failing to keep
up with the facts of modern life." (remarks of Daniel H. Distler)).
9 Cohen, Supplementary Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1007.
1W See Governor's Approval Memorandum, ch. 308, L. 1962, reprinted in 1962
N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 331-32.
11 See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New
York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1291 (2008) [hereinafter Money Judgment
Part 1].
12 Although I allude to many procedural aspects of the judicial lien, I do not
deeply analyze the constitutionality of New York's legal regime. Various due process
challenges have been mounted against this regime. When they succeed, the New
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Part I discusses the execution lien and the closely analogous pre-
judgment attachment lien.' 3  The execution lien is the "legal"
remedy for the disease of money judgment. In Part II, I examine
"equity" liens-liens associated with injunctive turnover orders
and the appointment of receivers. In Part III, I discuss personal
property that is so highly esteemed as to be exempt from
encumbrance by the judicial lien. Here we shall read of oxen,
church pews, and watches worth less than $35. The legislation
on exemptions serves a dual purpose. First, it immunizes certain
property against judicial liens. Second, thanks to federal law, it
authorizes bankrupt debtors to remove the designated property
from the bankruptcy estate. At all points of the analysis, the
interaction of federal bankruptcy law and state law will be
thoroughly examined. Part IV concludes with some modest
suggestions for reform to make the system more rational and to
mitigate the embarrassment that any patriotic New Yorker must
feel upon contemplating the current state of articles 52 and 62 of
the CPLR.
I. THE EXECUTION LIEN
A. Creation
The execution lien is conjured into existence by CPLR
5202(a):
Where a judgment creditor has delivered an execution to a
sheriff, the judgment creditor's rights in a debt owed to the
judgment debtor or in an interest of the judgment debtor in
personal property.., are superior to the extent of the amount of
the execution to the rights of any transferee of the debt or
property ... 14
York legislature dutifully amends the CPLR. My study assumes, perhaps foolishly,
that the current regime is as constitutional as it is regrettable.
13 Pre-judgment attachment liens merge into execution liens once the judgment
is entered. See Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan v. Abbruzzese, 57 Misc. 2d 783,
788, 293 N.Y.S.2d 634, 639-40 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).
14 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2008). Although only a sheriff (an officer of
the supreme court) is mentioned, delivery to marshals working for lesser or federal
courts has like effect. See First Westchester Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 42 Misc. 2d 1007,
1009, 249 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (Westchester County Ct. 1964); see also, N.Y. CITY CIV.
CT. ACT § 701(b) (McKinney 2008) ("The provisions of law applicable in supreme
court practice, relating to the execution of mandates by a sheriff and the power and
control of the court over the sheriff executing the same, shall apply in this court; and
they shall apply equally to both sheriffs and marshals."). The marshal, however,
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This peculiar sentence struggles to say that the lien is
created the moment that a judgment creditor serves an execution
on the sheriff.15 Notice that the above sentence neglects to use
the word lien. It merely says that the rights of a creditor in
personal property (whatever they may be) are good against
subsequent transferees. From this we can infer that the creditor
has a property interest-a lien!-in the debtor's personal
property once the execution is delivered.16
And what is a lien? The CPLR never says. Apparently
you're already supposed to know that in advance. Yet few
lawyers, I suspect, can hazard a satisfactory definition.
In general, a lien is a property interest connected with a
debt, so there is typically a debtor and a creditor. The property
interest in question is a power-in Hohfeldian terms, the ability
to change the legal present, which the empowered person may or
may not wish to exercise.1"
The lien creditor's power is to sell the debtor's property.,
Classically, the creditor can sell what the debtor could have sold
at the time the lien was created. 9 This formulation suggests
that the power cannot be defeated by the debtor's subsequent
transfers. This is a proposition the CPLR imperfectly articulates.
According to CPLR 5233(a):
The interest of the judgment debtor in personal property
obtained by a sheriff pursuant to execution or order, other than
legal tender of the United States, shall be sold by the sheriff at
public auction .... 20
may not enforce a supreme court judgment; only the sheriff can. Yeh v. Seakan, 119
Misc. 2d 681, 684, 464 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1983).
15 See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Under
New York law, a judgment creditor becomes a 'judgment lien creditor' as to personal
property only after execution is delivered to the sheriff.").
6 The inability to utter the word lien in CPLR 5202(a) may stem from two
scholars, one of whom was an associate reporter for the committee that drafted
article 52. These two writers unjustifiably thought the word "lien" vague, and so
CPLR 5202(a) anxiously dances around the word. See Distler & Schubin, supra note
8, at 459-65. Saying that the word "lien" is vague is like saying the phrase "security
interest" is vague and then recommending that article 9 of the UCC must never use
the phrase. Incidentally, the CPLR at least twice utters the profane name of "liens."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b), 5236(a).
17 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN LEGAL REASONING 7, 55-60 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
s See id. at 7.
19 See, e.g., 30 N.Y. JUR.2d Creditors' Rights and Remedies § 102 (2006).
20 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233(a).
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This principle is incoherent as stated. What is the interest of
the judgment debtor that the sheriff obtains? As of what time
must this interest be judged? The answer is, the creditor may
sell whatever interest the debtor had at the time the execution
was delivered to the sheriff. This would mean that, by the time
of the sale, a debtor might have no interest in property, yet the
sheriff still has a power of sale, as the following scenario shows:
First Scenario
Monday: The sheriff levies a thing from a judgment debtor
("JD") pursuant to a writ of execution obtained by a judgment
creditor ("JC"), so that JC has a lien.
Tuesday: JD, who owns the equity interest in the levied thing,
conveys all right, title and interest to X, so that JD has
absolutely no connection to the thing.
Wednesday: In a procedurally valid sale, the sheriff sells X's
thing to Y.
In the First Scenario, the sheriff had power to sell X's
property, even though, on Wednesday, JD had no interest at all
in it. Y obtains whatever interest JD had in the thing on
Monday. Hence, the proper formulation is that a lien is the
power of a creditor to sell whatever the debtor could have sold at
the moment the creditor's lien was created. Meanwhile, JC's
power is transferred to Y. Y therefore buys JD's equity interest
and JC's lien. These two merge, leaving Y with absolute title in
JD's thing. This is the proper formulation of the power of sale.
Yet, under the literal terms of CPLR 5233(a), Y obtains nothing
at all on Wednesday.
If the personal property is a debt that can be extinguished by
payment, the creation of a judicial lien is the involuntary
assignment of the debt, so that JC not only has a power of sale
but also has a power to collect money from the debtor's debtor
(whom, in imitation of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), I shall call the account debtor, or AD).21 In such cases,
no sale is needed to liquidate the property into cash, the
language in which debt is expressed. Once JC serves the
21 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (2007) ("'Account debtor' means a person obligated on an
account, chattel paper, or general intangible.").
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execution on the sheriff and creates the lien, AD, who owes a
debt to JD, must pay the sheriff instead of JD.22
In making delivery of the execution the moment of lien
creation, New York follows the noble reform of 1676 when the
spirit of Cromwell temporarily stirred Parliament from its
Restoration torpor to pass the famous Statute of Frauds.23 Best
known for making contracts unenforceable unless in writing and
for requiring a signed and delivered deed as the mode of
transferring real property, the Statute of Frauds also changed
the moment when the writ of fieri facias-which today we call a
writ of execution, or simply an execution-created a lien.24
Prior to the Statute of Frauds, English law indulged in the
extraordinary fiction that everything the courts did was
accomplished on the first day of the term (the date of teste),
including execution on property. 5  Hence, Shakespeare's
comment about "lawyers in the vacation[,] for they sleep between
term and term, and then they perceive not how Time moves."26
Imagine that the first day of term was January 10, 1600. On
January 11, 1600, JD sells a cow to X for a few pence. JC files a
complaint against JD in February and obtains a judgment in
April. The court issues a writ of fieri facias to the sheriff on April
15. The sheriff was fully able to levy on X's cow because the
judgment bound JD's property as of the first day of the term, the
day before X bought the cow.27 Obviously this played some havoc
with a farmer's ability to sell cows.
In order to improve JD's position, the Statute of Frauds
deferred JC's judicial lien until the moment the writ of execution
22 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a). There is a superficial resemblance between JC
claiming derivatively through JD and JC claiming that AD has made JC the third-
party beneficiary of a contract. Where JC has a judgment and sues AD under a
third-party beneficiary theory, the court may convert the breach of contract action to
a proceeding supplementary to judgment pursuant to CPLR 5225(b) or 5227. Port
Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 657, 357 N.E.2d 983, 987, 389
N.Y.S.2d 327, 331 (1976).
23 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 16
(Eng.); see Baker v. Hull, 250 N.Y. 484, 487-88, 166 N.E. 175, 176 (1929) (tracing the
New York rule to the Statute of Frauds).
24 See 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 15.
25 See Erwin's Lessee v. Dundas, 45 U.S. 58, 75 (1846); Roth v. Wells, 29 N.Y.
471, 489 (1864).
26 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 3, sc. 2 (The Riverside 2d ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1997) (1623).
27 See Bond v. Willet, 29 How. Pr. 47, 50 (1864).
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was delivered to the sheriff.2 This solution, however, is subject
to the criticism that delivery of the execution is largely an
invisible event. If X wishes to buy JD's cow, X can never be sure
that the sheriff has not received a writ of execution which would
encumber the cow with a lien. Because this is so, many
jurisdictions in the United States have wisely deferred the
moment of lien creation even further-to the time the sheriff
actually levies (or takes custody of) the personal property of JD.29
Dispossessing JD serves to notify the buyer of cows that perhaps
something is amiss with regard to JD's ownership of cows.
New York takes a different and less satisfactory approach to
the problem. Instead of abandoning the Statute of Frauds
solution altogether, as it should have done, it sentimentally
retains delivery as the moment of lien creation 3°-New York's
continuing tribute to the scabrous, plague-infested seventeenth
century, which, pace Milton, Purcell, and Newton, scarcely
deserves our high opinion. To counteract the invisibility of this
lien, New York creates two exceptions whereby transfers
subsequent to the lien are free and clear of it. 1 We consider in
turn each of these mystifying and unsatisfactory exceptions.
1. Pre-Levy Transfers
According to CPLR 5202(a)(1), the execution lien, created
upon delivery of the execution to the sheriff, is no good against "a
transferee who acquired the debt or property for fair
consideration before it was levied upon."32 This is very broad
protection indeed. CPLR 5202(a)(2), governing the post-levy era,
mentions absence of knowledge, 33  but knowledge is not
mentioned in 5202(a)(1). 34 Therefore, it must be concluded that a
JD has power to give title free and clear of an execution lien to a
bad faith transferee for a fair consideration. In exalting the bad
faith transferee over diligent creditors who serve executions on
sheriffs, New York unashamedly apes the bad example of article
9 of the UCC, where bad faith secured parties can take priority
28 See 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 15.
29 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6012 (West 2008).
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over earlier unperfected security interests, even though they
know they are harming the rights of a prior unperfected secured
party.3
5
CPLR 5202(a)(1) requires that a transfer be "for fair
consideration." At least one court has interpreted this language
to exclude security interests under guaranty contracts, where JD
is not the principal obligor. 6 The reasoning is that JD never
received the loan proceeds; some third party did.3 7 This makes
the guaranty obligation in the nature of a donative transfer-one
for no fair consideration. This position, however, entirely
overlooks the fact that, under the law of suretyship, JD always
obtains subrogation rights against the principal obligor, in
exchange for the suretyship promise. 3' Therefore, courts err if
they think sureties receive nothing from the parties they assure.
Properly, secured parties ("SPs") under suretyship contracts are
transferees for fair consideration. 9 What they give in exchange
for their security interests is subrogation rights against the
principal obligor.4"
A lien even weaker than the execution lien is created in the
pre-petition context when a plaintiff serves an order of
attachment on a sheriff.41 According to CPLR 6203, a lien is
created when the order of attachment is delivered to the sheriff,
but an alleged debtor ("D")42 retains power to give better title to
"a transferee who acquired the debt or property before it was
levied upon for fair consideration or without knowledge of the
order of attachment."4 3 The disjunctive suggests that bad faith
" U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (2007). In the case of a fraudulent conveyance, New York
law gives to a good faith transferee who gave less than a fair consideration a lien for
the consideration actually given. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278(2) (McKinney 2008).
But no such lien is provided as a partial defense to the judicial lien under CPLR
5202(a)(1). JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: C.P.L.R.
5202.13 (2d ed. 2008).
36 Yellin, Kenner & Levy v. Simon, 75 Civ. 3880, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373,
at *22 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1979).
37 Id.
" Contrary to popular belief, upstream guaranties are usually for fair
consideration because of subrogation. See Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudulent Transfer
Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 113 (1986).
39 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a).
40 Carl, supra note 38, at 113.
41 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203.
42 In attachment cases, I will refer to the defendant as D, not JD, since the
plaintiff ("P") does not and may never have a money judgment.
4 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203 (emphasis added).
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transferees for value are protected against the attachment lien
(as is true with the execution lien),44 but in addition, good faith
donees are protected. The only party defeated by the pre-levy
attachment lien is the bad faith donee and some subsequent
judgment creditors.15 New York's feeble pre-levy attachment lien
has been justifiably condemned as "America's weakest lien."46
Countermanding the weakness of the execution and
attachment liens, at the same time the New York legislature
enacted CPLR 6203, it also spoiled the uniformity of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act47 by adding section 273-a of the
Debtor and Creditor Law:
Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the
person making it is a defendant in an action for money damages
or a judgment in such an action has been docketed against him,
is fraudulent as to the plaintiff in that action without regard to
the actual intent of the defendant if, after final judgment for the
plaintiff, the defendant fails to satisfy the judgment.48
So even if the good faith donee takes free of the attachment
lien, the same donee has received a fraudulent conveyance, since
the order of attachment implies that the debtor-transferor is
probably already a defendant within the meaning of the above-
quoted provision.
It has tempted some to justify CPLR 5202(a)(1) because the
assignee ("X') who receives a transfer free of the execution lien
" InAdan v. Abbott, 114 Misc. 2d 735, 736, 452 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982), D's lawyer on a murder rap claimed to take free of an attachment lien
on book royalties, but the court held that the lawyer was no transferee. Presumably,
the mouthpiece could have obtained a security interest for past and future services,
and as bad faith transferee, beat the attachment lien after all. But, as we are about
to learn, new article 9 prevents subsequent SPs from taking free of judicial liens
under the CPLR. See infra text accompanying notes 55-93.
" Actually, judgment creditors would seem to be eligible for protection under
CPLR 6203(1), but this wipes out the basic priority system of 5234(b). So, by
implication, subsequent judicial lien creditors can never claim protection under
CPLR 5202(a)(2) or 6203(1). See infra text accompanying notes 128-1129.
46 David Gray Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 297
(1984).
4' The new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, however, adopts § 273-a as a good
idea. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a) (1984); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW
§ 273-a (McKinney 2008).
Ch. 310, § 103, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1699; TfHiRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1959) (Legislative Document
No. 17).
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replaces the value lost to JC by paying JD the consideration.49
But this is not so. Antecedent debt is included in the concept of
fair consideration. 50  From JD's standpoint, the property
conveyed to X is a dead loss if X is paid on antecedent debt. 51
Justification for lien weakness will have to be found elsewhere.
Furthermore, JC at least had something-a lien. Once the lien
disappears, JC has nothing but the faint hope of getting a new
judicial lien on something else. Perhaps several justifications are
needed. If X pays a fresh consideration, X deserves protection
because the transaction is revenue-neutral for JC.52  When X
takes a transfer in payment of or as security for antecedent debt
in good faith, X prevails because X did no intentional wrong and,
as a creditor, is the moral equal of JC. When X is in bad faith for
a fair consideration, perhaps we must simply admit that we do
not want to encourage a lawsuit from JC regarding what X did or
did not know. Perhaps the legislature does not really believe
that JC has much of a property interest just because her lawyer
filled in a form and delivered it to the sheriff. The lien created by
so scant an investment in diligence produces an invisible lien,
which threatens commerce. Yet in this last instance, a bad faith
X who takes a transfer from JD faces the risk that the transfer to
X was for the purpose of hindering or delaying creditors, thus
making it a deliberate fraud on creditors like JC.53 If so, X may
have to bear JC's legal fees under a non-uniform New York
enactment.54
Law professors make their living by inducing the premises
from the data of the rules. But the premises here induced cannot
disguise the fact that deferral of the judicial lien to the moment
49 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, % 5202.02, 5202.06, 5202.11, 5202.13.
50 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 272. The CPLR intentionally adopts the language
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which is the basis of New York's law.
See infra text accompanying notes 153-162.
51 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 5202.11 ("Because fair consideration
may include discharge of an antecedent debt[, ... however, there are clearly
instances where the CPLR provisions are less advantageous to the judgment creditor
than were the provisions of former law.").
52 At least this would be so if JD receives the cash proceeds in trust for JC.
Although this would make sense-JC has contributed property to JD's transferee-
there is not yet any judicial precedent for a proceeds theory. It would, however, be
easy for JC to make this claim; JC could simply ratify JD's action and make JD the
agent of JC for the purpose of the sale.
" See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276.
5 See id. § 276-a.
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of levy would be a vast conceptual improvement in the law of
judicial liens on personal property.
a. Subsequent Security Interests
CPLR 5202(a)(1) generates some merry confusion when read
in conjunction with article 9 of the UCC. According to section 9-
317(b) of the UCC, a secured party is subordinate to a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected.5  The UCC defines a person who becomes a "lien
creditor" as a person whose lien arises from "attachment, levy, or
the like."56 In New York, an execution lien arises from delivery of
the execution to the sheriff, 7 so presumably a judgment creditor
who has delivered an execution to the sheriff falls under the
awkward "or the like" catch-all phrase of the UCC.56
Meanwhile, according to 5202(a)(1), a creditor whose
unperfected security interest attaches after delivery of the
execution but before the levy takes free of the execution lien.59
Whereas the CPLR points to the superior second-in-time rights of
an unperfected SP, the UCC exalts the second-in-time rights of
JC.60 The two provisions are in contradiction." Accordingly, the
following anomalous priority is created:
Second Scenario
Monday: JC serves a writ of execution on the sheriff, thereby
creating a judicial lien.
Tuesday: Pursuant to a security agreement, SP advances funds
to JD, thereby creating a security interest in some thing. SP
does not perfect.
5 See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (2007).
56 Id. § 9-102(a)(52)(A).
51 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2008).
-' See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(A) (McKinney 2008); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(152)(A).
It has always struck me as lazy for the drafters of the UCC and the New York
legislature who enacted it to define what it means to become a lien creditor in New
York in terms as uninstructive as "or the like." See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(A);
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(A). Would it be so hard to look up what this means according
to the CPLR?
" See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1).
6 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A).
61 Peter F. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 77 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1964) ("[In fact, neither [the UCC nor the CPLR
seems to recognize the existence of the other.").
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In the Second Scenario, CPLR 5202(a)(1) awards priority to
SP because SP is a transferee for a fair consideration on
Tuesday. The UCC, however, can be read as awarding priority to
JC because JC is "a person that becomes a lien creditor
before ... the security interest.., is perfected."6 2  If so, each
statute gives a different answer.
In Yellin, Kenner & Levy v. Simon,63 Judge Thomas Griesa
ruled that in the Second Scenario, SP loses.64 According to the
seldom cited UCC section 13-103, when the UCC conflicts with
some non-uniform legislation, the UCC must triumph.65 Under
this license, Judge Griesa negated the exception to 5202(a) and
decided the priority contest solely by reference to article 9,66
according to which SP was the loser.
Judge Griesa's interpretation is correct under the 2001
amendments to article 9. Ironically, it was erroneous at the time
it was decided. In Yellin, JC delivered an execution to the sheriff
before SP's security interest attached or was perfected.67 In
62 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A). In Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp.
72, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a creditor claimed the exception in CPLR 5202(a)(1) by virtue
of an unperfected security interest. The claim was denied on the following ground:
A reading of the purported "assignment of interest" is nothing more than
an agreement under which [JD's] interest in the proceeds of contract were
to serve as collateral for [JD's] debt to [JC]. To be sure, the "assignment of
interest" possessed all the earmarks of a collateral agreement and none of
the earmarks of a genuine transfer....
It is evident that such a collateral agreement, although denominated as
an assignment of interest, falls far short of the type of "perfected
transaction" which marks a valid assignment.
Id. If this passage states that the creation of a security interest is not a transfer of
JD's property, then it is of course sadly benighted. If it says that unperfected
security interests cannot qualify for the 5202(a)(1) exception, it stands for the
override by the UCC of 5202(a)(1). Mantovani is a masterpiece of confusion. There,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and JC competed for a general intangible owed
by AD. The IRS had filed notice of its lien first and clearly had priority. JC argued
that it had served an execution second-in-time, but that JC qualified for the
protection of CPLR 5202(a)(1). In other words, JC implied that the IRS was bound
by the exception of 5202(a)(1). The mystifying passage quoted above responds to this
"point" and can be dismissed, along with the argument, as absurd.
75 Civ. 3880, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
64 See id. at *17-18. To be precise, SP was a post-levy transferee. But SP was
without knowledge of the levy and thus potentially comported with the second
exception to 5202(a). Yellin, however, is also good authority for the meaning of CPLR
5202(a)(1), pertaining to pre-levy transfers.
' See N.Y. U.C.C. § 13-103 (formerly § 10-103).
' See Yellin, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373, at *20-21.
67 See id. at *20.
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Judge Griesa's view, JC was the winner under the terms of old
UCC section 9-301-now unhappily renumbered as section 9-
317(a)(2) 68-because JC became a lien creditor before SP
perfected.6 9 According to this view, the UCC overrules 5202(a)(1)
and (2) in all cases; no secured party could ever take advantage of
5202(a)(1) provided that JC delivers an execution to the sheriff
before SP files a financing statement or otherwise perfects.
In contrast, SP argued that old section 9-301(b) applied only
where JC became a lien creditor during an unperfected gap in
SP's security interest.70 According to this view, entirely correct
prior to 2001, old section 9-301(b) had nothing to say when JC
became a lien creditor entirely before SP's security interest
attached. Rather, insofar as the UCC is concerned, SP's security
interest could only attach to JD's rights in the collatera 71-the
equity left over in light of JC's judicial lien. Because old
section 9-301 governed unperfected security interests only-not
pre-attachment events-the UCC did not conflict with the
CPLR.72 SP was, therefore, entitled to prevail under CPLR
5202(a)(1).
To consider this valid argument more slowly, we start with
the premise of section 9-201 of the UCC-article 9's so-called
golden rule: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors."73 Old
UCC section 9-301(1)(b) was one of the exceptions to which the
italicized language referred. It provided:
68 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-317 (formerly § 9-301). In the Golden Age of article 9-
prior to 2000-section 9-317 bore the noble number section 9-301. Today, we
petulantly suffer sixteen unedifying choice-of-law provisions before we encounter the
all-important priority contest between secured creditors and judicial lien creditors.
69 See Yellin, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373, at *20.
70 See id.
71 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2). The drafters of new article 9 call this the "nemo dat
concept." Id. § 9-317 cmt. 4. Though redolent of James Mason's character in Twenty
Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, it refers to the Latin sentence, nemo dat quod non
habet, which means "no one giveth who hath not."
72 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
73 Id. § 9-201 (emphasis added).
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), 7 4 an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected .. .
Notice that old section 9-301(1)(b) regulated unperfected
security interests only.76 When an unperfected gap existed and a
subsequent JC came into existence, SP was subordinated.77 On
the other hand, when SP perfected and attached at the same
time, article 9 could have no effect on the priority contest
whatsoever. Old section 9-301(b) applied only if there was an
unperfected gap.
If this argument is correct, as I believe it is, then the UCC
did not apply in Yellin-even if SP never perfected. Accordingly,
SP could indeed claim to fall under 5202(a)(1). Meanwhile, JC
could not claim protection of old section 9-301(b). Hence, there
was no conflict-only the CPLR applied. Under the CPLR, SP
should have won, even if SP never perfected.7"
4 Subsection (2) provided to purchase money SPs a grace period for perfecting.
It commenced when JD received delivery of the collateral and ran for ten days. See
id. § 9-301(2). Today this grace period has been stretched to twenty days. See id. § 9-
317(e).
75 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (McKinney 2000) (emphasis added) (current version
at N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-317 (McKinney 2008)).
76 See id.
77 Going back further in history, prior to the UCC, an unsecured creditor who
advanced "gap" credit could later obtain a senior judicial lien, even if SP perfected
its security interest before JC obtained a lien. See Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N.Y. 476,
481, 39 N.E. 11, 13 (1894). Under the notorious case of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5
(1931), a bankruptcy trustee could subrogate herself to the avoidance rights of a
unsecured gap creditor and avoid a security interest that was perfected years before
the bankruptcy. One of the most important goals of article 9 was to limit avoidance
rights to creditors who obtained liens during the unperfected gap. Since a
bankruptcy trustee was not subrogated to the rights of lien creditors, article 9
effectively defanged the dragon of Moore. See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 46, at
319-20.
"I See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1) (McKinney 2008). In the Second Scenario, SP did
not perfect and yet, on my reading of the pre-2000 UCC, SP still should have won
under the exception in CPLR 5202(a)(1). Can this be justified? The answer is yes
because old section 9-301(b) applied only in cases where a person became a lien
creditor in the gap between attachment and perfection of a security interest. JC
became a lien creditor before attachment and so UCC section 9-301(b) simply did not
apply. This is easy to fathom in a case where SP's security interest attaches and is
perfected simultaneously, as where SP's financing statement was filed prior to
Monday in the First Scenario. But it is equally true if SP never perfected at all.
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Yellin was a misinterpretation of old section 9-301(1)(b). Yet
new UCC section 9-317(a)(2) basically ratifies the Yellin premise
after the fact. According to new section 9-317(a)(2):
A security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the
rights of:
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), 79 a person
that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of the time:
(A) the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected;
or
(B) one of the conditions specified in Section 9-203(b)(3)"°
is met and a financing statement covering the collateral
is filed.1
Section 9-317(a)(2) operates differently from old section 9-301(b).
First, section 9-317(a)(2) makes no reference to unperfected
security interests, as did old section 9-301(b). Rather, new
section 9-317(a)(2) applies to perfected security interests,
consistent with the Yellin premise.8 2 As a result, it now becomes
plausible to contend that new section 9-317(a)(2) governs the
Second Scenario. Ironically, this puts the UCC into conflict with
To see why, imagine that JC has a judgment for $100 and that JD has a thing worth
$1,000. On Monday, JC serves an execution to the sheriff creating a defeasible lien
on the thing. Suppose on Tuesday, JD sells the thing outright to B for a fair
consideration. Clearly, JC no longer has a judicial lien on the thing; B owns it free
and clear. But now suppose that SP takes an unperfected security interest in the
thing in exchange for a $1,000 loan. Since SP's interest is less than absolute, JC's
lien is not entirely destroyed. Rather, it encumbers JD's equity in the thing.
Nevertheless, JC's lien is still largely destroyed because SP's unperfected security
interest is senior to it. The destroyed part of JC's lien can never come into conflict
with SP's unperfected security interest for the simple reason that JC's judicial lien
does not encumber that part of the collateral to which the unperfected security
interest attached. JC merely has the right to receive any surplus. See N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 9-615(a)(3) (McKinney 2008). But surely all other aspects of JC's lien is just as
destroyed as it is in the case where JC conveys an absolute interest to B.
In Yellin, we do not know whether SP's security interest on Tuesday was
perfected at birth or whether there was an unperfected gap. Either way, SP should
have prevailed under CPLR 5202(a)(1) because old section 9-301(b) applied only to
persons who became lien creditors after attachment and before perfection. See
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (2007).
79 Subsection (e) provides a grace period to purchase money SPs in which to
perfect. The grace period commences when JD receives delivery of the collateral and
runs for twenty days. See U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2007).
80 See id. § 9-203. This section refers to the existence of a security agreement
between JD and SP.
" Id. § 9-317(a)(2) (emphasis added).
12 Id. § 9-317(a)(2)(A).
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the CPLR, which means that SP loses! Although new article 9
was designed to reduce the power of JCs against SPs,13 here is
one unintended consequence in which JCs were exalted over SPs.
New section 9-317(a)(2) therefore governs perfected security
interests as well as unperfected ones.84 Consider the following
chronology:
Third Scenario
Monday: SP files a financing statement pursuant to a security
agreement, specifying some thing is SP's collateral. SP has
made no commitment to lend.
Tuesday: JC serves a writ of execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: SP advances funds to JD, thereby creating a
perfected security interest on the thing.
In the Third Scenario, JC had a senior lien all day Tuesday but
lost priority on Wednesday. In this case, both CPLR 5202(a)(1)
and new section 9-317(a)(2)(B) give SP the victory. Under the
UCC, filing without more is not perfection. Filing plus
attachment is perfection. 5  Prior to 2000, JC would have
prevailed. 6 Now SP wins because JC has not become a lien
creditor before "one of the conditions specified in [s]ection 9-
203(b)(3)87 is met and a financing statement covering the
collateral is filed.""8 Here the Yellin premise, imported into new
section 9-317(a)(2), does no harm to SP. But it still creates a bad
result for SPs in the Second Scenario, in spite of new section 9-
317(b)(2)(B).
Compare yet another chronology:
Fourth Scenario
Monday: JD and SP sign a security agreement with regard to a
thing owned by JD and SP gives value. SP does not perfect.
Tuesday: JC serves a writ of execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: SP perfects.
Thursday: The sheriff levies on behalf of JC.
Id. § 9-317 cmt. 4.
84 See id. § 9-317(a)(2)(B).
85 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-308 (McKinney 2008).
1 According to section 9-317 of the UCC, official comment 4, this subparagraph
was designed to make sure that an initial discretionary advance by SP would have
priority over a prior judicial lien. Id. § 9-317 cmt. 4.
87 Section 9-203(b)(3) refers to the security agreement. Id. § 9-203(b)(3).
88 Id. § 9-317(b)(2)(B).
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This time JC clearly wins under section 9-317(a)(2) of the UCC.
JC became a lien creditor before SP perfected. And because SP's
unperfected security interest attached prior to JC's lien, SP
cannot claim to be a post-lien transferee of JD under CPLR
5202(a)(1). On these facts, there is no conflict between the UCC
and CPLR 5202(a)(2). 89 Nevertheless, in Ruppert v. Community
National Bank,90 the court, on the above facts, said in erroneous
dictum that SP was entitled to protection under CPLR 5202(a)(1)
because SP obtained an unperfected security interest before the
levy.91 Ruppert is therefore the converse of the Yellin error. It
overlooks the fact that CPLR 5202(a)(1) is an exception to the
principle stated in the preamble.92 So, properly, CPLR 5202(a)(1)
is irrelevant; SP was first in time but subordinate to JC under
section 9-317(a)(2) of the UCC.93  SP was a pre-execution
transferee and had no right to the protection of CPLR 5202(a)(1).
b. Future Advances
The prior section points out that new article 9 changes the
mode of governing the priority between SP and JC. There has
also been a change in the way new article 9 governs the priority
of future advances made by SP after JC has become a lien
creditor.
As originally enacted in 1962, the UCC had no future
advance rule.94 So imagine the following scenario:
89 See Citibank, N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns Ltd., 98 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 780 N.E.2d
503, 503-04, 750 N.Y.S.2d 818, 818-19 (2002); Package Mach. Co. v. Cosden Oil &
Chem. Co., 51 A.D.2d 771, 772, 380 N.Y.S.2d 248, 248 (2d Dep't. 1976); R & L
Stationery Corp. v. 708 Dogwood Ave. Corp., 56 Misc.2d 465, 466-67, 288 N.Y.S.2d
653, 654-55 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
90 22 A.D.2d 165, 254 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't. 1964), affd, 16 N.Y.2d 589, 209
N.E.2d 100, 261 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1965).
91 Id. at 167, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
92 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2008).
91 As Ruppert held, when the sheriff released the collateral directly to SP, SP
was not a transferee by virtue of obtaining possession. 22 A.D.2d at 167, 254
N.Y.S.2d at 343-44. In fact, SPs possession was a perfecting act. The transfer
occurred much earlier, when SP's security interest attached to the collateral.
Nevertheless, the case was correctly decided; when the sheriff released the levied
collateral to SP, JC's execution lien died, leaving SP's newly perfected security
interest without a competing judicial lien against it. See infra notes 316-317 and
accompanying text.
94 George T. Lewis, III & Mary Aronov, The Tennessee Recording Tax Statute
and Its Effect on Perfection of Security Interests, 52 TENN. L. REV. 355, 360 n.12
(1985).
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Fifth Scenario
Monday: JD conveys a security interest in goods to SP. SP
perfects, which implies that JD has rights in the collateral, a
security agreement exists, and SP has given value to JD. The
security agreement authorizes but does not require SP to make
discretionary future advances.
Tuesday: JC serves a writ of execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: The sheriff levies goods on behalf of JC.
Thursday: SP makes a discretionary future advance.
Prior to the 1972 amendments to article 9, SP was definitely
senior for Monday's advance, but no one knew the status of
Thursday's advance. According to the "unitary" theory of
security interests, Thursday's advance was senior. According to
the "multiple" theory, Thursday's advance was junior. It created
a "new" security interest that was junior to JC's lien.95
The question became one of high moment in 1966, when
Congress amended the tax lien statute to protect UCC floating
liens from invalidity against tax liens under the inchoateness
doctrine.96 According to the 1966 amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code, SP's future advance would be protected only if the
advance were good against a judicial lien creditor under state
law.97 But this was precisely what no one knew. So the 1972
amendments added a rule that whittled down JC by the amount
of Thursday's advance. According to section 9-301(4) (1972):
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is
perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent
that it secures advances made before he becomes a lien creditor
or within 45 days thereafter or made without knowledge of the
lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without
knowledge of the lien.98
This 1972 provision protected Thursday's advance, but only
because there was already a security interest on Monday. In
comparison, consider this:
95 David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment: Postpetition Transfers
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 113, 150-51 (2004).
' See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 46, at 349-50. Inchoateness is described
infra text accompanying notes 117-127.
97 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)(1)(B), (d)(2) (2000).
98 U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (2007) (emphasis added).
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Sixth Scenario
Monday: JD signs a security agreement, which authorizes but
does not require SP to make discretionary future advances. SP
files a financing statement. SP makes no advance.
Tuesday: JC serves an execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: SP makes a discretionary future advance and has a
perfected security interest for the first time.
Thursday: The sheriff levies goods on behalf of JC.
In the Sixth Scenario, section 9-301(4) (1972) did not apply to
protect the Thursday advance, because old section 9-301(4)
required SP to have a perfected security interest before Tuesday,
when JC first became a lien creditor. But, at least in New York,
SP could rely on the protection of CPLR 5202(a)(1) to take free of
JC's lien (provided that Yellin99 was a bad Erie guess at New
York law).
New article 9 changes the premise of future advance
priorities. First, under section 9-317(a)(2)(B), SP wins in the
Sixth Scenario without any help from the CPLR. Since JC did
not become a lien creditor before a financing statement was filed
pursuant to a security agreement, JC loses, even though JC was
first to obtain a lien. Second, according to new section 9-323(b),
[A] security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person that
becomes a lien creditor to the extent that the security interest
secures an advance made more than 45 days after the person
becomes a lien creditor unless the advance is made:
(1) without knowledge of the lien; or
(2) pursuant to a commitment entered into without
knowledge of the lien.1 °0
New section 9-323(b) no longer requires SP to have a perfected
security interest before Tuesday in order to be senior for the
Thursday advance. But there is something peculiar about new
section 9-323(b). If we read it literally, it governs only advances
made more than forty-five days after the judicial lien.10 1 It
provides no rule at all for advances made the day after JC
became a lien creditor. 10 2  Nevertheless, through very subtle
reasoning, it is possible to see that Wednesday's advance is
senior to Tuesday's execution lien. In order to be senior, JC had
9 See supra text accompanying notes 63-83.
100 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-323(b) (McKinney 2008).
101 Id.
102 See id.
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to deliver the execution to the sheriff prior to the security
agreement and prior to the filing of a financing statement (events
that occurred on Monday). Since JC is junior in general, JC
continues to be junior as to any advance made within forty-five
days of Tuesday. If an advance is made by SP more than forty-
five days after Tuesday and if SP knows of the judicial lien,
section 9-323(b) subordinates SP. In other words, the 2000
amendments to article 9 institute the unitary view of security
interests for forty-five days after the judicial lien. 10 3 After forty-
five days, article 9 changes the theory and reverts to the multiple
theory. 104 Article 9 now resembles the New York law of
mortgages, which subordinates discretionary advances if made
with knowledge of an intervening interest.0 5 Article 9, however,
exalts bad faith discretionary advances made with knowledge of
a third party, if made within forty-five days of judicial lien
creation. 106
One fly in the ointment of new article 9 is presented by the
following scenario:
Seventh Scenario
Monday: JD signs a security agreement, which authorizes but
does not require SP to make discretionary future advances. SP
files a financing statement. No value has been given.
Tuesday: JC serves an execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: The sheriff levies goods on behalf of JC.
Fifty days later: SP advances new funds with full knowledge of
the levy.
Under section 9-323(b), SP should be junior since SP advanced
funds more than forty-five days after JC became a lien creditor.
Yet SP can claim to be the winner under section 9-317(a)(2)(B),
since SP filed a financing statement before JC became a lien
creditor. Hence, there is a conflict within the UCC about SP's
priority. An official comment insists that section 9-323(b)
103 Id.; see Carlson, supra note 95, at 150-51.
104 See U.C.C. § 9-323(b).
105 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2008) (subsequent advances made
with knowledge of prior interests is subordinated to that interest); 78 N.Y. JUR.2D
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 237 (2003).
106 For a description of the New York law of advances under a mortgage, see
Carlson, Money Judgment Part I, supra note 11; 78 N.Y. JUR. 2D Mortgages and
Deeds of Trust § 237 (2003).
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overrides section 9-317(a)(2), 10 7 but, of course, the statute
nowhere makes this explicit. Nevertheless, it is often said that
the particular statute overrules a conflicting general statute, 10 8
and courts have learned to apply the official comments of the
UCC as if they were really part of the statute.10 9 On this basis,
courts will surely subordinate SP's advance in the Seventh
Scenario.
c. Involuntary Transfers
Significantly, CPLR 5202(a)(1) does not use the word
"purchaser," which connotes a voluntary buyer of personal
property. 10 Rather, the broader term of "transferee" is used.
This is an unfortunate change from prior law. Former section
683 of the Civil Procedure Act protected pre-levy good faith
purchasers, not transferees.
The expansion of post-lien protection from purchaser to
transferee implies that a federal tax lien arising after delivery
and before the levy primes the execution lien. This too gives rise
to the same paradoxical priority between the execution lien and
the tax lien that we witnessed with regard to article 9 security
interests. According to the Internal Revenue Code, a tax lien
arises "upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal""' of the taxpayer "at the time the [tax] assessment is
made." 2 Yet the lien is unperfected as to any "judgment lien
creditor" until the IRS perfects (by filing notice of the tax lien in
107 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-317, cmt. 4 (McKinney 2008).
108 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S.
255, 260 (1890) ("[W]here there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment, and
also a general one, which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.").
"o Sean Michael Hannaway, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the
Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 962 (1990);
Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597, 604 (1966).
110 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(43) (West 2008) ("The term 'purchaser' means transferee of
a voluntary transfer....'"); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 290(2) (McKinney 2008) ("The
term 'purchaser' includes every person to whom any estate or interest in real
property is conveyed for a valuable consideration, and every assignee of a mortgage,
lease or other conditional estate."); U.C.C. § 1-201(32) ("'Purchase' includes taking
by sale ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.").
1 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000).
112 Id. § 6322.
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the local state UCC filing office). 113 A judgment lien creditor is "a
person who has obtained a valid judgment... for the recovery
of... a certain sum of money... [and] a person who has
perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved."'
So we get the following anomaly.
Eighth Scenario
Monday: JC serves an execution on the sheriff.
Tuesday: The IRS assesses a tax against JD, thereby creating a
lien on JD's property.
Wednesday: The IRS files notice of its tax lien.
Here the CPLR awards priority to the tax lien. Yet the Internal
Revenue Code says that "[tihe lien imposed by section 6321 shall
not be valid as against any... judgment lien creditor" until the
IRS perfects.115 Since federal law overrides CPLR 5202(a)(1), JC
is senior. But suppose we reverse the chronology.
Ninth Scenario
Monday: The IRS assesses a tax against JD.
Tuesday: JC serves a writ of execution on the sheriff.
Wednesday: The IRS files notice of its tax lien.
Here the Internal Revenue Code points to JC's priority,
whereas the IRS cannot claim to be a transferee of JD in the gap
between delivery of the execution and levy."6 Ergo, JC prevails.
A strange line of cases holds that, where JC's lien is
"inchoate," the IRS always takes priority over it.117 "A choate lien
is one in which the identity of the lienor, the property subject to
the lien and the amount of the lien are established."'1 8 Execution
liens in New York, at least prior to levy, have been deemed
choate even though the execution lien covers all of JD's personal
property.11 9 Perhaps JD's power to sell free of JC's lien points to
... Id. § 6323(a), (f).
114 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g) (2008).
115 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
16 This conclusion presupposes that we are ignoring the dictum in Ruppert v.
Community National Bank, 22 A.D.2d 165, 167, 254 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1st Dep't
1964), affd, 16 N.Y.2d 589, 209 N.E.2d 100, 261 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1965). See supra text
accompanying notes 88-93.
17 United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 87 (1963); Don King
Prods., Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529, 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1991).
11 Don King Prods., 945 F.2d at 533 (emphasis added).
11 See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Paradise Guard Dogs, Inc., 565 F. Supp 388,
390 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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inchoateness. 12°  Nevertheless, in American Express Travel
Related, Services Co. v. Kalish & Rice, Inc., '21 a district court
judge ruled that execution liens are choate as soon as the court
officer (here a federal marshal) receives an execution. 122  The
court noted that the marshal had already levied AD when AD
commenced an interpleader action.1 23  So it is possible to read
this case as saying that a levied execution lien is choate. In
Lerner v. United States,24 the court held that the execution lien
was choate by virtue of delivery of the execution in 198 1.125 This
delivery was still good enough to beat an IRS lien in 1985, even
though there had never been a levy.126 One problem with Lerner
is that execution liens supposedly die when returned at the end
of sixty days. 127  The court fails to explain how the execution
could have survived for four years sans levee.
Not only does the word "transferee" include tax lien
creditors, it also encompasses judicial lien creditors.128 Suppose
JC 1 serves an execution on the sheriff and JC 2 serves an
execution on the same sheriff. If we read the CPLR literally, JC 2
takes free of JC,. Yet we learn in CPLR 5234(b) that JC 1 retains
priority. Ergo, implicitly CPLR 5202(a)(1) defines "transferee" to
mean any transfer, voluntary or involuntary, except a judicial
lien creditor.1 29 Otherwise, CPLR 5234(b)'s priority rule is read
out of existence.
New York's scheme for collecting state taxes half-
incorporates executions under the CPLR. New York's lien for
120 See generally United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 287-90 (5th Cir. 1957)
(equitable lien inchoate in part because subsequent purchasers could later take
priority over it).
121 693 F. Supp. 1436, 1438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
122 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64, the federal marshal is subject to
the CPLR in any matter pertaining to a writ of execution. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
12 See American Express, 693 F. Supp. at 1438.
124 637 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
121 See id. at 680-81. In Corrigan v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 427 F.
Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), we are not told the sequence between delivery of the
execution and assessment of the tax. It appears as if the New York state tax warrant
(which equates with an execution) was served before the IRS filed notice of its tax
lien. So the case at least stands for the proposition that execution liens, prior to levy,
are choate.
126 Lerner, 637 F. Supp at 680-81.
127 See infra text accompanying notes 239-247.
128 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1) (McKinney 2008).
129 See id.
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income tax is equated with an execution lien. 3 ° Ergo, it cannot
fall under the exception of CPLR 5202(a)(1), because of the
aforementioned conflict with CPLR 5234(b). New York's lien for
sales tax does not equate with an execution.131 Ergo, the sales tax
lien is entitled to the exception of CPLR 5202(a)(1).
Upon assessing any state tax, the State Tax Commission
sends a warrant to the "sheriff of any county of the state, or to
any officer or employee of the department, commanding him to
levy upon and sell such person's real and personal property." 32
The sheriff must file the warrant with the clerk of the supreme
court for the county wherein the taxpayer resides. 33 Once
docketed, the warrant becomes the equivalent of a judgment. 134
The warrant itself is the equivalent of an execution. 135  The
sheriff is authorized to levy, and the State Tax Commission has
an execution lien (at least once the warrant is a judgment). 136
The warrant, however, is not limited to a sixty-day life, as
executions are. 137 Rather, the sheriff may levy at any time. 31
Yet there is a difference between the lien under section
692(d) for income tax and the lien under section 1141(b) for sales
tax. The income tax statute simply states that the tax
commission has whatever rights a judgment would give as to
personal property." 9  In addition, the warrant itself is the
execution. 140 Accordingly, when it comes to income tax liens, the
tax warrant is the same as an execution. Not so with regard to
the sales tax lien under section 1141(b), which creates a lien
quite independently of the CPLR's governance of executions.1
4
'
130 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 692(d) (McKinney 2008).
131 See id. § 1141(b).
132 Id. § 692(c).
133 Id. § 692(d).
134 See id. §§ 692(d)-(e) (state income tax); see also id. § 1141(b) (state sales tax).
'5 See id. § 692(f).
136 See Corrigan v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see
also United States v. J.H.W & Gitlitz Deli & Bar, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 1010, 1016
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (lien dates from docketing the warrant).
137 See infra text accompanying notes 239-247.
138 See United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Marine
Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, 47 N.Y.2d 758, 761, 391 N.E.2d 294, 294, 417
N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (1979).
139 N.Y. TAX LAW § 692(d).
140 See id. § 1141(b).
141 Id.
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In Craner v. Marine Midland Bank (In re Craner),142 the state
filed its warrant for sales tax moments before the bankruptcy."'
Under section 1141(b) it was per se senior to a subsequent
hypothetical lien creditor.1 " If the lien had been for income tax
under section 692(d), the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien
status would have trumped the tax commission.1 45
The Second Circuit has Erie-guessed that New York City tax
liens arise when warrants are docketed; delivery of the warrant
is not necessary to encumber the taxpayer's property.1 46
Accordingly, the city is not vulnerable to the exception in CPLR
5202(a)(1) or (2). 141 The Commissioner of Labor also can issue
warrants for unpaid unemployment insurance obligations. 48 But
section 573(2) of the New York Labor Law states that docketing
the warrant creates a lien on real property only.1 49 As to personal
property, one court has ruled that the Commissioner of Labor has
no lien until the sheriff levies. 50
Unless there is a genius in this legislation that I have
missed, these results raise the suspicion of unintended caprice
and incomplete theorization of state tax liens.
d. Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors
Prior to the permanent institution of federal bankruptcy in
1898, debtors could commence a collective creditors' proceeding
by making an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Although
initially contractual in nature, a history of private abuse led the
New York legislature to govern the device by statute.1 ' Federal
142 110 B.R. 111 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 110 B.R. 124
(N.D.N.Y 1989).
1 See id. at 120.
144 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1141(b). It was also not a voidable preference because it
was a statutory lien. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(6) (West 2008).
14' This is because mere delivery of an execution does not make a JC senior to
every conceivable subsequent JC. Because this is so, the trustee's strong-arm power
prevails. See infra text accompanying notes 836-837.
146 United States v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp.), 457 F.2d 409,
411-12 (2d Cir. 1972).
147 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1)-(2) (McKinney 2008).
" Comm'r of Labor v. Chudzik, 123 Misc. 2d 959, 961, 474 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922
(Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1984).
149 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 573(2) (McKinney 2008).
150 In re Reiber's Inn of Westchester, Inc., 1 B.R. 304, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1979), affd, 3 B.R. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
151 See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 3-24 (McKinney 2008).
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bankruptcy law has largely eclipsed the assignment for the
benefit of creditors, but the procedure still exists and is even
occasionally used."5 2
According to the Court of Appeals in International Ribbon
Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc. ,13 an assignment for the benefit
of creditors is not a transfer for a fair consideration.' This
overlooks the fact that the assignment is for the benefit of
creditors.'55 Consideration for the transfer is the assignee's
obligation to transfer proceeds of the debtor's property to the
creditors.'56 This should have been enough for the assignee to
take free of the execution lien under CPLR 5202(a)(1). Venerable
case law says otherwise, however. 5 7  Prior to the CPLR, the
difficulty was that old Civil Practice Act section 683 protected
"purchasers," which was construed to mean purchaser for a fresh
consideration. 5  The CPLR, however, protects transferees for a
fair consideration. These words are intended to incorporate by
reference the definition of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act.' 59 This implies that antecedent debt is fair consideration.
So assignees for the benefit of creditors should be viewed as
152 See Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 347, 358 (1993).
153 36 N.Y.2d 121, 325 N.E.2d 137, 365 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1975).
154 See id. at 125-26, 325 N.E.2d at 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
155 See Century Factors v. Everything New, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 89, 90, 468
N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (the assignee is a trustee for
creditors).
156 See id.
157 See In re Betty Barton Frozen Food Corp., 35 Misc. 2d 1057, 1059, 231
N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962) ("[A]n assignee takes the property of
the assignor subject to all equities and liens affecting his assignor prior to the
assignment."), modified, 20 A.D.2d 708, 247 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1964). At one
moment in International Ribbon Mills, Judge Breitel seemed to indicate that the
assignee had merely waived the claim of fair consideration by not raising it: "The
assignee, however, neither alleged nor contended, as indeed would be most unlikely,
that the assignment was in satisfaction of any of the assignor's debts." 36 N.Y.2d at
124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810. So perhaps the status of the assignee is
still open. In Alcor, Inc. v. Balanoff, 45 A.D.2d 795, 357 N.Y.S.2d 160 (3d Dep't
1974), the court seemed prepared to find that an assignee for the benefit of creditors
is superior to an execution lien if the sheriff has not levied. It found, however, that a
levy of property not capable of delivery had occurred before the assignment for the
benefit of creditors had been effectuated.
'" Distler & Shubin, supra note 8, at 477 n.94.
159 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 272 (McKinney 2008); 5 N.Y. Adv. Comm.
Rep. A-187 (Advance Draft 1961).
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transferees for a fair consideration, since they take title on behalf
of creditors with antecedent debts.
The court in International Ribbon Mills admitted that
satisfaction of antecedent debt is fair consideration, but it
doubted whether securing antecedent debt is. 160  The
International Ribbon Mills court cited to the definition of "fair
consideration" in section 272(a) of the New York Debtor and
Creditor Law, which requires satisfaction of debt. 161 Inexplicably,
the court overlooked section 272(b), which does indeed refer to
the securing of antecedent debt. 162  So both payment of and
transfers on antecedent debt should count as fair consideration.
Complicating this view is that article 9 of the UCC defines a
lien creditor as, among other things, "an assignee for the benefit
of creditors."163 This implies that general assignees take free of
unperfected security interests.164 If they take free of these, why
shouldn't they also take free of unlevied execution liens? Yet, if
assignees really are lien creditors, it is still true that they have
no priority under CPLR 5234. The conflict between CPLR 5234
and 5202(a)(1) led us to suggest that the class of post-delivery
transferees implicitly excludes the subsequent JCs. Assignees
for the benefit of creditors do not appear in CPLR 5234.161 So
they should be fully eligible for 5202(a)(1) protection, even if the
UCC generally names them to be judicial lien creditors (at least
in cases where SP priority is at stake).
160 Int'l Ribbon, 36 N.Y.2d at 124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
161 According to this provision:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair
equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an
antecedent debt is satisfied ....
N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 272(a).
162 According to this provision:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation...
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure
a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately
small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained.
Id. § 272(b).
6 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(B) (2007).
16 See id. § 9-317(b).
16 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234 (McKinney 2008).
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2. Post-Levy Transfers
Not only is JC's execution lien vulnerable to pre-levy
transfers but it is also vulnerable to some post-levy transfers.
According to the second exception to CPLR 5202(a), JC's
execution lien is no good against "a transferee who acquired a
debt or personal property not capable of delivery for fair
consideration after it was levied upon without knowledge of the
levy."'66 This exception introduces us to a new term: property
"capable of delivery."167 The phrase, undefined in the CPLR,
captures the idea of tangible property-property that can be
picked up and carried off.168 Thus, where JD has property
capable of delivery, the sheriff must levy on it "by taking the
property into custody. '169  In contrast, property not capable of
delivery is intangible in nature. There is nothing physical for the
sheriff to hold onto, no handle by which the object can be reduced
to manucaption. In such cases, the sheriff levies "by serving a
copy of the execution upon the garnishee. ''170
166 Id. 5202(a)(2).
167 Id.
168 Prior to the CPLR, the phrase was used by courts to negate intangibility. See
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Co., 33 F.2d 104, 105 (2d Cir. 1929). The
phrase appeared in New York Civil Practice Act sections 796 and 978, which
governed turnover orders. See Intra-Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A. v. John S. Emery &
Co., 11 F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Meth v. Greenspan, 169 Misc. 378, 380, 7
N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938). It also appeared in New York Civil
Practice Act section 793, involving the right of a receiver to receive property from
third parties. Rockwood & Co. v. Trop, 211 A.D. 421, 423, 207 N.Y.S. 507, 509 (2d
Dep't 1925). Oddly, article 8 of the UCC defines delivery of investment securities in
a way to encompass the transfer of uncertificated securities. U.C.C. § 8-301(b).
169 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b). The sheriff must also serve a copy of the execution
upon the dispossessed party. Id. Furthermore, where the execution does not state
that JD has received a restraining order, together with its constitutionally required
warning that certain property may be exempt from legal process, the sheriff must
mail to JD the warning described in CPLR 5222(e). Id. 5232(c); see Cais v. Pichler,
123 Misc. 2d 275, 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)
(sheriffs mailing to Connecticut DMV adequate mailing to debtor). Failure of the
sheriff to mail the notice within the four-day period following the levy renders the
levy ineffective, even if JD knew of the levy. Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 40
A.D.3d 758, 759, 835 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (2d Dep't 2007); FDIC v. Wirth, No. M18-
302, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13706, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1991).
170 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a); see also id. 105(i) ("A 'garnishee' is a person who owes
a debt to a judgment debtor, or a person other than the judgment debtor who has
property in his possession or custody in which a judgment debtor has an interest.").
Prior to 1952, the execution lien could not reach intangible property. See In re
Chelsea Pure Food Corp., 18 F.2d 112, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Distler & Schubin, supra
note 8, at 470.
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Where property is capable of delivery, the sheriff levies it by
taking custody. 171 In such cases, JD has no power to convey free
and clear of JC. The premise is that JD's lack of possession is a
warning to the world that JD's title to the goods is defective. On
this very principle, creditor possession under UCC article 9 is
notice to the world that the secured party has a security interest
in the item that the debtor does not possess.172
The sheriff who has levied property not capable of delivery
has accomplished this by delivering the execution to AD.1 73
Under CPLR 5202(a)(2), JD has power to convey such property to
bona fide transferees without knowledge. 74 The levy of such
property is not exactly invisible. Buyers could consult with AD
before buying a claim against her. But entities in the business of
buying general intangibles apparently will not be put to this
trouble.175 The avoidance of some slight convenience to buyers
outweighs the property rights of a JC who has prompted the
sheriff to a diligent levy. Accordingly, JD has a post-levy power
to sell free and clear, if the transferee paid a "fair consideration
after it was levied upon without knowledge of the levy."1 76
Ironically, new article 9 reverses the result for the buyer of
any payment intangible. 7   This result follows because the
revision to section 9-317(a) of the UCC accidentally deprives any
secured party of the CPLR protections.17 1
To make this point a little more slowly, article 9 covers
security interests in general intangible property,1 79 and it
traditionally covered those who bought absolute interests in
accounts or chattel paper.'80 Buyers of general intangibles were
171 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b).
172 U.C.C. § 9-313(a); see generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About
Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (1996) (discussing the concept of
physical possession of property).
173 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
174 See id. 5202(a)(2).
175 For example, without a financing statement on file, a security interest in a
payment intangible is unperfected under the UCC even if a secured party has
notified AD. The secured party can perfect only by filing a financing statement.
U.C.C. § 9-310(a). This is easier for competing secured parties to find.
176 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(2).
177 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) ("'Payment intangible' means a general intangible
under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.").
178 See supra text accompanying notes 79-93.
- U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1).
1SO See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (2000) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (2007)).
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not under the UCC and, prior to 2000, such buyers were eligible
to take free of execution liens under CPLR 5202(a)(2). New
article 9, however, has expanded its scope to cover sales of
payment intangibles or promissory notes.8' Accordingly, these
buyers are denied protection under CPLR 5202(a)(2). Only
buyers of general intangibles that are not payment intangibles
can take free of a post-levy execution lien. These, for the
moment, are not yet article 9 transactions.
The post-levy attachment lien has greater weakness than the
post-levy execution. According to CPLR 6214(a), all levies are
paper levies. 8 2 Under CPLR 6203(2), once the sheriff levies, the
debtor may transfer better title to a transferee for fair
consideration "without knowledge of the levy."8 3 In general,
article 62 mercifully avoids the article 52 distinction between
property capable or not capable of delivery. A paper levy under
CPLR 6214(a) is supposed to culminate in payment or delivery of
personal property to the sheriff.8 4  Accordingly, the debtor's
power to give better title to a bona fide transferee for value ends
when property is "in the possession of the sheriff."18 5
Although the attachment lien is even feebler than the
execution lien, the new UCC deprives any buyer of or lender on a
payment intangible of CPLR protections. 8  Virtually any other
buyer need hardly fear the attachment lien, but, thanks to new
article 9, any voluntary transferee of a payment intangible is
absolutely subordinate to an attachment lien, once a plaintiff has
served the order of attachment on the sheriff.
18 7
l8l Id. § 9-102(a)(47), (61), (65) (2003).
182 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2008).
183 Id. 6203(2).
14 According to CPLR 6214(c), "[w]here property or debts have been levied upon
by service of an order of attachment, the sheriff shall take into his actual custody all
such property capable of delivery and shall collect and receive all such debts."
Taking custody, however, is not the levy. Nevertheless, the levy dies after ninety
days, except as to property or debts delivered or paid during the ninety-day period
(allowing for court extensions). N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(e). A plaintiff may also insist that
the sheriff seize property right off the bat. Id. 6215. But the plaintiff must furnish a
satisfactory indemnity. Id. Also, an order of attachment "granted without notice may
provide that the sheriff refrain from taking any property levied upon into his actual
custody, pending further order of the court." Id. 6211(b).
185 Id. 6203(2).
186 For the definition of a payment intangible, see U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61).
187 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a).
187 See id.
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3. Defeasibility and the Bankruptcy Estate
We have seen that New York makes defeasible most of its
judicial liens on personal property. Prior to levy, both the
execution and attachment liens can be defeated by transfers to
bad faith transferees, if they have given fair consideration.1 8
After the levy, transfers can defeat the execution lien if the
property is not capable of delivery and the transferee is in good
faith and for a fair consideration."8 9 The attachment lien after
levy is also likewise vulnerable until the garnishee pays or gives
up property to the sheriff. Finally, although we have not yet
examined equity liens,190 equity liens are likewise defeasible. For
example, if JC acquires a turnover order, JC has a lien on
personal property under CPLR 5202(b), but JD retains power to
convey better title to "a transferee who acquired the debt or
property for fair consideration and without notice of such
order."1 91
Do these disabilities adversely affect the bankruptcy estate?
After all, the bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical judicial lien
creditor as of the time of the bankruptcy petition.192 Suppose a
bankrupt debtor conveys property to a bona fide transferee after
the bankruptcy petition. Does CPLR 5202(a)(1) or 5202(b) imply
that the transferee takes free of the bankruptcy trustee?
Let me rehearse some bankruptcy basics in light of a very
simple hypothetical fact situation:
Tenth Scenario
Monday: D, who owns a Renoir painting, files for bankruptcy.
Tuesday: Without court or trustee approval, D conveys the
Renoir painting to X, a good faith purchaser for value with no
knowledge of the bankruptcy.
May the trustee retrieve the painting from X? If the trustee is
deemed to be a judicial lien creditor on Monday, and if New York
law applies, the answer would be no. Under CPLR 5202(a)(1) or
5202(b), X takes free and clear of the judicial lien. 193 Is this also
the bankruptcy result? If so, CPLR 5202(a)(1) and 5202(b) wreak
188 See id. 5202(a)(1), 6203(1).
"8 See id. 5202(a)(2).
190 See infra Part II.
191 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
192 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
193 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1), (b).
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havoc in any bankruptcy where personal property is located in
New York.
The argument against this result is that the trustee is not
just a judicial lien creditor subject to the disabilities of the CPLR.
The trustee is better than that because she is also a successor to
whatever rights D had. Accordingly, the Renoir is the property of
the bankruptcy estate on Monday under section 541(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code. X is an "entity ... in possession ... of
property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section
363 [of the Bankruptcy Code], "  within the meaning of
section 542(a); accordingly, X must turn over the Renoir to the
trustee. 95
There is, however, another way of looking at the matter.
According to this view, the trustee must bring an avoidance
action against X, because D has made a post-petition transfer of
estate property. 196 According to section 549(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code:
the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2)...
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the
court. 
1 97
Actions under section 549(a), if required, are subject to the
defense of section 546(b)(1)(A), which provides:
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and
549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that-
(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires rights in such
property before the date of perfection ... 198
X could conceivably save the Renoir by invoking this defense.
If a judicial lien creditor had a pre-levy execution lien on the
Renoir, then CPLR 5202(a)(1) is a generally applicable law that
permits post-lien transfers to be effective against a judicial lien
creditor who "acquire[d] rights"' 99 in the Renoir before X
perfected an interest in the Renoir. If so, then not only is the
19 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
195 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 566.
196 See Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 72 (9th Cir. 1994).
197 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
198 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
'9 Id. § 546(b)(1)(A).
[Vol. 83:43
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 77
section 549(a) action defeated, but X is also immune from
bankruptcy's automatic stay.200
Courts have attempted to restrict the use of section 546(b)(1)
on premises not actually invoked in the statute. One court
insisted that section 546(b)(1) applies only if X has an
unperfected lien prepetition which is perfected postpetition.2 1
Another court required a state statute to have an overt "relation
back" device on the face of the statute."2 Still another court
required a pre-petition unsecured claim before a section 546(b)(1)
defense could be asserted.20 3  These non-statutory criteria, if
applied against the tradition of enforcing the statute as written,
would be impediments to X's defense. Yet does not the United
States Supreme Court constantly admonish the lower courts not
to add criteria to the statutes that Congress did not see fit to
add?204
The best way to view the Tenth Scenario is to recognize that
the trustee does not need section 549(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
to recover the painting from X.2°5 Rather, D simply has no power
to convey free and clear of the bankruptcy estate.206 Although D
purported to convey the Renoir to X, D is in effect a thief with
200 Id. § 362(b)(3).
201 See Lincoln Sav. Bank, FSB v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows
Racing Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540, 1546-47 (2d Cir. 1989).
202 See Makoroffv. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890, 892-95 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1990).
201 See In re AR Accessories Group, Inc., 345 F.3d 454, 458-59 (7th Cir. 2003).
204 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 127 S. Ct. 1199,
1205 (2007) ("In rejecting Travelers' claim for contractual attorney's fees, the Court
of Appeals did not conclude that the claim was 'unenforceable' under § 502(b)(1) as a
matter of applicable nonbankruptcy law. Nor did it conclude that Travelers' claim
was rendered unenforceable by any provision of the Bankruptcy Code.... The court
nevertheless rejected Travelers' claim based solely on a rule of that court's own
creation .... ).
205 Ironically, if X, without knowledge of the bankruptcy, gives the painting to a
museum, then section 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Code validates the museum's
property interest, requiring the trustee to bring the section 549(a) action, which can
be brought notwithstanding section 542(c). According to section 542(c), if X
"has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the commencement of
the case concerning the debtor," X may "transfer property of the estate ... in
good faith ... to an entity other than the trustee, with the same effect
as to the entity making such transfer ... as if the case under this
title ... had not been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (2000). Nevertheless, the
museum plausibly has a section 546(b)(1) defense against section 549(a) avoidance.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(b)(1) (West 2006).
206 When this is true, a trustee has no need of avoidance under § 549(a) to
retrieve property possessed by third parties under color of title. See Carlson, supra
note 95, at 118-21.
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void title. Rather than relying on avoidance under section 549(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can simply seek a turnover
order against X, who is in possession of property of the
bankruptcy estate. °7 If this follows, CPLR 5202(a)(1) and like
provisions do no damage to the administration of bankruptcy
estates.
What does this say about the trustee's status as a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor under state law? The above
analysis assumes that it adds to, but does not detract from, the
trustee's power. Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code refers to
the "rights and powers" of a judicial lien creditor, not to duties
and liabilities.°8 On the one hand, the trustee is simply the
successor to D and therefore owns legal title to the Renoir for the
benefit of creditors. On the other hand, the trustee has the
additional powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor. For
instance, if D had granted SP an unperfected security interest
prior to bankruptcy, the trustee as a mere successor takes subject
to SP. But as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, the trustee is
senior to SP.20 9
Such a theory has bad side effects, however. Suppose D
owns a house and goes bankrupt. If the bankruptcy trustee now
owns the house outright, then D is a trespasser and owes rent to
the trustee. If, however, the trustee merely owns the house as a
lien creditor, then D is not a trespasser until the trustee actually
sells the house.21 ° A theory that makes bankruptcy trustees the
fee simple owners of D's prepetition property cannot explain why
D owes no rent for occupying the house after the bankruptcy.211
Nevertheless, this bad side effect (all debtors have to pay rent to
207 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
208 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (emphasis added).
209 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2007).
210 The trustee needs court approval to sell out of the ordinary course of
business. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
211 One court holds that D does not owe rent because D and the bankruptcy
trustee are cotenants (where D has a homestead exemption). In re Szekely, 936 F.2d
897, 903 (7th Cir. 1991). This rationale palpably does not work. If the trustee is a
cotenant, then he has a right of possession equal to that of D. But this is surely not
the case. The trustee would surely be viewed a trespasser if the trustee were to
break into the house late at night (without court approval). See generally Vladimir
Elgort, Note, Do Debtors Owe Rent to Their Bankruptcy Trustee for Remaining in the
Home After Filing and Prior to Foreclosure, Notwithstanding a Homestead
Exemption?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2253, 2271-73 (2002).
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bankruptcy trustees) is the logical price of preventing the CPLR
from devastating bankruptcy law in cases filed in New York.
4. Territorial and Temporal Limitations
Subject to the above-described exceptions, JC has a lien
when she delivers an execution to the sheriff. But perhaps this
principle has some inherent limitations not expressed in the
statute.
The first is arguably territorial. Suppose JD's personal
property is located in Erie County but JC serves an execution on
the sheriff of Suffolk County. Does JC have a lien on JD's
property in Erie County?
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, the law was clear on
this point. According to section 679(1) of the former New York
Civil Practice Act, "goods and chattels of a judgment
debtor ... are bound by the execution, when situated within the
jurisdiction of the officer to whom an execution against property
is delivery, from the time of the delivery thereof to the proper
officer to be executed, but not before."212 The CPLR, however,
makes few references to the jurisdiction of the sheriff. For
example, express territorial limits are imposed with regard to
income executions, but this is designed to prevent national
employers from being garnished for wages earned entirely
outside New York.213 Also, the CPLR sets forth a priority rule
covering the circumstance in which officers for two different
courts have both received executions. The priority rule holds
that the first officer to levy has priority. This rule applies,
however, only if the property is "levied upon within the
jurisdiction of all of the officers."214 Article 62 requires that an
order of attachment be "directed to the sheriff of any county or of
the city of New York where any property in which the defendant
has an interest is located or where a garnishee may be served.
The order shall direct the sheriff to levy within his
jurisdiction .. .."'1 This restriction, however, does not apply to
executions.
212 N.Y. C.P.L.R 679 (1921).
213 See infra notes 755-756 and accompanying text.
214 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
211 Id. 6211(a).
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Do these references thus imply that no limitations exist with
regard to ordinary executions in all other circumstances? The
answer is unknown.216
There is also a limit with regard to after-acquired property.
An execution lien cannot attach to property unless the debtor has
rights in the property.217 So if a JC serves an execution on the
sheriff on Monday and the debtor buys a thing on Wednesday,
the lien arises on Wednesday, not on Monday.218
As always, contingency baffles the courts. In Corwin
Consultants, Inc. v. Interpublic Group of Companies,219 the IRS
arguably filed notice of a tax lien22° with regard to a non-compete
contract JD had with a corporation requiring that JD "earn" the
payment by not competing. Thereafter, JC served an execution
on the sheriff.221 The court ruled that the IRS had a lien on the
executory contract only when JD earned the money by not
competing.222 It then held that the IRS was senior to JC.2 3 But
if it is true that the IRS had a lien only when JD earned an
installment by non-competition, then the IRS should have been
tied, and hence, pro rata with JC.224 In fact (assuming the IRS
properly filed), the IRS had priority because it is possible to
encumber an executory contract even before payments are
earned by JD's performance.225 This is a principle we shall
revisit when we analyze whether wage garnishments can be
voidable preferences in federal bankruptcy proceedings.226
216 The leading treatise assumes that these territorial restrictions exist. See
WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 5202.02, 5202.06.
217 See United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
218 See id. at 907-08 (finding that lien attached to property only when debtor
purchased valuable coins).
219 375 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 605 (2d
Cir. 1975).
220 The case was reversed on the question of whether the IRS filed its notice in
the proper location. See Corwin Consultants, 512 F.2d at 609.
221 Corwin Consultants, 375 F. Supp. at 189.
222 See id. at 193.
223 See id. It is not clear from the case whether JC perpetuated the execution
lien with a levy or by extending the sixty-day life of the lien. A different judgment
creditor who had levied was held to have no priority, so presumably JC did
something to keep the execution lien alive for several years.
224 See United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
225 See In re Owen, No. 90-CV-659, 1990 WL 198386, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
1990) (holding that a pre-petition levy of an executory contract established a lien
valid against a bankruptcy estate).
226 See infra text accompanying notes 876-887.
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B. Duration
CPLR 5230 governs the formal aspects of the execution. The
document itself must 2 7 rehearse the following information:
(1) The date the judgment was entered, if entered in the
supreme, county or family court.228 If entered in some other
state court or in federal court, the date on which a transcript of
the judgment was filed with the county clerk.229
(2) The court in which it was entered.23 °
(3) The amount of the judgment.2 31
(4) The names of the JCs and JDs.
(5) A direction that only property or debts in which JD (not
deceased) has an interest.
(6) The last known address of JD.
(7) Whether the property execution upon was subject to an
earlier order of attachment in favor of JC.
232
The first item suggests that, where a judgment has been
entered in New York Supreme Court, enforcement can begin
even before the clerk dockets the judgment.233
2217 Failure to comply justifies the sheriff in refusing to levy under the execution.
See Freedom Disc. Corp. v. McMahon, 38 A.D.2d 947, 948, 331 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (2d
Dep't 1972) (income execution).
228 There is a hint in Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 40 A.D.3d 758, 760, 835
N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (2d Dep't 2007), that an error in the date of judgment renders the
execution and any levy thereunder void.
229 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a) (McKinney 2008). Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits executions to be delivered to a federal marshal, but the rule also
requires that New York state law govern the execution. See Money Judgment Part I,
supra note 11, at 1299. That the execution must list the date that the federal
judgment was filed with the county clerk suggests that no execution delivered to a
federal marshal is valid until this transcript has been filed. No case has ever
established this point; however, it is routinely held that the federal marshal cannot
levy on real estate, as the federal judgment must first be registered in state court.
See id.
230 Where JC has a federal judgment docketed with the Supreme Court of New
York, the execution to the state sheriff properly issues from the supreme court, not
the federal court. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile, Ltd., 596 F.
Supp. 657, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated sub nom. D'Ambra v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 766 F.2d 95, 95 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the execution nevertheless).
21 The amount of interest need not be listed. This, the sheriff must calculate. 11
WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 1 5230.11.
232 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a).
233 Entry means that the clerk enters the judgment in a chronological judgment
book. Money Judgment Part I, supra note 11, at 1296. Docketing means listing the
judgment in an alphabetical index. Id. at 1297. Docketing cannot occur until the
winning side files the judgment roll. Id. Where an execution is served before proper
entry, the execution becomes effective only when entry of the judgment is achieved.
Hathaway v. Howell, 54 N.Y. 97, 103 (1873).
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An execution can be issued by an officer of the court,
including a clerk "or the attorney for the judgment creditor as
officer of the court. 23 4  Thus, as is true with restraining
notices,235 victorious plaintiff lawyers need no court involvement
to ignite the clunky engine of judicial collection.
According to CPLR 5230(c), an execution must be returned to
the clerk of the court whence it issued sixty days after delivery
unless a levy of property not capable of delivery has occurred.236
(Oddly the levy of property capable of delivery is not mentioned.)
The time may be extended "in writing"237 by the judgment
creditor's attorney (acting as officer of the court). It may be
extended multiple times "unless another execution against the
same judgment debtor.., has been delivered to the same
enforcement officer and has not been returned. '238
Although the statute nowhere says so, courts assume that
return of the execution (where no levy has occurred) terminates
the execution lien on the debtor's personal property. 2 9 Early
234 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(b). A sheriff may issue an income execution, if designed to
enforce an order for support in a matrimonial action. Id. 5241(b)(1). See infra text
accompanying notes 750-752.
235 Id. 5222(a).
236 Id. 5230(c). The sixty-day period was introduced in 1840. See Ansonia Brass
& Copper Co. v. Conner, 103 N.Y. 502, 510-11, 9 N.E. 238, 239 (1886).
237 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(c). Presumably this means a writing delivered to the
sheriff.
238 Id. In United States v. Abcon Assocs., No. CV 05-3178 (LDW), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92038, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006), execution creditors were held entitled
to a priority in an interpleader action. Id. The opinion does not state when the
interpleader action was filed or whether the lives of the executions were extended or
not. Presumably, if the execution lapsed before the start of the interpleader action,
the creditors would have no claim to the interpleaded fund. See Int'l Ribbon Mills,
Ltd. v. Arijan Ribbons, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 325 N.E.2d 137, 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d
808, 810 (1975) (if execution lapses before an assignment for benefit of creditors, the
judgment creditor has no lien good against the assignee). If the executions were alive
at the time the interpleader commenced, would this be enough to establish a valid
lien in the interpleader? In American Express Travel Related, Services Co. v. Kalish
& Rice, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court specifically ruled that the
commencement of the interpleader extended the life of a levy. Id. at 1438. I can
think of no reason why it should not also extend the life of the execution and the lien
that accompanies it.
239 N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Paradise Guard Dogs, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 388, 390
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Walker v. Henry, 85 N.Y. 130, 134-35 (1881); Garro v. Republic Sheet Metal Works,
Inc., 284 A.D. 660, 662, 134 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153-54 (4th Dep't 1954); Vance Boiler
Works v. Coop. Feed Dealers, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 654, 655-56, 260 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304-
05 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1965).
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cases suggest the sixty day period is for the benefit of the
creditor, who has the right to expect prompt enforcement,24 ° but,
of course, termination of the lien much benefits JD or perhaps
junior JCs. Another thought is that the short life of the
execution is designed to prevent JC from using the execution lien
as a security device; rather, the creditor is expected to encourage
the quick liquidation of debtor assets. Two commentators
remark:
[A] wary creditor, discovering assets to levy on, would be well
advised to withhold the information from the sheriff until any
prior outstanding executions against the same debtor have been
returned. Such strategy, however, makes a mockery of the
implication in the decisions that delivery alone constitutes the
"diligence" to be rewarded by priority.241
If the rule were otherwise, JC 1 could serve an execution with no
research as to the location of assets. JC 2 could do the research,
only to see JC 1 enriched. The death of JC's execution lien
therefore prevents JCi from free-riding on JC 2's research.
Yet counter-examples exist to suggest the execution lien
survives return of the execution. In International Ribbon Mills,
Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc.,242 JC delivered an execution to the
sheriff. Soon thereafter, JD made an assignment for the benefit
of creditors. Judge Charles Breitel complained that the record
was silent on whether the execution had been returned before or
after the assignment. 243 Rather than remand, he found another
way to award JC priority. But Judge Breitel was quite ready to
find that JC's execution created a priority so long as the return
was after the assignment.244 Perhaps the idea is that possession
by the general assignee is possession by the sheriff and hence a
levy in disguise. In effect, the assignee levies for the benefit of
240 See, e.g., Ansonia Brass, 103 N.Y. at 508, 9 N.E.2d at 238; Excelsior Needle
Co. v. Globe Cycle Works, 48 A.D. 304, 309, 62 N.Y.S. 538, 540 (4th Dep't 1900).
241 Distler & Schubin, supra note 8, at 474. Ancient doctrine also stated that, if a
creditor orders the sheriff to hold off on levying or sale, the execution lien becomes
"dormant"; that is, it can be primed by other liens. Peck v. Tiffany, 2 N.Y. 451, 456
(1849); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 219 A.D. 193, 195, 219 N.Y.S. 541, 544 (4th
Dep't 1927); Excelsior Needle, 48 A.D. at 309-10, 62 N.Y.S.at 540-41. There is no
hint that this continues to be the rule under the CPLR.
242 36 N.Y.2d 121, 325 N.E.2d 137, 365 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1975).
243 The assignee did not take free of the execution lien because the court ruled
that the assignment was not for a fair consideration, within the meaning of CPLR
5202(a)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 153-165.
244 Int'l Ribbon, 36 N.Y.2d at 124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
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JC.245 Another example is In re City of New York, 246 where the
city had condemned JD's land and owed just compensation. JC
served an execution on the sheriff which was returned
unsatisfied sixty days later. Subsequently, JD executed an
assignment for the benefit of creditors.247 The court held that JC
had priority.248 So obviously the execution lien did not die just
because the sheriff returned the execution without levying upon
the city. This case goes even further than International Ribbon
to suggest that return of the execution does not terminate the
execution lien, as the assignment in City of New York was
entirely after the return of the execution.
C. Levies
A levy can only occur during the life of an execution. 249 The
execution constitutes a court order to the sheriff to levy.25°
Without any such order, the sheriff is inert.2 5 ' The sheriff is
strictly an officer of the court-a robot who moves only upon
judicial command. Meanwhile, only the sheriff can levy.2 52
Attorneys may not.25 3  Nevertheless, some federal counter-
examples exist. Both these cases also involved turnover orders,
so in the end it is not clear whether the court was relying on a
levy or on a turnover order to generate a lien for JC.254
JC may, however, arrange to be appointed a receiver, in
which case JC would have the power to sell JD's property,255
245 A like result is appropriate for interpleader cases. See supra note 283.
246 56 Misc. 2d 602, 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 682 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).
247 Id. at 603, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
248 Id.
249 Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Conner, 103 N.Y. 502, 510-11, 9 N.E. 238,
239 (1886); Marine Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, 62 A.D.2d 429, 436, 405
N.Y.S.2d 334, 338 (4th Dep't 1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 758, 760, 391 N.E.2d 294, 294,
417 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (1979); Vail v. Lewis, 4 Johns. 450, 456 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
250 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230 (McKinney 2008).
251 Id. 5328.
252 Lopez v. City of N.Y., 152 Misc. 2d 817, 819, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1991); Yeh v. Seakan, 119 Misc. 2d 681, 683, 464 N.Y.S.2d 627,
629 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1983).
251 A counter-example exists in which an attorney's service of an execution
counted as a levy. Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 & n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
254 Id.; Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., No. M18-302 (CSH), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3772, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2004).
255 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a); see Ernest Lawrence Group, Inc. v. Gov't Careers Ctr.,
No. 99 Civ. 3807 (DC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000);
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though JC must waive receiver fees as a condition of her
appointment.256
If a levy of property has occurred during the life of the
execution, the lien continues so long as the levy does.257 While
the levy continues, the sheriff has no duty to return the
execution.258 Or if the execution is returned nevertheless, the
levy sustains JC's lien. 259 Although CPLR 5230(c) suspends the
sheriffs duty to return the execution only if the sheriff levies
property not capable of delivery,26 ° only one court has been
tempted to announce a different rule for property capable of
delivery.261
Vitale v. City of N.Y., 183 A.D.2d 502, 503, 583 N.Y.S.2d 445, 446 (1st Dep't 1992);
Konvalin v. Tan Hai Ying, 13 Misc. 3d 287, 289, 818 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Sup Ct.
Queens County 2006). For a case surcharging JC for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with selling JD's property, see Saline v. Saline, 48 A.D.3d 439, 440, 851
N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (2d Dep't 2008).
256 See Oppel v. Di Gangi, 84 A.D.2d 549, 549-50, 443 N.Y.S.2d 177, 177 (2d
Dep't 1981).
257 See Ruppert v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank, 22 A.D.2d 165, 167, 254 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343-
44 (1st Dep't 1964) (unperfected secured party prevailed over JC where the sheriff
released the levy and killed the execution lien).
258 Kennis v. Sherwood, 82 A.D.2d 847, 848, 439 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (2d Dep't
1981).
259 Am. Express Travel Related, Servs. Co. v. Kalish & Rice, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
1436, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). One court has suggested in dictum that, where levy is by
seizure of property capable of delivery, JC (through his attorney as an officer of the
court) must extend the life of the execution itself; return of the execution implies
that the sheriff must surrender the tangible property back to its owner. N.Y. State
Comm'n of Taxation & Fin. v. Bank of N.Y., 275 A.D.2d 287, 289, 712 N.Y.S.2d 543,
545 (1st Dep't 2000).
260 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(c) (McKinney 2008).
261 In Vance Boiler Works v. Co-operative Feed Dealers, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 654, 260
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Court Wayne County 1965), a very early CPLR case, JC 1 and JC 2
sequentially delivered executions to the sheriff. The sheriff "levied" by serving JD
with executions. Properly, these were levies of neither property capable or nor
property incapable of delivery. More than sixty days then passed. The court
nevertheless remarked:
Insofar as such execution may be held to relate to "property capable of
delivery by taking the property into his [Sheriffs] custody without
interfering with the lawful possession of pledgees and lessees" as to any
property encompassed therein the levy became void 60 days after service of
the execution upon the debtor, since petitioner obtained no extension of the
effective time thereof and did not in fact take specific property into his
custody.
Id. at 655-56, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04 (citations omitted) (citing Walker v. Henry, 85
N.Y. 130, 135 (1881)). The Vance Boiler court was quite confused. Executions lapse
must be returned sixty days after issuance, not sixty days after they are served on
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1. Property Not Capable of Delivery
A levy of property not capable of delivery is accomplished by
serving the execution on a third party who owes a debt or has
control of property.262 I will call this a "paper levy." A paper levy
on JD is never permitted with regard to executions, though it is
permitted for pre-judgment attachment, where all levies are
paper levies.
A levy is accomplished only if, at the time the third party is
served, the third party actually owes a debt or controls property
in which he or she knows or has reason to believe the judgment
debtor or obligor has an interest, or if the judgment creditor or
support collection unit has stated in a notice which shall be
served with the execution that a specified debt is owed by the
person served to the judgment debtor or obligor or that the
judgment debtor or obligor has an interest in specified property
not capable of delivery in the possession or custody of the person
served.263
The levy therefore has a knowledge requirement. Either AD
must have reason to know of an obligation to JD, or JC must
specify the debt owed or property possessed." 4 So, for example,
in State Tax Commission v. Blanchard Management Corp.,265 JD,
itself a judgment creditor, had validly levied a debt owed by AD
(a bank).266 JC then levied AD without informing AD that AD's
customer's bank account had been levied by JD.2 67  The court
absolved AD of the duty to figure out the connection between the
levied customer and JD.265 As a result the levy failed.269
If indeed AD knows that it owes JD a debt or possesses her
property capable of delivery at the time the execution is served,
the levy encompasses both that debt/property and also
subsequent debts or after-acquired property that AD owes or
JD. The court seemed to think serving executions on the debtor was the equivalent
of the sheriff taking possession of property capable of delivery.
262 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
263 Id.
264 Id. If AD has reason to know and lies about it, thereby causing the levy to
die, JC has a tort cause of action against AD for damages caused. See Leber-Krebs,
Inc. v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1985).
265 91 A.D.2d 501, 456 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1st Dep't 1982).
266 Id. at 501-02, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
267 See id.
268 See id. at 502, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 365-66.
269 See id. at 502, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
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controls. ° If knowledge of present property is absent, there is no
levy of after-acquired debt/property. 1
According to CPLR 5232(a), the levy of property not capable
of delivery constitutes an injunction against AD's transferring
property or paying debts to JD.2 72 In short, the levy is the
equivalent of a restraining notice under CPLR 5222(b). The
injunctive effect, however, lapses ninety days after the levy.273
The injunctive effect can be further extended by motion beyond
ninety days. 4  Indeed, the motion to extend can be made even
after the levy has died. Courts seem to assume that the lapse
of the injunctive effect is the same thing as the lapse of the
execution lien. 6  Indeed, it is fair on this basis to view
garnishment as injunctive in nature, consistent with its
history.277
270 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2008) ("The person served with the
execution shall forthwith transfer all such property, and pay all such debts upon
maturity, to the sheriff or to the support collection unit and execute any document
necessary to effect the transfer or payment.").
271 But see Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Arg., 282 F. App'x 41, 42 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to attachment order with regard to empty
bank account). An empty bank account is still property, presumably, because the
bank remains contractually obligated to honor checks should any further funds be
deposited.
272 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a). In Wordie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 140 A.D.2d
435, 529 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1988), AD responded to a levy by sending the sheriff a
check. The check was lost, and AD sent paperwork for replacing it to JC's attorney
who never completed it. See id. at 435-36, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 1-2. AD was held not to
have violated the CPLR 5232(a) injunction. See id. at 436, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
272 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) ("At the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made
by service of the execution, or of such further time as the court, upon motion ... has
provided, the levy shall be void except as to ... debts ... paid to the sheriff.. . or as
to which a proceeding under sections 5225 or 5227 has been brought.").
274 Id. A motion to extend need not be decided, only moved for, within the life of
the levy. See Knapp v. Barron, 83 F.R.D. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (pre-judgment
attachment).
217 See Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503,
507 (2d Dep't 2004); infra text accompanying notes 296-302.
276 James Talcott Factors, Inc. v. Blatter (In re Blatter), 16 B.R. 137, 139 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981). Pre-judgment attachment is on a different basis. Whereas ninety
days is mentioned in connection with injunction against transfers, N.Y. C.P.L.R.
6214(b) and (e) separately end the levy in all aspects if there is no payment, delivery,
extension, or turnover proceeding within the life of the levy, see id. 6214(e).
277 In the nineteenth century, debt could be garnished only through a
supplemental proceeding resulting in an injunctive order. Isadore H. Cohen,
Collection of Money Judgments in New York: Third Party Orders, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
1196, 1203 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Third Party Orders].
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The filing of a turnover action automatically extends a levy
so long as the turnover action continues. It equally extends the
life of the pre-judgment levy pursuant to an order of
attachment. 79  Extension by commencement of a turnover
proceeding is a key concept under the CPLR. Where AD is
validly garnished and refuses to pay or hand over property not
capable of delivery, the sheriff does not intervene to enforce AD's
obligation. Rather, JC is expected to start a turnover proceeding.
There is a story behind this aspect of the paper levy. The
story has to do with the fact that, in the nineteenth century,
equity liens-those arising from receiverships or turnover
orders-related back to the time the equity proceeding was
commenced.8 ° In this era, the idea that levies might extend to
intangible property was entirely rejected. Instead, JC was
expected to bring a supplementary proceeding against third
parties in order to collect debts.28 l In other words, all liens on
property not capable of delivery were equity liens. Only in 1952
did New York permit levy of property not capable of delivery.
2 2
Later, the CPLR (regrettably) abandoned the idea that
equity liens are created when the equity proceeding is
commenced. Rather, the CPLR deferred the birth of the equity
lien. Today, a turnover proceeding without a levy 28 3 creates a lien
only when "a judgment creditor has secured an order for delivery
of [or] payment of ... a debt ... or ... personal property."28 4
Compensating for this regrettable deferral, the sheriff was
278 See In re Blatter, 16 B.R. at 139; Kitson, 10 A.D.3d at 27, 778 N.Y.S.2d at
508. Commencing a turnover proceeding means making the garnishee a party to the
action within the life of the levy. See Kennis v. Sherwood, 82 A.D.2d 847, 848, 439
N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (2d Dep't 1981). One court has suggested that a restraining notice,
without a turnover proceeding, extends a levy. See Metro Burak, Inc. v. Rosenthal &
Rosenthal, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 637, 643-44, 372 N.Y.S.2d 781, 788-89 (Sup. Ct.
Richmond County 1975), modified on other grounds, 51 A.D.2d 1003, 380 N.Y.S.2d
758 (2d Dep't 1976).
279 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(e). In the pre-judgment context, the turnover
proceeding is governed by CPLR 6214(d). In federal court, a motion to the court can
be substituted for the special proceeding required in CPLR 6214(d). See Foreign
Exch. Trade Assocs. v. Oncetur, S.A., 591 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
280 Cohen, Third Party Orders, supra note 277, at 1208-09.
281 See id. at 1198.
212 See Ch. 835, § 687-a, 1952 N.Y. Laws 2.
283 There is no requirement that there be a levy before a turnover proceeding can
be commenced. Garland D. Cox & Assocs. v. Koffinan, 48 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 400
N.E.2d 302, 302, 424 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (1979).
284 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
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permitted to levy intangibles.2 5 Yet, significantly, the sheriff
plays no role in enforcing the paper levy.2" 6 As in the old days,
this is left to the supplementary proceeding against the
garnishee.2 7 In other words, the levy of property not capable of
delivery basically represents a way to obtain an earlier equity
lien associated with the turnover order.
If commencement of the turnover proceeding precedes the
levy, it will sustain the life of a subsequent levy. In Clarkson Co.
v. Shaheen,218 JC1 commenced a turnover proceeding, which did
not create a lien.28 9 Thereafter, JC, served an execution on the
sheriff and obtained a levy.29 ° Following JC 1's levy, JC 2 obtained
its own levy.29' Hoping for priority, JC 2 protested that a turnover
proceeding commenced before a levy could not extend the life of
JC,'s execution lien.292 But the court ruled for JC, under CPLR
5232(a)'s eighth sentence:
At the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made by service
of the execution, or of such further time as the court, upon
motion of the judgment creditor.. has provided, the levy shall
be void except as to property ... as to which a proceeding under
sections 5225 or 5227 has been brought.
293
The Sheehan court observed that this sentence did not require
the turnover proceeding to be commenced after the levy.294 It was
enough that, prior to lapse, a proceeding "has been brought. 295
The passive voice, so unpopular with law review editors, saved
JC1's priority.
An emerging rule from the case law is that, where the sheriff
has levied property not capable of delivery, no second levy on
behalf of the same JC is valid. In New York State Commissioner
of Taxation & Finance v. Bank of New York,29 6 JC served an
285 See id. 5232(a).
286 Compare id. 5232(b) (allowing the sheriff to physically take property capable
of delivery), with id. 5232(a) (allowing the sheriff to only execute the levy).
287 See id. 5225(b).
288 540 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 716 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1983).
289 See id. at 639-40.
290 See id. at 639.
21 See id. at 638.
292 See id. at 638-39.
293 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
294 Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 540 F. Supp. 636, 640 n.2. (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd,
716 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1983).
295 Id. (citing N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. LAW § 5232 (McKinney 1962)).
29 275 A.D.2d 287, 712 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep't 2000).
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execution and the sheriff levied.297 While the levy was still
enjoying its ninety-day life, JC served a second execution on the
sheriff, who purported to levy a second time. Waiting until the
first levy was dead and, even though the second levy was less
than ninety days old, AD released the funds to JD.298 The court
held that AD had behaved properly because the second levy was
no levy at all. According to the court:
The service of multiple, overlapping levies creates confusion and
is contrary to the purpose of the statutory limitation "to
minimize the burden on the garnishee." Even where an
extension is granted on motion, "[t]he court must avoid
permitting extensions that would harass the garnishee, unduly
embarrass the judgment debtor or prejudice other judgment
creditors." 299
The Bank of New York court would have allowed a second levy
after the first levy was utterly dead.300  But Kitson & Kitson v.
City of Yonkers 30 1 does not even permit this. According to Kitson,
JC can never levy again. Rather, the execution creditor must
move to revive the defunct levy nunc pro tunc. °2
191 Id. at 288, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 289-90, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (citation omitted) (citing WEINSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 35, 5232.14-15).
300 Id. at 289, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 545; accord Vance Boiler Works v. Coop. Feed
Dealers, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 654, 260 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1965). In
Vance, JC 1 delivered an execution on January 11, 1963, and JC 2 delivered the next
day. On January 13, the sheriff "levied" by serving both executions on the debtor.
See supra note 261. The levy was therefore for the benefit of both JC, and JC 2. When
the levy died after ninety days, JC 2 delivered another execution. This time, the levy
netted some value. JC 2 was given all the proceeds, proving that new levies after the
old one dies were permitted.
301 10 A.D.3d 21, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 2004).
302 See id. at 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08. Kitson overrules an early
pronouncement in Freedom Discount Corp. v. Clune, where JC obtained a default
judgment on July 8, 1966. 32 A.D.2d 833, 302 N.Y.S.2d 465 (2d Dep't 1969). JD
sought relief from the judgment, but the court ambiguously gave JD the right to
answer the complaint. Id. at 834, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 466. The default judgment was not
formally revoked until two years later. Id. Meanwhile, thinking that the court's
initial permission for JD to answer the complaint was tantamount to a vacation of
the judgment, JC obtained an order of attachment, under which the sheriff levied
some wages, itself an impropriety, as attachment liens cannot reach wages.
Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 244 N.E.2d 259, 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783,
787-88 (1968). The attachment levy then died. Inconsistently, JC insisted there was
a judgment and so served an execution on the sheriff, who levied the same employer,
who paid more wages to the sheriff, who paid them to JC. Freedom Disc. Corp., 32
A.D.2d at 834, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67. JD then obtained an order requiring the
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These nunc pro tunc motions provoke yet another strange
story. They were invented in the era of Seider v. Roth."3  In
Seider, the Court of Appeals scandalized the civil procedure
professors by holding that a New York resident could sue a
Montreal driver for an accident in Vermont by attaching the
insurance company's obligation to defend the driver, where the
insurance company was present and doing business in New
York.3" 4 A lapse of the ninety-day attachment levy, however, was
thought to be a jurisdictional bar to the Seider-style quasi in rem
action.0 5 To preserve judicial business, courts permitted nunc
pro tunc motions to extend the levy. 6 This nunc pro tunc
practice could never have occurred under the statutes that
preceded the CPLR °.3 7  The United States Supreme Court has
since put a well-justified stiletto into the heart of Seider-style
quasi in rem cases on the modern premise that quasi in rem
jurisdiction requires the defendants to have some minimum
contact with the forum state °.30  Nevertheless, Seider's ghost
lingers on in the form of nunc pro tunc motion practice to haunt
New York civil procedure.
sheriff to repay the amount levied under the execution, since the judgment had been
vacated. Before the sheriff could repay, JC re-delivered the old order of attachment
on the sheriff, demanding that JC's debt to JD for the refund be levied. Id. at 834,
302 N.Y.S.2d at 467. The court smiled upon this "second" levy. Id.; cf. Andrias v.
Nat'l Sur. Corp., 98 Misc. 2d 292, 293, 413 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1978) (disapproving as a "fraudulent trick" the attachment by JD of JD's
liability on a money judgment to JC, whom JD wished to sue quasi in rem).
303 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
304 Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
305 See Cenkner v. Shafer, 61 Misc. 2d 807, 808, 306 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636 (Sup. Ct.
Herkimer County 1970). In pre-judgment attachment cases, the question arises
whether the levy is at all necessary for the court to issue a quasi in rem judgment.
Under CPLR 6203, the plaintiff has a lien on all personal property as soon as the
order of attachment is delivered to the sheriff. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203 (McKinney 2008).
Admittedly, this lien is extraordinarily weak. The defendant still has power to
convey free and clear to just about anyone (except an article 9 secured party). Why is
this not enough to justify a judgment quasi in rem?
306 See Kalman v. Neuman, 71 A.D.2d 996, 996, 420 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (2d Dep't
1979).
307 See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Fishman v. Sanders, 18 A.D.2d
689, 689-90, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (2d Dep't 1962) (discussing earlier statutory
law).
301 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 486,
425 N.E.2d 851, 855, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 467-68 (1981) (citing Rush, 444 U.S. at 328-
33) (throwing in the Seider towel).
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What of transferees between the death of the levy and its
miraculous resurrection in a nunc pro tunc order? The Kitson
court urged, "In determining an application for an extension the
court should consider the intervening interests of third
parties."309  Presumably this means that the intervening third
party is entitled to priority over JC if JC obtains nunc pro tunc
relief.
An intervening interest of a third party did emerge in
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. D'Ambra,31° which involved the
following chronology:
March 19: P delivers an order of attachment to the sheriff.
June 19: P's levy lapses. 311
July 2: The sheriff purports to levy again for P under the March
19 order of attachment.
July 3: JC delivers an execution to the sheriff.
July 5: The Supreme Court extends P's first levy nunc pro tunc.
July 6: The sheriff levies the bank on behalf of JC.
It should have been straightforward that P had priority to
whatever the bank owed JD. According to CPLR 5234(b):
Where two or more executions or orders of attachment are
issued against the same judgment debtor.., and delivered to
the same enforcement officer ... they shall be satisfied out of
the proceeds of personal property or debt levied upon by the
officer.., in the order in which they were delivered .... An
execution or order of attachment returned by an officer before a
levy or delivered to him after the proceeds of the levy have been
distributed shall not be satisfied out of those proceeds. 312
309 Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508
(2d Dep't 2004). In Amoco, 605 F.2d at 652, the court affirmed the power of the lower
court to give a nunc pro tunc extension of the levy. But also in the case, the court
had entered a default judgment against the defendant. Id. at 650. Why couldn't the
sheriff levy again under a writ of execution? The answer might be that under the
Kitson rule, no new levies under an order of attachment or execution are permitted.
Only nunc pro tunc extensions are permitted, followed by turnover actions. Kitson,
10 A.D.3d at 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
310 766 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1985).
311 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2008). The rule applies only to
garnishees. Apparently, it does not apply when the sheriff levies the order of
attachment against the defendant. Finance Inv. Co. (Berm.) v. Gossweiler, 145
A.D.2d 462, 463, 535 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (2d Dep't 1988). A curious omission in CPLR
6214 is that none of its rules govern a levy of the defendant directly. See infra text
accompanying notes 943-973.
312 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
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Under this distribution rule, the sheriff must prefer P, even
where P's levy has lapsed and has never been renewed. Though
the operative levy was pursuant to JC 2's subsequent execution,
P's priority under the order of attachment still perdured. P loses
seniority under the last sentence of CPLR 5234(b) only if the
sheriff has returned the order of attachment prior to the
operative levy on behalf of JC. This last sentence is odd. A
sheriff has a duty to return executions. 13 But no duty exists to
return orders of attachment. To the contrary, according CPLR
6211(a)'s final sentence:
The order [of attachment] shall direct the sheriff to levy within
his jurisdiction, at any time.., and upon such debts owing to
the defendant as will satisfy the amount specified in the order of
attachment. 14
So, unlike an execution which has a limited life of sixty days
(unless extended),315 an order of attachment endures until a
money judgment is actually entered. Accordingly, even though
the sheriff collected under JC 2's levy, priority went to P, in spite
of the lapsed levy.316 Lapse meant only that, if AD had paid JD,




316 Contra Corwin Consultants, Inc. v. Interpublic Group of Cos., Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 186, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir.
1975). In Corwin, P had served an order of attachment on the sheriff. Later JC
served an execution. The IRS also claimed a tax lien and was apparently the first to
levy AD. Although the matter would seem to have been under the federal law of tax
lien levies, JC commenced an action in state court, under CPLR 5239, to determine
priorities. Id. at 189-90. Even though the IRS was the first to levy, the state court
ordered AD to pay the disputed funds into the court. The matter and, presumably,
the funds were removed to federal court by the IRS. Judge Morris Lasker ruled that
P had forfeited its priority because the levy lapsed. Id. at 190. The holding is odd
because the sheriff never levied at all for P or anyone else. Nevertheless, Judge
Lasker thought CPLR 5234(b) decided the matter. Here, we find no reference to
lapsed levies in deciding priorities. So P properly should have had priority, if indeed
CPLR 5234(b) were relevant. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
How should the case have been decided? Since this was a federal levy, section
6342(a) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that, after expense of sale, the money
goes to the IRS for its tax lien. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6342(a)(1) (West 2008). No reference
here is made to senior liens. Yet the levy does not deprive senior lien creditors of
their priority. See United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 721
(1985). In Corwin, it appears that the IRS did not file its notice in the right place.
Therefore, judicial lien creditors would have priority over the IRS.
26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(a). The IRS was itself a post-lien, pre-levy transferee within the
meaning of CPLR 5202(a)(1) and CPLR 6203(1). N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(1), 6203(1).
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Overlooking this admittedly fine point, Judge Ellsworth Van
Graafieland ruled that P had priority by virtue of the July 2 re-
levy."' Fireman's Fund, therefore, contradicts the Kitson
holding, and in Kitson, Judge Goldstein punishes the Second
Circuit with a withering "but see" citation-the prerogative that
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins319 grants state judges at the expense of
their federal betters. Given that the Fireman's Fund ruling was
unnecessary to the result and a mere Erie guess, either Bank of
New York or Kitson states the rule: Overlapping or perhaps
subsequent levies are not permitted. On Kitson's holding, only
the first levy counts, and it must be extended on a nunc pro tunc
basis.2 °
Meanwhile, another thing that extends the levy of property
not capable of delivery is that AD actually pays or surrenders
property. According to CPLR 5232(a) (eighth sentence), the levy
is void after ninety days "except as to property or debts which
But this we must ignore, as state law is preempted by Internal Revenue Code
section 6323(a). See supra text accompanying notes 111-116. Therefore, JC, should
have been first, as it served the order of attachment on the sheriff first. The failure
to levy, or lapse of levy, is irrelevant. JC 2 is second by virtue of the subsequently
served execution. CPLR 5234 is itself irrelevant to these priorities, as the sheriff
apparently never levied and never had funds. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234 (a).
317 This precise answer was rejected by the district court, on the ground that
JC,'s priority lapsed when the levy lapsed. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza
Oldsmobile Ltd., 596 F. Supp. 657, 662-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 766 F.2d 95, 97
(2d Cir. 1985). This ignores the direct command of CPLR 5234(b)'s last sentence,
which states that only if the sheriff has returned the order of attachment does
JC,'s priority lapse. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b); see Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1979)
(where order of attachment pre-existed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C.A. § 1609, and where the levy lapsed after the Act, the order of attachment
was still valid; any other ruling "mistakes the levy for the order of attachment").
318 Accord Amoco, 605 F.2d at 653 ("[Blut the order granting the attachment was
never itself rendered void. It subsisted so that a new levy.., could be made under
it.").
319 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
320 Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507-
08 (2d Dep't 2004). Suppose a levy of property not capable of delivery dies and,
instead of moving to revive it nunc pro tunc, JC commences a turnover proceeding,
which would have extended the levy if commenced during or before the life of the
levy. Will the turnover proceeding revive the levy? Although this would make sense,
there is no current case law to support it. In Kitson, JC,'s levy died. JC 2 then
obtained an execution lien. JC1 started a turnover proceeding in which JC 2
intervened. JC1 's turnover commencement did not revive his earlier levy-at least
not at JC 2's expense. JC 2 was held to have the senior lien, but JC 2 was an
intervening party between the death of JC,'s levy and the commencement of the
turnover proceeding. Id. at 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
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have been transferred or paid to the sheriff,"321 and CPLR 6214(e)
terminates a levy under an order of attachment "except as to
property or debts which the sheriff has taken into his actual
custody."3 22 JCs therefore have reason to expand the notion of
what it means for AD to pay the sheriff. In particular, several
courts have found that AD's attornment-acknowledgement of
liability-to the sheriff is the same as paying her, for the purpose
of perpetuating the levy. 23
2. Banks
Much confusing the levy of property not capable of delivery is
New York's rule, perhaps still valid, that, for garnishment
purposes, every branch of a bank is a separate entity from every
other branch. 24 So a garnishment on a Brooklyn branch fails to
encumber a bank account opened in Manhattan.325 The reason
for this is as follows:
Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity for
attachment purposes, no branch could safely pay a check drawn
by its depositor without checking with all other branches and
the main office to make sure that no warrant of attachment had
321 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
322 Id. 6214(e). Once the sheriff has the property, the sheriff must "hold and
safely keep" it. Id. 6218(a). If urgency requires, the court may direct a sale. Only
after the plaintiff has a money judgment will the plaintiff actually get the money.
223 Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Rozenbaum, 192 A.D.2d 340, 341, 595 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770
(1st Dep't 1993); Kalman v. Neuman, 102 Misc. 2d 662, 664-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d 649,
650-51 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980).
124 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Advanced Employment Concepts, Inc.,
269 A.D.2d 101, 101, 703 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (1st Dep't 2000).
"' See Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50,
53 (2d Cir. 1965). An exception exists where the right branch is closed or refuses the
demand for payment; then, recourse may be had to the main office. See Vishipco
Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 169, 145 N.E. 917, 920 (1924). But see
Abuhamda v. Abuhamda, 236 A.D.2d 290, 654 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep't 1977)
(affirming injunction, per an order of attachment, directing bank present in New
York not to pay out funds from an account in Jordan). Another exception exists
where the bank and its customer agree that a bank account is payable at locations
other than the branch of deposit. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852
F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 660 (1990). It has been
held that a bank waives the branch rule if not properly raised in a turnover
proceeding. Foreign Exch. Trade Assocs., Inc. v. Oncetur, S.A., 591 F. Supp. 1496,
1501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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been served upon any of them. Each time a warrant of
attachment is served upon one branch, every other branch and
the main office would have to be notified. This would place an
intolerable burden upon banking and commerce .... 326
At best, the separate-branch rule should be limited to garnishing
bank accounts. Arguably, it should be viewed as outmoded with
regard to branches located entirely within the United States. 27
In any case, the rule should never be applied with regard to
discrete property as to which a bank is bailee.2 8 Whereas a bank
might erroneously honor a check at branch A even though branch
B was levied, there is no similar danger if branch B receives an
execution, and branch A holds identifiable property capable of
delivery.3 29 The branch rule should be limited strictly to the
phenomenon of check-clearing.3
326 Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
327 See Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(upholding restraining order served in New York as affecting conduct of the bank
outside the state). For branches existing abroad, where full faith and credit does not
reign, New York's "separate entity" rule is indeed useful. If ten different countries
each insisted on the effectiveness of local garnishment with regard to a deposit
elsewhere, a bank with foreign branches would have a tenfold liability for a single
deposit. Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 35-36
(1998); see Fid. Partners, Inc. v. Philippine Exp. & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp.,
921 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (account opened at Manilla branch could not be
garnished at New York branch); McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 11 N.Y.2d
936, 183 N.E.2d 227, 228 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1962) (stating that a German deposit could
not be garnished in New York). Presumably, full faith and credit prevents this from
happening within the United States.
328 See Buy Fabrics, Inc. v. Ada Co., 76 Misc. 2d 607, 608, 351 N.Y.S.2d 522,
523-24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). Courts are capable of confusing the bank's in
personam obligation to a debtor for a deposit abroad with tangible property that
could be brought to New York. See Mones v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait S.A.K., 399
F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 204 F. App'x 988, 989
(2d Cir. 2006).
M The separate entity theory for banks is sometimes rejected for various
reasons not related to attachment of bank accounts. See First Nat'l City Bank of
N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1959) (bank records); see also Yayasan
Sabah Dua Shipping SDN BHD v. Scandinavian Liquid Carriers Ltd., 335 F. Supp.
2d 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("virtual" branch in Cayman Islands was physically
located entirely in New York); Gavilanes v. Matavosian, 123 Misc. 2d 868, 872, 475
N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984) (subpoena of bank records).
330 In ancient times, banks required passbooks from their customers as a
condition for paying a bank account. Banks could not, however, resist a garnishment
on the ground that they had no duty to pay without presentment of the passbook.
Dumpson v. Empire City Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 8, 10, 252 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1964); Brezenoff v. Franklin Sav. Bank (Reddington), 108 Misc. 2d
626, 627, 438 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (citing Dumpson v.
Empire City Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 8, 252 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
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3. Debts v. Property
The CPLR draws unsatisfactory distinctions between debts
and property and between property that is or is not capable of
delivery. Each of these distinctions, arcane and old-fashioned,
has proved foetid pools of confusion and contradiction.
According to CPLR 5201(a), not every debt can be levied.33'
Rather, a money judgment may be enforced against "any debt,
which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor."332 Contingent debts cannot be
garnished. Certitude is the key to the kingdom of debt.333 This
morbid dread of contingency is entirely outmoded-the product of
obsessional anxiety and low self-esteem. Article 9 of the UCC
sees no reason why contingent debts cannot be collateral.334 Yet
New York courts have a woeful history of equating contingent
debt with no debt at all.335 This anxiety has invaded the CPLR to
no good end.
1964)); see Oppenheimer v. Dresdner Bank A.G., 50 A.D.2d 434, 439-40, 377
N.Y.S.2d 625, 631 (2d Dep't 1975) (stating that AD could pay garnishment even if
contractual language prohibited it). The matter is different if the bank has uttered a
negotiable instrument, such as a certificate of deposit. Such property is "capable of
delivery," and so the sheriff must levy by taking possession of it. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5201(c)(4) (McKinney 2008); id. 5232(b). JC could, however, pursue the bank in a
turnover proceeding. Id. 5227; Kazanjian v. Jamaica Sav. Bank, 105 Misc. 2d 228,
229, 432 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). The bank is also susceptible to
pre-judgment attachment, which makes no reference to property capable of delivery.
If the bank actually pays, even though a negotiable instrument is outstanding, the
bank is entitled to a discharge under CPLR 5209 or 6204. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209, 6204.
Presumably this holds even if the negotiable instrument ends up in the hands of a
holder in due course.
331 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a).
332 Id.
1.1 See Wabco Trade Co., Div. of World Standard Exp. v. S.S. Inger Skou, 508 F.
Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 663 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Baumgold
Bros. Inc. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 A.D. 158, 163, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661-62 (1st
Dep't 1949)) (stating that once casualty loss occurred, the insurer's obligation to
indemnify is garnishable). A disputed debt was equated with a contingent debt in
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293, 301, 846 N.Y.S.2d
171, 177 (1st Dep't 2007) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a)). Such a holding is
questionable in light of the the second sentence of CPLR 5201(a), which provides,
"'A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred
accruing within or without the state.'" C.P.L.R 5201(a).
334 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2007) (defining "account" as "right to payment of a
monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance").
3" See City of N.Y. v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33, 141
N.E.2d 575, 576, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68-69 (1957). In Bedford, JD assigned to SP its
contingent right to a refund from the state comptroller if JD chose to cancel its
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Meanwhile, contingent property other than debts can be
levied.136  According to CPLR 5201(b), a judgment may be
enforced "against any property which could be assigned or
transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or
interest and whether or not it is vested."3 7  Vested typically
means not subject to a condition precedent.3
CPLR 5232(a) authorizes a paper levy with regard to debts
or "property not capable of delivery,"339 thereby implying that
intangible property might exist which is not a debt. Such
property includes AD's obligation to pay which is not certain to
become due. 40
Significantly, only AD can be the subject of a paper levy
pursuant to CPLR 5232(a). 41 Where there is no third party to
garnish, property not capable of delivery cannot be levied at all.
Copyright is an example. 42 Any such property can be reached
only by turnover order under CPLR 5225(a) where the court may
order the debtor "to deliver any other personal property ... to a
designated sheriff."343  Oddly, the sheriff may not levy the
copyright from JD, but JD may be ordered to turn the copyright
liquor license. JD did cancel its license, so that the comptroller had a fixed obligation
to pay. JC then obtained a lien on the comptroller's obligation. The Court of Appeals
held that JC was the victor. SP had only an equitable lien on after-acquired
property, which could not take priority over JC's "legal" judicial lien. See id. at 433,
141 N.E.2d at 577, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 69. One would have thought that the equitable
lien, arising when the comptroller's obligation to pay became vested, would have
been completely good against a subsequent judicial lien. The whole point of the
equitable lien is to foreclose subsequent creditors. See Eisenberg v. Mercer Hicks
Corp., 199 Misc. 52, 54, 101 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
Nevertheless, JC prevailed, justly engendering the disgust of the great Grant
Gilmore. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.12, at
247, § 12.9, at 398 (1999).
336 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (explaining what property may be levied),
with id. 5201(a) (explaining what debts may be levied).
337 Id. 5201(b).
338 Christian v. County of Ontario, 92 Misc. 2d 51, 53, 399 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381
(Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1977).
339 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
340 See id.
341 See id.
342 See Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 451 (1854) (copyright has no situs and
so cannot be levied); see also Kingsrow Enters., Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 879, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ruling sheriffs sale of copyright ineffective to
transfer title); Doreen J. Gridley, Note, The Immunity of Intangible Assets from a
Writ of Execution: Must We Forgive Our Debtors?, 28 IND. L. REV. 755, 755-56
(1995).
-43 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(a).
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over to the sheriff for sale, all the same. Yet CPLR 5233 requires
that "Itihe property shall be present and within the view of those
attending the sale unless otherwise ordered by the court."3"
Without a court order, the sheriff may not sell property not
capable of delivery simply because such property is invisible. 345
When it comes to pre-judgment attachment, the distinction
between property capable and not capable of delivery mercifully
falls away. 46 Article 62 assumes that all levies are to be paper
levies.3 47  Third parties can be served with the order of
attachment with regard to debts or "any interest of the defendant
in personal property."348 A paper levy is also permitted against
debtors in possession of any personal property.349 This is so
whether or not the property is capable of delivery. So, absurdly,
a copyright may be levied prior to judgment but not after.
As commercial lawyers and speculative philosophers know,35°
all debts are property. But if this is so, then is not CPLR 5201(a)
swallowed whole by CPLR 5201(b)? This is what the Court of
Appeals seemed to hold in ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Apple
Films, Inc. 1 In ABKCO, a plaintiff (P) sued D for defaulting on
a loan. Pursuant to this law suit, P obtained an order of
attachment, which the sheriff served on AD.352 According to
CPLR 6202, "[a]ny debt or property against which a money
judgment may be enforced as provided in CPLR 5201 is subject to
attachment. '3 3 AD had promised to remit profits to D, if any,
... Id. 5233(a).
"-' But see Fishgold v. C.O.F., Inc., 288 A.D.2d 827, 827-28, 732 N.Y.S.2d 919,
919 (4th Dep't 2001) (sheriff sold and did not collect payment intangibles).
346 Property capable of delivery is mentioned in CPLR 6214(c), which directs the
sheriff to take custody after the levy. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(c). But seizure is not
the levy. Delivery of paper is.
3'1 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a).
348 Id.
349 Id.
'50 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 429
(A.V. Miller trans., 1969).
351 See ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 674, 350 N.E.2d
899, 901, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512-13 (1976); see also Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 190 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1999) ("ABKCO
virtually erases the distinction in § 5201 between 'debt' and 'property' by line re-
characterizing-as '[piroperty against which a money judgment may be enforced'-
debts that otherwise are placed out of reach by § 520 1(a)'s requirement that the debt
being pursued be either past due or certain to become due upon demand.").
352 ABKCO, 39 N.Y.2d at 672, 350 N.E.2d at 900, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
353 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6202.
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from a film. That profits would accrue seemed a safe bet, as D
owned a film featuring the Beatles.354 Yet the amount, if not the
existence, of profit was as uncertain as it was substantial. The
ABKCO court held that D's right to a profit could not be levied as
a debt. But it could be levied as contingent property within the
meaning of CPLR 5201(b). 55 Thus, the whale of CPLR 5201(b)
seemed to swallow whole the Jonah of CPLR 5201(a).
It is still true, however, that CPLR 5201(b) property must be
"property which could be assigned or transferred."3 6 These are
showings on which JC bears the burden of proof.357 But if this
can be shown, JC can garnish a renter's right to buy cooperative
shares, 358 a divorcing spouse's right to receive the proceeds of real
estate in which he has no present interest,359 his own obligation
to pay the judgment debtor, or a factor's obligation to remit
proceeds from accounts receivable-even though a factor's right
of charge-back existed. 6'
The Court of Appeals came to regret its ABKCO decision
soon enough. In Supreme Merchandise Co. v. Chemical Bank,362
3" The film was Let It Be, a back-stage documentary about the Beatles making a
record album. The film was designed to soothe the disappointment of fans that the
Beatles had disdained personal appearances some years before.
"I ABKCO, 39 N.Y.2d at 675-76, 350 N.E.2d at 902, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 513-14
(explaining that the uncertainty regarding the value of the property interest is
irrelevant in determining whether it can be levied).
356 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b).
357 See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 190 F.3d
16, 21 (2d Cir. 1999).
358 See In re Charney, 233 A.D.2d 147, 147, 649 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1st Dep't
1996). But see Kashi v. Gratsos, 712 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Kashi, JD was
arguably a renter when he died. His estate purchased the cooperative shares
pursuant to an insider right. The court ruled that the estate's interest in the insider
rights was "too remote to constitute a property interest." Id. at 26. Clearly a better
answer is that, where JC had no lien at the time of the death, nothing within the
decedent's estate could be liened. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5208. Rather, JC was subject to the
priority rules of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW
§ 1811(2) (McKinney 2008).
359 See United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Ackerman, No. 76 Civ. 4208 (RWS), 1980 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9814, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1980) (dictum).
360 See P & K Marble, Inc. v. La Paglia, 147 A.D.2d 804, 805, 537 N.Y.S.2d 682,
683 (3d Dep't 1989) (dictum). Presumably the judgment creditor would pay monthly
installments on his mortgage to the sheriff instead of to the judgment debtor. Such a
garnishment, then, would be a kind of rolling setoff month by month, with the
sheriff as intermediary.
361 See Bata Shoe Co. v. Silvestre Segarra e Hijos, S.A., 58 A.D.2d 133, 135, 396
N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (lst Dep't 1977).
363 70 N.Y.2d 344, 514 N.E.2d 1358, 520 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1987).
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P sought to levy D's letter of credit. AD's obligation to pay the
letter of credit was contingent upon submission of conforming
documents. Under ABKCO, the letter of credit should have been
viewed as leviable contingent property of D. The trial court
"understandably relied"363 upon ABKCO and so held. But this
result was deeply disturbing to the banking community jealous to
protect the certitude of letter of credit payment (if conforming
documents are presented). 64 Accordingly, the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the reversal of the Supreme Court's decision.
The facts of Supreme Merchandise are worth dwelling on:
Early March, 1984: The sheriff serves P's order of attachment
on AD.
April 17: D having sold or perhaps pledged a draft on AD to B 1,
B1 presents the draft to AD and AD accepts it. B1 had no
knowledge of the order of attachment.
April 27: D having sold or perhaps pledged a draft on AD to B 2,
B 2 presents the draft to AD and AD accepts it. B 2 had no
knowledge of the order of attachment. At this point the letter of
credit is fully paid out.
May 30: The sheriff serves P's second order of attachment on
AD.
3 6 5
Properly, even if the first levy had been valid, B 1-2 took free of it
under CPLR 6203(2), which holds that the attachment lien is no
good against "a transferee who acquired the debt or property for
fair consideration after it was levied upon without knowledge of
the levy while it was not in the possession of the sheriff."36 6 The
36 Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 117 A.D.2d 424, 425, 503 N.Y.S.2d 9, 9
(1st Dep't 1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d at 353, 514 N.E.2d at 1363, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
31 See id. at 430-31, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (quoting Diakan Love, S.A. v. Al-
Haddad Bros. Enters., Inc., 584 F.Supp. 782, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
365 See id. at 425-26, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
36 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203(2) (McKinney 2008). With regard to the second levy, the
court held it no good because acceptance of B1-2's drafts constituted the
extinguishment of D's rights. This principle, no doubt right, would aid the bank
where BI-2 are bad faith post-levy transferees, but since the first levy was held no
good, B,-2 would be pre-levy bad faith transferees. Such transferees take free of the
lien created by the order of attachment. Id. 6203(1).
Letter of credit law distinguishes between a transfer of the letter and assignment of
the proceeds of the letter. Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urunleri
Dis Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 748 F.Supp. 177, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). If the letter is
transferred, only the transferee has the right to present documents. Id. at 182. If the
proceeds are assigned, only the original beneficiary may present documents. Id. In
either case, whatever the transferee or assignee gets from the original beneficiary is
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Supreme Merchandise court, however, was not content to reverse
on so narrow a ground. Rather, it wanted to make a grander
point that letters of credit cannot be garnished so long as AD's
obligation to pay it is still contingent. It ruled that AD's
obligation to pay the letter of credit was not "property." Rather,
it was a contingent debt which, under CPLR 5201(a), could not be
levied. As a result, the early March service of the order of
attachment on the issuing bank was no levy.367
How could this be reconciled with ABKCO? The court
concluded:
Such a mechanical application of ABKCO to all questions
concerning attachable interests not only would swallow up
CPLR 5201(a) in its entirety but also would require us to blind
ourselves in every instance to the nature of the interest
involved. We determine, therefore, that the mere assignability
of [D's] interest does not warrant the conclusion that it is
"property" for purposes of CPLR 5201(b), and that in the
circumstances the interest is not subject to attachment.368
Thus, miraculously the Jonah of CPLR 5201(a) was coughed up
by the whale of CPLR 5201(b), because it could not digest the
case of the letter of credit.
The Supreme Merchandise court also stated that the letter of
credit was subject to a greater contingency than was the case for
the film royalties in ABKCO.369 In ABKCO, D's right in the
debt/property was "contingent solely as to value, which depended
on events beyond its own control,"370 that is, the popularity of the
Beatles, which, at the time, exceeded that of Jesus.37 1 But in
Supreme Merchandise, D's right was contingent on D's own
performance in presenting conforming documents. This
conditionality, depending on D's willful act, somehow meant that
D's right was not "property" within the meaning of CPLR
free of the attachment lien. Ultimately, this distinction makes no difference in
attachment cases.
367 Supreme Merch., 70 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 514 N.E.2d at 1360-61, 520 N.Y.S.2d
at 736-37.
"I Id. at 350, 514 N.E.2d at 1360-61, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37 (emphasis
omitted).
369 Id. at 350, 514 N.E.2d at 1361, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
370 Id.
371 Jen Waters, Gospel of the Fab Four: Book Details Spiritual Side of Beatles,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at A02 ("And the band they created, John would later
claim, became 'more popular than Jesus.' ").
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5201(b).372 As a later court put it, the rights to a letter of credit
are "not the property of the beneficiary thereunder for purposes
of attachment."3 73 But they are the property of the debtor for all
other purposes. Thus, property is sometimes not property,
depending on what suits the preconceived result the courts wish
to reach.
These grounds-property for some purposes but not for
others-will convince no one unwedded to the preconceived
result. Indeed, it is not even an argument but rather the mere
announcement of the result. Accordingly, the Supreme
Merchandise court was reduced to confessing that letters of credit
were just special-a kind of legal miracle of the sort Jonah
needed to be saved from the whale. 4
The more profound difference from ABKCO, however, lies in
the fact that what is at issue here is [D's] interest in a
negotiable letter of credit, an instrument extensively used in
domestic and international trade, which because of its unique
character typically implicates others than the immediate
parties to the underlying transaction. The transaction before
us, for example, involves not only [D and P1, but also [AD and
B1-2]-none of whom had any part in the dispute between [P]
and [D], yet whose interests could be affected by permitting
attachment of [D's] interest in the letter of credit.
We are persuaded that, for policy reasons, the rationale of
ABKCO does not extend this far, and that [D's] interest for
present purposes must be considered a contingent,
nonattachable "debt" under CPLR 5201(a) rather than
attachable "property" under CPLR 5201(b).375
3" Thus, earlier Erie guesses by federal courts were vindicated. See, e.g., Diakan
Love v. Al-Haddad Bros. Enters., 584 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
37' Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc., v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 252 (2d Cir.
1999).
374 2 Jonah 2:10 ("And the Lord spoke to the fish, and it vomited out Jonah upon
the dry land.").
371 Supreme Merch., 70 N.Y.2d at 351, 514 N.E.2d at 1361, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 737
(emphasis omitted); see also Ferrostaal Metals Corp. v. S.S. Lash Pacifico, 652 F.
Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Clentral to the vacation of the attachment,
however, were the importance of letters of credit to international trade and the
uncertainties which would result if attachment of open letters of credit were
permitted.").
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For good measure, the court warned, "In view of the versatility of
letters of credit, it bears emphasis that our disposition is limited
by the facts before us." 76
Supreme Merchandise holds open the possibility that, when
debts are "too contingent," they are not property under CPLR
5201(b).37 7  So post-ABKCO examples persist of courts
disallowing levies of contingent debts. For example, choses in
action might to too contingent to levy upon and sell. 378 A promise
to hold D harmless from a harm not yet manifested is too
contingent for a levy.3 79 And a pension right that required the
debtor's election could not be reached through a turnover order,
where the debtor had not made the election.38 °
One side effect of Supreme Merchandise is the final
overruling of Seider v. Roth,8 l that scandalous chapter in
American jurisprudence reviewed earlier. 2  Seider virtually
guaranteed any New Yorker a local forum for any cause of action,
provided the defendant had insurance from a national
company.33 It was not long, however, before the constitutional
rug was yanked from beneath the jurisdictional feet of Seider.
After Shaffer v. Heitner,38 4 any defendant in a quasi in rem
376 Id. at 352 n.*, 514 N.E.2d at 1362, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (citation omitted).
377 Id. at 349, 514 N.E.2d at 1360, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
'71 Fishgold v. C.O.F., Inc., 288 A.D.2d 827, 827-28, 732 N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (4th
Dep't 2001).
379 Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
380 Sochor v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 60 N.Y.2d 254, 259-60, 457 N.E.2d 696,
698-99, 469 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593-94 (1983). In Sochor, the possibility was left open
that if the debtor had actually been joined as a party, the debtor might be ordered to
elect early payout, in which case the debtor would have a vested right that the
creditor could reach. Pre-ABKCO decisions proclaiming debts to be too contingent
also exist, but it is unclear whether they survive as good authorities. Colonial Press
of Miami, Inc., v. Bank of Commerce, 71 Misc. 2d 987, 988-89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1972). JC could not reach AD's liability for having
converted to its own use JD's property; "[a] greater degree of 'certainty' of the
indebtedness is required than here demonstrated for this cause of action against the
bank, which actually is a claim for facilitating an allegedly unauthorized diversion of
corporate funds." Id.
381 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
-12 See supra text accompanying notes 303-308.
'83 Seider, 17 N.Y.2d at 111, 216 N.E.2d at 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (allowing
attachment to a contractual obligation of insurer).
384 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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lawsuit must have the same minimum contacts with the forum
state as would justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction. s5
But does Seider live on as a valid collection principle?
Imagine that JC 2 is injured in a car accident by JD. AD has
promised to defend and, if necessary, to indemnify JD. Before
JC 2 obtains a judgment, JC1 dockets a judgment on some
unrelated claim. JC, then induces the sheriff to garnish AD.
According to Seider, the levy picks up the insurance policy. Does
this mean that JC1 can hijack insurance intended to protect JC 2?
For the most part, New York's direct action statute prevents
this result. 36 The effect of this provision is to give a security
interest in the insurance policy to JC 2 that is good against JC1 .38 7
Yet this does not entirely solve the dilemma. Seider involved the
385 See id. at 212. The question arises, what is the point of quasi in rem
jurisdiction after Shaffer? Perhaps none, but some states, including New York, have
elected not to enact the maximum possible in personam "long arm" statute. See
Banco Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 464 N.E.2d
432, 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984). Hence, there is a statutory gap in which
constitutionally permissible quasi in rem jurisdiction might supply jurisdiction
where in personam jurisdiction is not statutorily permitted. Michael B. Mushlin, The
New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has
Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1059, 1090 (1990). Is it not odd that plaintiffs can
basically get pre-judgment security interests in the assets of foreign defendants,
even though it no longer serves any jurisdictional purpose? With regard to
domiciliaries, the plaintiff must first prove the defendant is a crook. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 6201(4) (McKinney 2008). Therefore, CPLR 6201 equates crooks and
foreigners. See id. 6201.
A line of cases, however, holds that courts have discretion to deny orders of
attachment against non-domiciliaries who pose no risk of failing to pay a judgment.
In Ames v. Clifford, 863 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the court stated that
"New York courts have required an additional showing that something, whether it is
a defendant's financial position or past and present conduct, poses a real risk to the
enforceability of a future judgment." Id. The court went so far as to suggest that, in
the absence of such discretion, New York law might violate the constitutional right
of non-domiciliaries to equal protection of the laws. See id. (citing Jonnet v. Dollar
Sav. Bank of N.Y., 530 F.2d 1123, 1142 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring)); see
also Thornapple Assocs. v. Sahagen, No. 06 Civ. 6412(JFK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17370, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru,
948 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Incontrade, Inc. v. Oilborn Int'l, S.A.,
407 F. Supp 1359, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)); Reading & Bates Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Incontrade, 407 F. Supp at
1361); Maitrejean v. Levon Props. Corp., 45 A.D.2d 1020, 1020-21, 358 N.Y.S.2d
203, 205 (2d Dep't 1974) (reversing supreme court for granting a lien against a
foreign corporation, where corporation was highly liquid).
386 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(b) (McKinney 2008).
M7 In re F.O. Baroff Co., 555 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1977). For a description of the
mechanics, see generally David Gray Carlson, Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25
CARDozo L. REV. 1951 (2004).
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garnishment of the insurance company's obligation to defend.8
Of what does this consist? AD typically chooses and pays the
attorney that defends JD and pays that attorney.8 9 Yet any fee
payable by AD to the attorney is garnished in advance by JC 1.
Indeed, under CPLR 5232(a) (fifth sentence), "the garnishee is
forbidden to... pay ... any [garnished] debt."3 9 Knowing this,
the attorney no doubt will selfishly refuse to perform the services
that AD is obliged to finance. In short, not only is the debt
contingent and not garnishable, it is likely never to arise.
This contingency closely resembles that in Supreme
Merchandise, where an issuing bank's obligation to pay a letter of
credit depended on D's presentation of documents. 391  D's
incentive to avoid presentment led the court to declare that D's
right was too contingent to be considered "property" in the
ABKCO sense.392  The garnishment in Seider is no less
contingent. So not only is Seider overruled on the jurisdiction
side393 but also on the collection side as well, by the Supreme
Merchandise decision.394
4. Property Capable of Delivery
Where property is capable of delivery, the sheriff must levy
"by taking the property into custody without interfering with the
lawful possession of pledgees and lessees."395 The phrase "into
custody" has been defined to include the sheriff padlocking a
store and posting notice that its contents had been levied. 96
388 See Seider, 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
389 See Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 472-73 (1958).
390 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
"' See Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 70 N.Y.2d 344, 348, 514 N.E.2d
1358, 1359, 520 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (1987).
"' See id. at 351, 514 N.E.2d at 1361, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
393 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1980) (finding this "ingenious
jurisdictional theory" unconstitutional because "the fictitious presence of the
[insurer's] obligation in Minnesota does not, without more, provide a basis for
concluding that there is any contact in the International Shoe sense between
Minnesota and the insured" (emphasis omitted)).
394 See Supreme Merch. Co., 70 N.Y.2d at 351, 514 N.E.2d at 1361, 520 N.Y.S.2d
at 737.
195 C.P.L.R 5232(b).
'9 See In re Alcor, Inc., 45 A.D.2d 795, 795, 357 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (3d Dep't
1974); see also Marrano v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 768, 770, 364 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (Ct. Cl.
1975) (holding no rent claims can arise from such a padlocking).
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Posting without padlock 39 7 and padlock without posting"9 8 have
sufficed. So has an oral declaration, coupled by an inventorying
of the personal property levied.3 99 According to an ancient case:
[T]here can be no difficulty in ascertaining what constitutes a
valid levy either against the debt or against any persons
claiming title through him to the property:
First, the property must be in the view and under the control of
the officer.
Second, the officer must take possession of the property either
by removing or by an oral declaration that a levy is intended,
and that the officer claims to hold the goods under such levy.
Third, an inventory, or, at least, a memorandum of the levy
should be made at the time.
Fourth, levying the goods in the possession of the debtor until
the sale is at the risk of the officer, but does not invalidate the
levy.40
0
An even simpler test is that a levy occurs when the sheriff
intends to levy and does some overt act to express the intent. °1
A levy occurs if the sheriff (but for legal process) would be guilty
of trespass upon the chattel.0 2
At least one court has stated that the sheriff (or, rather,
marshal) must act reasonably and not take too much property;
otherwise the levy will be undone.0 3 Another court saw no
... See Ace Food Corp. v. Rochlin, 23 Misc. 2d 274, 274, 200 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960). Contra Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Wayne County
Produce Co., 24 Misc. 519, 523, 196 N.Y.S.2d 729, 734 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1959).
398 See Marine Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, 62 A.D.2d 429, 436, 405
N.Y.S.2d 334, 338 (4th Dep't 1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 758, 760, 391 N.E.2d 294, 294,
417 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (1979).
"' See Sheridan Farms, Inc. v. Federico, 48 Misc. 2d 599, 599, 265 N.Y.S.2d 922,
922-23 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1965) (citing Bond v. Willett, 31 N.Y. 102 (1864));
see also In re Gilbert, 127 N.Y.S.2d 533, 539 (Utica City Ct. 1953) (quoting Bond, 31
N.Y. at 102).
400 In re Gilbert, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39 (quoting Bond, 31 N.Y. at 102) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
"I See Stallknecht v. Gilbert Appliance Corp., 144 Misc. 626, 628, 259 N.Y.S.2d
189, 191 (Monroe County Ct. 1932).
"2 See Rodgers v. Bonner, 45 N.Y. 379, 382 (1871) (citing Camp v. Chamberlain,
5 Denio 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848)).
403 See Yeh v. Seakan, 119 Misc. 2d 681, 683, 464 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1983).
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problem in the levy of a luxury cooperative apartment to enforce
a $350 judgment. 40 4
a. Leased Property
A sheriff may not levy by seizure if it interferes with the
possession of a lessee or a pledgee.40 5 The reference to a lessee
presumably assumes JD is the lessor, not the lessee.40 6 Where
JD is lessor, the reference could have been omitted, since JD has
no present right of possession. So neither does the sheriff.407
When JD is the lessor, JD only has the right to receive rent
during the lease408 and the "residual interest"409 (AD's obligation
to return the leased property at the end of the lease).410  Can
these obligations be levied, on the theory that they are properties
not capable of delivery? After all, the leased thing may be
deliverable (that is, tangible) when considered in the abstract,
but perhaps JD's purely future interest in the thing is not itself
presently deliverable.411 Separately, the rent obligation property
would appear to be not capable of delivery.
It would certainly not shock the conscience to say that each
of these interests of JD were not capable of delivery, but there
are doctrinal impediments. These impediments lead to the
suspicion that courts may find that JD's rights in leased personal
404 See House v. Lalor, 119 Misc. 2d 193, 194, 462 N.Y.S.2d 772, 774 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983). Cooperative shares are considered personal property. Tax
Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d 151, 371 N.E.2d 523, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1977).
405 Key Lease Corp. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 117 A.D.2d 560, 562, 499
N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (1st Dep't 1986). This reverses an ancient New York rule permitting
levy of pledged material. Stief v. Hart, 1 N.Y. 20, 23-24 (1847); see also Monitor Co.
v. Confianza Furniture & Appliance Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1955).
406 Cf. Gleich v. Rose, 294 A.D.2d 177, 177, 741 N.Y.S.2d 683, 683 (1st Dep't
2002) (implying that where JD is lessee, sheriff may levy by seizure).
407 U.C.C. § 2A-307(1) (2007) ("[A] creditor of a lessee takes subject to the lease
contract.").
408 Id. § 2A-103(1)(m) ("'Leasehold interest' means the interest of the lessor or
the lessee under a lease contract.").
409 Id. § 2A-103(1)(q) ("'Lessor's residual interest' means the lessor's interest in
the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract.").
410 Id. § 2A-525 (explaining lessor's right of possession if lessee defaults).
411 Two cases hold that property capable of delivery becomes undeliverable when
in the hands of a third party. See Michelsen v. Brush, 233 F. Supp. 868, 870
(E.D.N.Y. 1964) (suggesting that tangibles in the hands of a third party are property
not capable of delivery); In re Flax, 179 B.R. 408, 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing
Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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property are reified into what article 9 calls chattel paper.412 The
chattel paper would then be separate from the leased thing.
With regard to JD's future right to possess the leased thing,
this future right is property capable of delivery (that is, no paper
levies), if we follow the classic, now outmoded, case of Feldman v.
National City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants).413  There, the
Second Circuit Erie-guessed that a future possessory interest in a
thing is not distinguishable from the thing under New York
law.414 The decision is not based on some unique article 9
principle but relies on an underlying premise of New York
property law that is neither codified nor countermanded in the
UCC itself.
In Leasing Consultants, a New York debtor (D) leased
equipment to AD in New Jersey. D granted a security interest in
the chattel paper to SP and, separately, a security interest in the
equipment leased.415 SP was unusually determined to perfect its
security interest.416 It took possession of the chattel paper, which
sufficed for perfection of its security interest in the rent
stream."7 To make assurance double sure, it filed a financing
statement with both the New York Secretary of State and the
local UCC clerk in Queens.41 8 And by way of triple insurance, D
even filed a cautionary financing statement in New Jersey where
the leased equipment was located in the possession of AD.4"9
This would have protected D (and hence SP) if the lease were
covertly a security interest in equipment that AD bought
outright. Were it a true lease, the filing was useless. Yet, when
D filed for bankruptcy in New York, this smorgasbord of
perfection did not sate the appetite of the bankruptcy trustee, nor
did it satisfy the Erie-impaired intuitions of the Second Circuit.42 °
Since SP was claiming a security interest on goods in New
Jersey, SP should have filed yet one more time-in New Jersey,
412 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11) (defining chattel paper as "records that evidence.., a
lease of specific goods").
413 486 F.2d 367, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1973).
414 Id.
... Id. at 369.
416 Id.
417 U.C.C. § 9-313(a).
418 Leasing Consultants, 486 F.2d at 369.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 371-72.
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against D (who did not even live there).4 1 SP was therefore
unperfected, at least as to the right to possess the equipment in
the future.
New article 9 has purged perfection of its adventurous spirit.
It now requires but one filing where D is located. 422 As a result,
Leasing Consultants is no longer good law on the question of how
to perfect a security interest in D's rights as a lessor. The New
York filing alone would have sufficed to confound the modern
bankruptcy trustee.423 But the underlying property premise of
Leasing Consultants still remains: A claim to a future possessory
right of a thing is the same as claiming the thing-in-itself.424
Transporting this dubious lesson to the CPLR, the only way to
reach the future interest in property capable of delivery is for the
sheriff to seize the underlying thing under CPLR 5232(b). Yet
the sheriff is not permitted to interfere with the rights of the
lessee.425 Meanwhile, a paper levy under CPLR 5232(a) is not
permitted because JD's right is in a thing capable of delivery.426
CPLR 5232(a) applies only if the property is not capable of
delivery.427 In short, the Second Circuit's Erie guess is that New
York is wedded to the principle that the thing and JD's future
interest in the thing are one and the same. This reasoning
implies that future interests in personal property are quite
immune from the New York execution lien.
Even so, is not the rent stream on a different basis? Can the
sheriff levy the rent on the theory that it is a debt or property not
capable of delivery? Leasing Consultants left this question
open.4
28
421 Why didn't D's cautionary filing suffice? Because leases, then and now,
require no perfection. The filing was a meaningless event. Ironically, had the lease
been a disguised security interest, D's filing would be perfection, and D's assignment
of the security interest to SP would have been unassailable.
422 U.C.C. §§ 9-201(a), 9-501(a)(1); see also C. Scott Pryor, How Revised Article 9
Will Turn the Trustee's Strong-Arm into a Weak Finger: A Potpourri of Cases, 9 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 209, 270-72 (2001).
421 See Pryor, supra note 422, at 272.
424 See Leasing Consultants, 486 F.2d at 372.
425 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5232(b) (McKinney 2008).
426 Id. 5232(a).
427 Id. 5232(b).
428 The opinion is most confused on this point. The trustee and SP had joined to
sell all their rights in the equipment to a third party for $60,000. The court
remanded to determine whether this $60,000 represented solely SP's perfected right
or also SP's security interest on D's future right of possession. The trustee argued
[Vol. 83:43
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Confusing the matter is Glassman v. Hyder,42 9 which was no
mere Erie guess. Glassman concerned levying rent from real
property, and its applicability depends on whether leases of real
and personal property operate on the same principle.4 °
In Glassman, a non-domiciliary defendant (D) leased a New
Mexico building to AD, who was present in New York. JC
obtained an order of attachment under article 62 of the CPLR,
and the sheriff tried to levy the rent stream by garnishing AD in
New York.431 Peering deeply into New York's unsatisfactory
distinction between debts and property, the Court of Appeals
ruled that, as a debt, the rent was not leviable because it was not
certain to become due, within the meaning of CPLR 5201(a).432
AD might be evicted, in which case the rent obligation would be
canceled. The court conceded that the rent stream was also
contingent property, leviable under CPLR 5201(b).433 But, as the
building was in New Mexico, rent-as-property could only be
reached by means of a New Mexico judicial lien.434 In other
words, rent was real estate, and it was to be found in New
Mexico. Translated to our present context, rent cannot be
distinguished from the thing rented.435 So conceived, rent of
deliverable personal property is property capable of delivery. Yet
the sheriff cannot take the thing away from AD, because this
would interfere with AD's right of possession.
There is reason, however, to find that leases of real and
personal property are different. In real estate cases, New York
views the rent stream so tied up with the thing that it gives no
regard to assignments of real estate rents, separate and apart
from a mortgage on the reversion. Rather, whoever possesses the
that the $60,000 represented only the future right of possession. Leasing
Consultants, 486 F.2d at 373-74.
429 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968).
431 See id. at 357, 244 N.E.2d at 260, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
11 See id. at 360-61, 244 N.E.2d at 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
432 See id. at 358, 244 N.E.2d at 261, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
433 See id. at 359, 244 N.E.2d at 261, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
144 See id. at 366, 244 N.E.2d at 265, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
45 Glassman supports a further distinction: If AD is past due on rent, that past
due rent is a chose in action that is not the same as the New Mexico real estate.
Rather, the past due rent is a leviable debt. And if there is even a smidgen of
overdue rent, the after-acquired property principle in CPLR 5232(a)'s second
sentence picks up all rent as debt, once the rent becomes unconditionally due and
owing. See Money Judgment Part I, supra note 11 at 1363-65.
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reversion has the right to collect the rent.436 The only way a
secured creditor claiming the underlying real estate can capture
the rent stream is to dispossess the debtor (by obtaining the
appointment of a receiver).437
On the other hand, under the ancient common law of
personal property leases, the lease was considered a bailment.
The obligation to pay for an irrevocable bailment was more like
an account receivable in the nature of a promise to pay the
price.4 39 That is to say, the "account" was unconnected to the
thing purchased. True, a payment default permitted termination
of the bailment, but there was no necessary connection between
the rent stream and the thing rented.44 ° If true, the way is open
for a court to view the rent stream as contingent property not
capable of delivery, albeit not a debt certain to become due. As
such, it can be levied by garnishing AD.
Article 9 points to another possibility. What signifies JD's
present possession of the rent stream is tangible chattel paper-
that is, the lease agreement.441 If JD borrows from SP and allows
SP possession of the chattel paper, SP is perfected. 4 2 The UCC,
however, innovated on this score. Prior to the UCC, possession of
the lease was not essential to owning the rent stream.443 If the
UCC creates a different rule, it is very easy for a court to rule
that this reification of rent stream into chattel paper exists only
if article 9 applies, because SP claims seniority over the sheriff.
Whatever the UCC says about SP is useless unless SP (that is,
" See In re Riverside Nursing Home, 100 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank v. R & G Sloane Mfg. Co., 84 A.D.2d 212, 215, 445 N.Y.S.2d
560, 563 (2d Dep't 1981); Witschger v. J.K. Marvin & Co., 255 A.D. 70, 75, 5
N.Y.S.2d 910, 915 (2d Dep't 1938); cf Ireland v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 72 A.D.
95, 102, 76 N.Y.S. 177, 182 (1st Dep't 1902) (stating that "the mere fact that the
mortgagee receives the rents and profits does not constitute him chargeable as a
mortgagee in possession").
431 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254(10) (McKinney 2008).
438 United States v. Wexler, 621 F.2d 1218, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1980).
43' Amelia H. Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary Treatment of a "Special" Kind
of Commercial Specialty, 1983 DUKE L.J. 69, 86 (1983).
440 Id. at 76-77.
44' Chattel paper does not, however, embody a future right to possess the thing
leased. See U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 11 (2007). If it did, then sale of chattel paper would
actually be an article 2 transaction (in part). Boss, supra note 439, at 107-08.
42 U.C.C. § 9-313(a).
' See Boss, supra note 439, at 92, 103-06.
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either a buyer of or lender against chattel paper) is involved in
the litigation.444
On the other hand, the UCC does govern if SP claims the
rent income.44 Suppose SP possesses the chattel paper but has
not filed a financing statement. SP is perfected, which means
that the sheriff is obliged to view the chattel paper as embodying
the rent stream. In other words, when SP claims the rent
stream, the rent is chattel paper-property capable of delivery.
Where no SP claims the rent, the rent stream is property not
capable of delivery. Yet another strange encounter between the
CPLR and the UCC!
b. Pledged Property
For our purposes, pledges are not so very different from
leases. A lessee is entitled to possession so long as she does not
breach the lease. A pledgee is likewise entitled to possession
until the property is redeemed.44 Regardless of what CPLR
5232(b) says, a sheriff may not levy property capable of delivery
from a pledgee (SP) simply because SP's right of possession is
superior to that of JD. If JD has no right of possession, neither
does the sheriff.
Leasing Consultants447 is just as effective an Erie guess for
pledges as for residual interests in leased property: A future
right to possess a thing is the same as the thing. Therefore, the
sheriff cannot paper-levy JD's future right of possession following
redemption.448  Meanwhile, JD's right to a surplus after a
foreclosure sale449 could be viewed as a contingent debt of SP to
JD. As such, it is property not capable of delivery leviable
against SP as AD of JD.
The interaction of CPLR 5232(b) with pledges was addressed
in Knapp v. McFarland.45 ° In Knapp, JD and X owned a Virginia
building and were involved in litigation. Pending the outcome,
they sold the building for cash and put the funds in escrow with
Article 9 applies to sales of chattel paper as well as to security interests in it.
See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
I Id. § 9-604(a).
446 A pledgee, however, may not use the collateral beneficially, as a lessor could,
unless the parties agree otherwise. See id. § 9-207(b)(4).
44 See supra text accompanying notes 413-428.
"8 See U.C.C. § 9-623.
44 See id. § 9-615(d)(1).
450 462 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972).
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AD1 in Maryland. AD1 used the proceeds to buy a treasury bill
for the benefit of the litigants. The treasury bill was purchased
from AD 2 in New York.451
In its analysis, the Knapp court made two fundamental
errors. First, it imagined that AD, was a pledgee, not a bailee.
Second, the court imagined that the treasury bill was a
certificated security-that is, JD had pledged to AD , an
identifiable piece of paper which AD 2 held in its vault as
collateral agent for AD1 .4"2 In fact, AD 1 probably held only a
security entitlement in AD 2's jumbo treasury bill or perhaps in
AD 2's book-entry with the Federal Reserve Bank.453 If so, the
sheriff was levying property not capable of delivery. Let us
continue to play along with the court's misconceptions, however.
These two misconceptions, taken as true, implied that the
sheriff could not grab the alleged certificate; CPLR 5232(b) did
not permit him to interfere "with the lawful possession of
pledgees. '45 4 Instead, the sheriff simply served the execution on
AD 2 without taking possession of the allegedly certificated
security.
Later, enforcement of JC's judgment was suspended when
JD posted a supersedeas bond pending appeal. 455  This was a
happy news for JC, because it guaranteed a solvent surety to pay
the judgment if JC survived appeal. The sheriff, however,
protested against dissolving the levy altogether because the
sheriff was entitled to an undetermined poundage fee for the
levy. He therefore demanded that an execution lien for $11,000
be sustained, notwithstanding the supersedeas bond.45 6  JD
countered that, since the sheriff had not seized the alleged
certificate that AD 2 supposedly held the sheriff had not levied
451 See id. at 936.
452 See id. at 940.
4" See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 568-69
(D.N.J. 1986); see also Martin J. Aronstein, The New/Old Law of Securities
Transfer: Calling a "Spade" a "Heart, Diamond, Club or the Like," 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 429,432 (1990).
411 Knapp, 462 F.2d at 941 (emphasis omitted).
455 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5204 (McKinney 2008).
41 It may be observed that $11,000 covers the time and expense of strolling from
Courthouse Square in Manhattan some five blocks south to Pine Street, where AD2
(Chemical Bank) was then located. Nice work if you can get it!
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and so was disentitled to any poundage.457 Judge Mansfield
viewed this action as a valid levy:
Under the circumstances we believe that the Sheriffs service of
a copy of the execution upon [AD 2] was sufficient to constitute a
valid levy entitling him to poundage. The effect of the service of
a copy of the execution, coupled with issuance of the restraining
notices, was to bar the bank as garnishee from making any
transfer of the Treasury bills.458
Of course, service of the execution is the proper way to levy
property not capable of delivery.459 Yet Judge Mansfield did not
go so far to proclaim JD's future interest in the alleged certificate
to be property not capable of delivery. 460 Rather, he ruled that,
while there was no levy of the certificate, somehow there was a
levy sufficient to justify poundage. The levy was not a levy for
the purpose of permitting the sheriff to sell. But it was a levy for
the purpose of generating a poundage fee.461  Feeble reasoning
indeed! Why should the sheriff get a fee if he did no act that
could have benefited JC?
Entirely mysterious is Judge Mansfield's implication, in the
above-quoted passage, that a restraining notice, served on AD2 by
JC's attorney, somehow plays a role in establishing the levy. All
a restraining notice does is to order AD 2 not to convey away the
certificate.462 Yet a paper levy under CPLR 5232(a) (seventh
sentence) has precisely this same injunctive effect.463 So Judge
Mansfield idea seems to be that, where property capable of
delivery is pledged and where AD2 is enjoined against alienating
... Knapp, 462 F.2d at 942.
411 Id. at 941.
459 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
410 Judge Dorothy Eisenberg interprets Knapp oddly when she cites it for the
following proposition:
New York courts have not held the Sheriffs failure to obtain possession of
the property to be seized fatal to the lienor's interest in every case, but the
courts have made an exception only where the failure is caused by a third
party's failure to comply with the Sheriffs directives to turn over the
property.
In re Flax, 179 B.R. 408, 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Knapp, 462 F.2d 935).
The sheriff had no power to direct a pledgee to surrender possession. A paper levy
implies such a direction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a). But Knapp holds that the levy did
not involve property not capable of delivery.
461 Knapp, 462 F.2d at 942-43.
462 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
4163 Id. 5232(a).
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the thing, somehow this all adds up to a paper levy for which the
sheriff deserves compensation.464
Continuing to play along with the court's two
misconceptions, it was possible for Judge Mansfield to uphold the
levy on another basis. The principle of Leasing Consultants
prevents JD's future interest in a certificate to be property not
capable of delivery.465 A future interest in a thing is the thing,
according to that opinion.466 But if we really had a genuine
pledge before us (which we do not), then AD 2 (as agent of AD1)
owed JD a contingent debt-JD's right to a surplus in case of a
foreclosure sale. As property not capable of delivery, it could be
paper-levied under CPLR 5232(a). On this basis, Judge
Mansfield could have upheld the levy. He could then have
dispensed with the restraining notice, the role of which is
unexplained and mysterious. On this view (and on the premise
that AD 2 was a pledgee holding JD's property capable of
delivery), AD 2 had a contingent duty to pay a surplus to JD. But
can the sheriff levy a sub-bailee once removed from JD for this
surplus? 467 According to CPLR 5232(a), "the sheriff.., shall levy
upon any interest of the judgment debtor ... in personal property
not capable of delivery.., by serving a copy of the execution
upon the garnishee."468 A garnishee is defined as "a person other
than the judgment debtor who has property in his possession or
custody in which a judgment debtor has an interest."469 So, as
long as JD's right to the surplus is indeed property not capable of
delivery, the levy of the remote bailee was proper. Of course,
poundage would be determined on the value of this contingent
right to a surplus, not on the value of the underlying certificated
security, which is not leviable under the CPLR. 470  And, we
4 Knapp, 462 F.2d at 940.
4- Feldman v. Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants), 486 F.2d 367, 371-
72 (2d Cir. 1973).
" See supra text accompanying notes 413-427.
467 AD, could terminate AD2's bailment at any time, in which case AD 2's
obligation to pay the surplus to JD would disappear.
4 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
469 Id. 105(i).
470 Unless article 8 overrules it in this regard. On this possibility, see supra text
accompanying notes 514-519.
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should add, there was no possible surplus, since AD 1.2 were
bailees, not pledgees. 71
Judge Mansfield thought the certificate, not the surplus, was
the thing levied. 2 Yet there was no certificate! There was only
AD 2 intangible obligation to obey the instructions of AD1 as to a
security entitlement, which means that Judge Mansfield was
accidentally approached a correct result. There was property not
capable of delivery after all!
473
Nevertheless, CPLR 5201(c)(4), as it then existed, would still
have prohibited the levy of AD 2. According to CPLR 5201(c)(4) as
then in effect:
Where property or a debt is evidenced by a negotiable
instrument[,] ... a negotiable document of title or a certificate
of stock of an association or corporation, the ... certificate shall
be treated as property capable of delivery and the person
holding it shall be the garnishee; except that in the case of a
security which is transferrable in the manner set forth in
section 8-320 of the uniform commercial code, the firm or
corporation which carries on its books an account in the name of
the judgment debtor in which is reflected such security, shall be
the garnishee; provided, however, that if such security has been
pledged, the pledgee shall be the garnishee.474
471 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals may have extended Knapp's principle in
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 544 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2008), where AD's subsidiary
(as AD's agent) was served with an execution and a restraining notice. (The opinion
indicates that JC, not the marshal, served the execution, which means that there
was no proper levy.) JC sought to encumber certificated shares pledged to AD and
held in AD's Bermuda vault. JC followed up by commencing a turnover proceeding.
Id. at 81. Ultimately, the Second Circuit certified the question whether an AD can be
compelled to deliver property capable of delivery into the state which is located
outside the state. Id. at 88. And it is very unclear whether the court thought it was
relying on the injunctive effect of a levy or on the turnover procedure. If the levy was
valid, it was valid only on the authority of Knapp. It is possible, however, that the
court did not rely upon the levy but rather on a turnover order, which creates a lien
independently of a levy.
472 Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 941 (2d. Cir 1972).
171 See id.
474 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4) (McKinney 1996). For the text of old CPLR
5201(c)(4), see Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 56 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 544 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Old UCC section 8-320 governed ownership of pro rata interests
as reflected in book entries of brokers."' What old CPLR
5201(c)(4) is saying is that AD2 could not be the garnishee. Only
AD1 (in Maryland) was. Only on the basis of AD 1 did JD appear
as an owner. So even if we overlook the Knapp court's two
misconceptions, perhaps the case was still wrongly decided." 6
The Knapp case was, to say the least, a weak Erie guess as to
the state of New York law. In fact, AD 2 was no pledgee 477 and so
owed no contingent debt to pay a surplus. Rather, AD 2 was the
bailee for AD 1 (and sub-bailee to JD). Furthermore, the so-called
certificated security was no such thing. It was what new article 8
calls a "security entitlement," '' which means that the property
was not leviable at all, since AD 2 held no property traceable to
JD. To understand this last claim we must delve into the law of
article 8 and the transfer of securities.
5. Article 8 Securities
Levying pledged securities poses special complexity because
it is possible that article 8 of the UCC overrules the CPLR.
Accordingly, we turn next to the interaction of New York judicial
liens and article 8 of the UCC.
a. Securities Entitlements
Over the past thirty-five years, the stock certificate, like the
vinyl recording, has become passd. Instead, certificates issued by
publicly traded companies have been immobilized. The issuer
typically utters a jumbo certificate, which is held by the
Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), a corporation organized
under the banking laws of New York.479 The DTC then issues pro
rata shares in the jumbo certificate to various brokers. The
brokers then sell pro rata shares in their pro rata shares to
476 U.C.C. § 8-320 (1977). For the text of former U.C.C. section 8-320, see
Satterfield v. Haymond, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14322, CV No. C-84-0646W, at *17
n.4 (D. Utah, Oct. 31 1985).
476 This conclusion presupposes that the treasury bill, if certificated, would have
been a negotiable instrument. It certainly was neither a negotiable document, see id.
§ 1-201(15), nor a certificate of stock.
47 See Knapp, 462 F.2d at 937.
478 N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (McKinney 2008).
171 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
307, 317 n.23 (1990).
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customers or other brokers.4' The typical American shareholder
is therefore many times removed from the jumbo certificate
located in DTC's closely guarded vault in New York City.4"'
Article 8, much revised in 1994,482 calls the shareholder's
remote interest in a jumbo certificate a security entitlement.4 3
According to section 8-112(c) of the UCC:
The interest of a debtor in a security entitlement may be
reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the securities
intermediary with whom the debtor's securities account is
maintained, except as otherwise provided in subsection (d).
"Legal process" is not a term the UCC defines, but New York
courts would be justified in interpreting it to mean either an
execution followed by a paper levy, a turnover order, or the
appointment of a receiver.4 s4 Each of these establishes a judicial
lien on personal property.48 5 If a debtor has granted a security
480 See id. at 316-18.
481 See id. at 317-20.
482 See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time?: The
Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291
(2004) (discussing the 1994 changes to article 8).
48 U.C.C. § 8-102(17) (2007) (defining security entitlement as "the rights and
property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset specified
in Part 5"). Part 5 sets forth various rules of issuance and transfer with regard to
security entitlements. A financial asset is defined as, among other things, a security.
Id. § 8-102(a)(9)(i).
To be distinguished from the security entitlement is the uncertificated security. The
uncertificated security was invented in 1977 to solve the "paper crunch" of the
1960s, during which stock markets could not physically handle the transfer of
certificated shares. See Mooney, supra note 479, at 317 n.23. It never caught on,
however, because immobilizing jumbo certificates with the DTC proved popular and
easy. Nevertheless, they are used by mutual funds, many of which will be located in
New York. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 614 (1990).
Mutual fund shares might be held by a broker for the benefit of the customer, in
which case the customer owns a security entitlement, not an uncertificated security.
But mutual funds may register the ownership interests of customers directly. If so,
the uncertificated security of a judgment debtor can be levied only "by legal process
upon the issuer at its chief executive office in the United States, except as otherwise
provided in subsection (d)." U.C.C. § 8-112(b).
44 See U.C.C. § 8-112.
485 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202 (McKinney 2008).
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interest in the security entitlement, section 8-112(d) of the UCC
provides a different rule:
The interest of a debtor in ... a security entitlement
maintained in the name of a secured party, may be reached by a
creditor by legal process upon the secured party.48 6
This provision applies only where the securities intermediary
(that is, the broker) has attorned to-that is, has agreed to follow
only the instructions of-SP. The UCC calls attornment
"control. 48 7 Control is a mode for perfecting article 9 security
interests.8 8
Section 8-112(c) requires that "legal process" be directed only
to the broker with whom the debtor has dealt.48 9 In Knapp v.
McFarland,49 ° the sheriff levied AD2 on the theory that AD 2 was
supposedly holding paper for AD 1, which JC 1 in turn held for
JD.491 In truth, AD 1 invested the cash in a pro rata share of
AD2 s treasury bill and therefore had a security entitlement.
Under modern section 8-112(c), enacted in 1984, only AD1 could
be garnished to reach this property-not AD2. Nevertheless,
even at the time Knapp was decided, we saw that the CPLR had
a rule requiring that remote brokers could not be garnished, one
of many rules the Knapp court overlooked.492 Today, CPLR
5201(c)(4) simply cross-references to article 8, which now takes
up the rule the CPLR had introduced.493
Suppose JC properly levies a broker with whom JD has
dealt. The security entitlement is undoubtedly property not
capable of delivery. According to CPLR 5232(a), a garnishee
must "pay all such debts" (that is, debts owed to JD) and
"transfer all such property" (that is, JD's property not capable of
-6 U.C.C. § 8-112.
487 Id. § 8-106(d)(2) (Control exists when "the securities intermediary has agreed
that it will comply with entitlement orders originated by the purchaser without
further consent by the entitlement holder.").
488 Id. § 9-314(a).
489 Id. § 8-112(c).
490 462 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972).
491 See id. at 937.
492 See supra text accompanying notes 474-476.
493 For a different result even before the enactment of section 8-112(c) of the
UCC, see Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of New York, 58 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (New York indenture trustee who issued a jumbo certificate to a
broker who sold a pro rata share to a Philippine Bank who sold a pro rata share to a
Philippine resident not a proper garnishee).
[Vol. 83:43
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 121
delivery in control of JD's broker).494 The broker's obligation to
JD-a securities account 495-certainly cannot be called a debt. A
debt is defined in New York as an amount due or certain to
become due.496 Therefore, the broker holds property (not debt) of
JD and so must transfer the property to the sheriff.
The transfer from broker to sheriff is accomplished under
section 8-501(b) of the UCC:
[A] person acquires a security entitlement if a securities
intermediary:
(1) indicates by book entry that a financial asset has been
credited to the person's securities account; ... or
(3) becomes obligated under other law.., to credit a
financial asset to the person's securities account.497
Since the broker is obligated by law to credit the sheriff, section
8-501(b)(3) suggests that, at the moment of the levy, the sheriff
instantly owns the security entitlement. If the broker resists,
then, as with all paper levies, JC must bring a turnover
proceeding against the broker. According to CPLR 5225(c), "[t]he
court may order any person to execute and deliver any document
necessary to effect payment or delivery."49
What then can the sheriff do with the security entitlement
now registered to her in her name? Unfortunately, the sales
mechanism of the CPLR is quite inadequate to the modern article
8 regime. According to CPLR 5233(a):
The interest of the judgment debtor in personal property
obtained by a sheriff pursuant to execution or order ... shall be
sold by the sheriff at public auction at such time and place and
as a unit or in such lots, or combination thereof, as in his
judgment will bring the highest price .... The property shall
be present and within the view of those attending the sale
unless otherwise ordered by the court.4 99
494 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2008).
495 A securities account is defined as "an account to which a financial asset is or
may be credited in accordance with an agreement under which the person
maintaining the account undertakes to treat the person for whom the account is
maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset."
U.C.C. § 8-501(a).
49 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a).
497 U.C.C. § 8-501(b).
498 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(c).
I Id. 5233(a).
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This section requires that the sheriff must sell it at a public
auction. 500 If the security entitlement is in shares trading on a
stock exchange, certainly the stock exchange itself should be
viewed as an auction. There is the difficulty that, at the auction,
the levied property must be visible to of those attending the
auction. A security entitlement, however, is quite invisible
(though the broker's records could be viewed). Fortunately,
pursuant to CPLR 5233(c), the court can order a different sales
procedure. 50 1 But presumably this puts everyone to the trouble of
a court hearing.
CPLR 5233(b) also imposes notice requirements with regard
to the sale.5 °2 Notice must be posted in three public places in the
town in which then sale is to be held. Since the stock exchanges
are typically in New York City, the sheriff will be able to
substitute newspaper ads for public posters. Notice
requirements with regard to publicly traded stock are a useless
formality. Given the fact that the auction via the stock market is
supposed to be highly efficient, °3 notice to potential buyers
serves no role in increasing the amount bid. The court might as
well waive notice pursuant to its discretion to change the rules
under CPLR 5240.504 This too, however, will require a hearing.
50 See Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 211 F.R.D. 197, 202 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (assuming levied securities must be sold pursuant to auction). The sale of
stock by the sheriff is immune from federal and state securities laws. See Kohl v.
Arlen Realty, Inc., 120 Misc. 2d 414, 416, 465 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
501 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5233(c) (allowing for an immediate sale of property when
the case requires).
02 Id. 5233(b).
503 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing the reasons that capital
markets are efficient).
'04 According to CPLR 5240:
The court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any
interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an order
denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use
of any enforcement procedure.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240. No similar provision exists in article 62, governing prejudgment
attachment. Nevertheless, at least one appellate panel has suggested that the court
has discretion to release funds in hardship cases (though it declined to do so for the
purpose of paying the defendant's attorneys, where millions of dollars were missing
in a fraud). See Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile v. Hirsch, 242 A.D.2d 183,
185, 673 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (1st Dep't 1998). In comparison, the Second Circuit ruled
that there is no discretion to deny attachment because the court doubts whether the
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CPLR 5233(c) indicates that "[t]he court may direct
immediate sale or other disposition of property with or without
notice if the urgency of the case requires. 505  With stock,
however, the case is rarely urgent. In any case a court order is
required, slowing up and increasing the cost of the liquidation
process. °6 In truth, the CPLR is poorly drafted with regard to




While certificated shares no longer trade very often in the
stock market, they are commonly used in closely held
corporations. The CPLR is strangely contradictory with regard
to levying these shares.
According to CPLR 5201(c)(4):
Where property or a debt is evidenced by a... certificate of
stock of an association or corporation, the ... certificate shall be
treated as property capable of delivery and the person holding it
shall be the garnishee; except that section 8-112 of the uniform
commercial code shall govern the extent to which and the
means by which any interest in a certificated security... may
be reached by garnishment, attachment or other legal
process.5 o7
We may pause to consider some curiosities produced by CPLR
5201(c)(4). First, garnishees are defined as non-debtors in
possession of debtor property.0 5 Yet CPLR 5201(c)(4) says that
anyone in possession (including JD) is to be the garnishee.50 9 But
to what end? Paper levies of garnishees under CPLR 5232(a) are
limited to property not capable of delivery, yet CPLR 5201(c)(4)
insists that certificated securities are to be considered capable of
levied asset is valuable. See Capital Ventures v. Argentina, 443 F.3d 214, 220-22 (2d
Cir. 2006).
505 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233(c).
506 See id. 5233.
507 Id. 5201(c)(4). This section overrules the view that certificated shares could
not be reached by writ of execution. See Ajax Craftsmen, Inc. v. Whinston, 269 N.Y.
7, 12, 198 N.E. 611, 613 (1935).
505 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(i) ("A 'garnishee' is a person who owes a debt to a judgment
debtor, or a person other than the judgment debtor who has property in his
possession or custody in which a judgment debtor has an interest.").
,o0 See id. 5201(c)(4).
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delivery. Paper levies of property capable of delivery are
permitted as part of pre-judgment attachment, however. 5 0 Here
it makes sense to identify the debtor as a garnishee.
In addition, CPLR 5201(c)(4) seems to be saying that UCC
section 8-112 governs the extent to which certificated securities
may be reached by judicial process. Yet CPLR 5232(b) states:
The sheriff... shall levy upon any interest of the judgment
debtor in personal property capable of delivery by taking the
property into custody without interfering with the lawful
possession of pledgees .... 511
According to CPLR 5232(b), the sheriff may not levy pledged
shares, even if there is a valuable debtor equity in them.512
Arguably the UCC imposes a different rule. According to section
8-112(a):
The interest of a debtor in a certificated security may be
reached by a creditor only by actual seizure of the security
certificate by the officer making the. . . levy, except as
otherwise provided in subsection (d).513
Does this section not authorize the sheriff to take possession even
from a pledgee? If so, CPLR 5232(b) is overruled, because, as we
have seen, whenever the UCC conflicts with a non-UCC
provision, the UCC prevails.5 14  And, independently, CPLR
5201(c)(4) specifically exalts article 8 over the CPLR.51 5
Complicating our analysis further is section 8-112(d):
The interest of a debtor in a certificated security for which the
certificate is in possession of a secured party ... may be reached
by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party.516
The problem we now face is that CPLR 5201(c)(4)
subordinates the CPLR to the UCC. Yet at the crucial moment of
governing the levy of pledged certificated securities, the UCC
sends us right back to the CPLR for the definition of "legal
510 See id. 6214(a).
51 Id. 5232(b) (emphasis added).
512 See id. In dictum, the court in Cohen v. First National City Bank, 49 Misc. 2d
141, 267 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), says otherwise, but it
assumes that the statute says sheriff may not interfere with the senior secured
party's security interest. See id. at 145, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 151. In fact, the statute says
that the sheriff may not interfere with the possession of the senior secured party.
513 U.C.C. § 8-112(a) (2007).
514 Id. § 10-103; see supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
"' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4).
516 U.C.C. § 8-112(d).
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process."517 There we learn that the sheriff may not seize pledged
certificated securities under CPLR 5232(b). 1s  Yet this is
preempted by section 8-112(a), which permits seizure of JD's
interest in the certificate. 19 We are thus caught in a renvoi.
The vicious circle just described was addressed obliquely in
Knapp v. McFarland.52 ° In Knapp, the court upheld the paper
levy of what it took to be a pledged certificated security under
New York law (though in truth AD had an intangible security
entitlement).5 2' Here is how Judge Mansfield described the
relation of section 8-112(a) and CPLR 5232(b):
[D] argues that the Sheriffs claim to poundage is defeated by
§ 8-317 [now numbered as § 8-112(a)], which provides that no
levy upon an outstanding security shall be valid until it is
actually seized by the officer. However, that statute was not
enacted for the purpose of determining what levy would suffice
to entitle a sheriff to poundage or to enforce a money judgment
against a judgment debtor. Its purpose is to define the rights of
third parties claiming an interest in attached personal property.
More specifically its effect is to protect bona fide purchasers for
value of property subject to a judgment creditor's lien by
invalidating a levy as to such parties unless the sheriff has
taken actual possession.5 22
In other words, Judge Mansfield holds that section 8-112(a) is
compatible with CPLR 5232. The meaning of section 8-112(a) is
that, if the sheriff seizes the certificate, there can be no
"protected purchaser" who takes free and clear of JC's execution
lien.523 But section 8-112(a) does not mean the sheriff must or
even may levy by seizure.
Putting together the above thoughts, Knapp holds that
article 8 does not require levy by seizure of the certificate. But it
is equally true that section 8-112(a) of the UCC authorizes it.524
True, section 8-112(d) covers pledged securities. So we may
517 See id.
s See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b).
519 See U.C.C. § 8-112(a).
520 462 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
815 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1987).
521 See supra text accompanying notes 450-477.
522 Knapp, 462 F.2d at 942.
52 See U.C.C. § 8-112(a).
524 See id.
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concede that the specific overrules the general52 -in the case of
pledges, only section 8-112(d) governs, not section 8-112(a). Yet
section 8-112(d) requires us to know what "legal process" is.526
Well, legal process includes the levy pursuant to execution.
Furthermore, section 8-112(a) of the UCC defines levy as seizure
of the certificate.527 So, at the end of the day, perhaps the sheriff
may break into SP's vault and take the certificate.
ii. Pre-Judgment Attachment
Whatever may be the case for post-judgment judicial liens on
certificated securities, the matter stands differently for pre-
judgment orders of attachment. Pre-judgment attachment does
not utilize the concept of property capable of delivery.5 28 Paper
levies are authorized for any personal property, whether held by
the debtor or a third party. So in Proteus Food & Industries, Inc.
v. Nippon Reizo Kabushiki Kaisha, 29 AD held JD's certificated
security in New York as part of a voting trust. AD was,
therefore, no pledgee. The sheriff served AD with an order of
attachment under CPLR 6214(a).13 ° Unlike post-judgment levy,
pre-judgment paper levies are perfectly valid with regard to
certificated securities. Among the things a CPLR 6214(a) levy
signifies is an injunction prohibiting the garnishee from
disposing of JD's property.131 Whereas section 8-112(a) states
that the "interest of a debtor in a certificated security may be
reached by a creditor only by actual seizure,"531 section 8-112(e)
provides:
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a certificated
security.., is entitled to aid from a court.., by injunction or
otherwise, in reaching the certificated security.533
On this basis, the Proteus Food court upheld the paper levy of
shares held by the custodian. 34
... See supra note 108.
526 See U.C.C. § 8-112(d).
527 See id. § 8-112(a).
52 See supra text accompanying note 183-185.
5 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 961 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
52 See id. at 963.
531 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2008) ("Until such... delivery is
made,.., the garnishee is forbidden to make or suffer any.., transfer of, or any
interference with any such property... to any person other than the sheriff ...
532 U.C.C. § 8-112(a) (2007).
52" Id. §8-112(e).
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Location of the certificate outside New York might prove an
impediment to pre-judgment attachment. Koehler v. Bank of
Bermuda, Ltd.,535 illustrates the problem, even though it was a
post-judgment case. In Koehler, JC arranged for a levy of SP, to
whom JD had pledged shares." 6 SP kept the shares in Bermuda,
but SP eventually confessed to being present in New York for
Shaffer v. Heitner purposes. 37 As we have seen, the propriety of
this levy is questionable; no matter where the shares are located,
it is not clear that pledged certificated shares can be paper-levied
in New York.5 38 Nevertheless, a paper levy is appropriate in the
pre-judgment context, so that, however wrong the case is for
post-judgment remedies, Koehler can be viewed as a test case for
the attachment lien.
After the alleged levy, the Koehler court signed an ex parte
order commanding SP to bring the shares from Bermuda to New
York. 39 Later, the court regretted its action and rescinded it on
two grounds. First, JD and JC had settled, which had the effect
of satisfying the underlying judgment.54 °  Second, as an
alternative ground, the court ruled that it could not order a
person present in New York to bring shares from outside the
state into New York. The situs of the stock, the court reasoned,
was Bermuda.541 But so what? A levy of the order of attachment
constitutes a command to SP to deliver all of D's property in the
possession of AD to the sheriff.5 42 Similarly, a valid paper levy of
property not capable of delivery pursuant to an execution
constitutes an injunction to turn over such property to the
sheriff.54 3 If the levy was valid, then it already constituted an
injunction to deliver. Levies last only ninety days, unless
extended by, inter alia, bringing a turnover proceeding against
SP pursuant to CPLR 5225(b). The "levy" was indeed extended
511 See 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) at 964.
... No. M18-302 (CSH), 2005 WL 551115 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005).
53 See id. at *6.
See id. at *8.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 446-447.
See Kholer, 2005 WL 551115 at *1.
540 This holding was later reversed on appeal. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd.,
544 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2008).
'41 See Kholer, 2005 WL 551115 at *11.
542 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2008).
' See id. 5232(a).
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by the commencement of a turnover proceeding.5' Turnover
proceedings themselves generate equity liens. So properly
conceived, Koehler has to be viewed as an equity lien case, not an
execution lien or attachment lien case. On this basis, the order
seems well within the jurisdiction of the court. So, for example, a
defendant (as opposed to AD) has been ordered to bring
certificated shares to New York from Bermuda.545 Why should it
make a difference that AD is so ordered? 46
There is nevertheless troubling dictum in ABKCO Industries,
Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., where the court upheld garnishment
of a film royalty owed by a New York AD to a foreign D.548
Distinguishing the intangible royalty from negotiable
instruments, the court held
Tangible personal property obviously has a unique location and
can only be attached where it is. It is true that some intangibles
are deemed to have become embodied in formal paper writings,
e.g., negotiable instruments, and in such instances attachment
depends on the physical presence of the written instrument
within the attaching jurisdiction.5 49
This remark overlooks the injunctive effect a levy of an order of
attachment has. Since the remark is mere dictum, it should be
ignored as contrary to CPLR 6214(a).5  The dubious lesson of
Koehler and the ABKCO dictum, incidentally, is that JDs and
ADs should keep certificated shares across the bridge in New
54 Letter from Brian G. West to author (February 26, 2008) (on file with
author).
1, See United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962) (tax lien case).
5 One procedural curiosity is that the district court purported to give an ex
parte turnover order. CPLR 5225(b), however, requires a special proceeding to be
commenced. Nevertheless, ex parte restraining notices can be issued. But this lasts
only one year, and there is no explicit authority to extend the effect of the notice. Id.
5222(b). The litigants, however, did not challenge the authority of the district court
to issue an ex parte order. Significantly, AD returned the shares to JD in violation of
the ex parte order; JC's action is for damages for violating the court order. Of course,
if the order is ultra vires, AD would not owe damages. Perhaps the court's ex parte
turnover order can be justified as a temporary restraining order within the meaning
of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7 39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
548 Id. at 672, 350 N.E.2d at 900, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
5 Id. at 676, 350 N.E.2d at 901, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
5' Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l Fin. Co., 41 A.D.3d 25, 35, 836
N.Y.S.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Dep't 2007) (turnover order requiring debtor to bring
certificated shares from Indonesia).
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Jersey, as that will cost JC the trouble of starting a New Jersey
proceeding.
iii. Perfection by Filing
One of the political programs of the 2000 amendments to
article 9 of the UCC was to pulverize the bankruptcy trustee for
the benefit of article 9 lenders.551 But this could only be done by
pulverizing JCs at state law, since bankruptcy trustees have, as
of the day of the bankruptcy petition, all the powers of JCs.52
Any attempt by the UCC to attack bankruptcy trustees directly
would likely be struck down on constitutional grounds.553
Therefore, the sheriff had to take a beating really aimed at the
bankruptcy trustee.
Accordingly, one of the important article 9 reforms is to
permit SP to perfect a security interest in "investment property"
by filing an ordinary financing statement. 554  "Investment
property" is defined to include certificated securities and security
entitlements. Therefore, after a sheriff levies, whether by
serving the execution in case of the security entitlement or by
seizing certificated securities, a secured party may emerge who
has perfected a senior security interest in the levied property by
filing a financing statement.
One possibility is for JC is to convert the judicial lien into an
article 9 security interest. Suppose, for example, that the sheriff,
on behalf of JC has garnished JD's broker with regard to a
security entitlement. We have seen that the sheriff can insist
that the broker attorn to the sheriff. We also suggested that the
sheriff can use the stock market as an auction (with court
assistance).556 If the sheriffs power could fall under the concept
of control, then JC would be a secured party with priority over a
secured party who has perfected by a mere filing.
151 Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Greedy?, 104 COM. L.J. 241,
241-43 (1999).
52 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
53 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1929).
5' U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (2007).
5 Id. § 9-102(a)(49).
556 See supra notes 502-506 and accompanying text.
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The impediment is that the definition of "control" is tied to
the concept of a purchaser . 5 7  A "purchase" is a "voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property."5 8 Judicial lien
creditors are not purchasers. 9 So the sheriff has no control. But
what if JD could be persuaded to sign a security agreement with
the sheriff, for the benefit of JC? JD's acquiescence to the levy
would be the consensual grant of a security interest,
transforming JC's judicial lien into a senior security interest,
which trumps SP's perfected-by-filing security interest.56 °
According to CPLR 5225(c), a court "may order any person to
execute and deliver any document necessary to effect payment or
delivery."56' Presumably, JD may be ordered to sign a security
agreement for the benefit of JC, but this would not make JC a
purchaser as JDs' action cannot be considered voluntary under
these circumstances.
6. Negotiable Instruments
CPLR 5201(c)(4) proclaims negotiable instruments property
capable of delivery. Therefore the sheriff must levy by seizure.562
The same puzzles about pledgees will play out with regard to
negotiable instruments.
Negotiability differentiates between bearer paper and paper
requiring special indorsement.563 Where the sheriff levies bearer
paper, the sheriff can sell it to a buyer at the execution sale who
then becomes a holder. The maker or acceptor will then be
obligated to honor the instrument. 64 The buyer, however, can
557 U.C.C. § 9-106 ("A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated
security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 8-106"). Section 8-106 limits
all forms of control to purchasers. See id. § 8-106.
6 8 Id. § 1-201(32). A purchaser, not surprisingly, is "a person who takes by
purchase." Id. § 1-201(33).
119 FDIC v. Malin, 802 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1986) (real estate case).
560 This actually occurred in Citibank, N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns Ltd. (In re
Citibank), 98 N.Y.2d 743, 780 N.E.2d 503, 750 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2002). The case did not
involve investment securities, however, and JC,, who received the consensual
assignment of a payment intangible, stupidly forgot to perfect, so that JC2 snatched
away priority. Id. at 744, 780 N.E.2d at 503-04, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 818-19.
561 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(c) (McKinney 2008).
562 Id. 5232(b).
r6 Id. 5225(c).
56 Where the sheriff levies personal checks made out to the debtor, the drawer
of the check may well stop the payee bank from paying. N.Y. U.C.C § 4-403(1)
(McKinney 2008); Argiriou & Finkel v. Marciante Luncheonette II, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d
660, 663-64, 315 N.Y.S.2d 448, 452 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970). Nevertheless, the
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never be a holder in due course; 565 if there is some adverse claim
superior to the buyer's or a maker-issuer's defense, the adverse
claim or defense will prevail.566
If, on the other hand, the debtor's endorsement is missing,
the buyer at the foreclosure sale should be able to compel JD to
supply the missing indorsement, thereby making the buyer a
holder. 67 If the maker-issuer does not pay, the buyer can sue the
maker-issuer for payment.565
While the law of the levied negotiable instrument is not
difficult, a regrettable opinion exists within the New York oeuvre.
In In re Flax,569 a sheriff levied a certified check made out to JD
about 100 days before bankruptcy. Once the bankruptcy petition
was filed, the sheriff voluntarily returned the check to the
attorneys for JD, who presumably held it in trust for the
bankruptcy trustee.7 0 This should not have ended the levy.
Sheriffs have a duty to return levied material to the bankruptcy
estate, according to some courts.571  The sheriff should not be
taken to intend a dissolution of JC's rights. Rather, the
bankruptcy estate is obliged to provide adequate protection of
JC's valid lien on the certified check as condition to its use, sale
or lease.572
buyer of the personal check at an execution sale would have the right to sue the
drawer for breach of warranty. The buyer must first become a holder, however. N.Y.
U.C.C. § 3-413(2).
"" See N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(a) (McKinney 2008); see also U.C.C. § 3-302(c)
(2007).
56 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(a); U.C.C. § 3-302(c); see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-
306(a)-(b); U.C.C. § 3-306.
567 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(c); N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-201(1); see also Gryphon Domestic
VI, LLC v. APP Int'l Fin. Co., 41 A.D.3d 25, 35, 836 N.Y.S.2d 4, 11 (1st Dep't 2007)
(court could order debtor to execute documents needed to transfer ownership of
certificated shares of stock). Under new article 3, the transferee can skip the step of
obtaining JD's signature and proceed directly against the maker-acceptor. Where JC
relies on CPLR 5225(c), JC must make the person executing the document a party to
the supplementary proceeding. Sochor v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 60 N.Y.2d 254,
260, 457 N.E.2d 696, 699, 469 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (1983).
568 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-413(1).
569 179 B.R. 408, 410 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
171 See id. at 410.
571 See Concordia Lumber Co. v. Knaus (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th
Cir. 1989); David Gray Carlson, Turnover of Collateral in Bankruptcy: Must a
Secured Party in Possession Volunteer?, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 483 (1997).
572 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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Nevertheless, the Flax court ruled that the levy had
dissolved;573 JC was unjustly demoted to the indignity of an
unsecured creditor.574  First, the Flax court incomprehensibly
assumed that the sheriff had levied property not capable of
delivery, so that CPLR 5232(a) governed the levy. It then
assumed that the levy was unperfected because the sheriff
negligently did not obtain the necessary indorsements to create a
bearer instrument. There is no such principle in CPLR 5232(a),
even if it applied. The sheriff has no duty whatever to obtain
signatures. This the buyer at the execution sale can do.575
Rather, CPLR 5232(a) indicates that, if property is transferred to
the sheriff, the levy does not lapse. 6 This rather supports JC's
claim to be a secured creditor in the bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, a non-negotiable note is property not capable of
delivery. 77 Yet it might still be an instrument under the article 9
definition. Prior to 2000, an SP claiming instruments was
considered unperfected unless it had possession of them.
Therefore, it became possible for JCs to sneak in and paper-levy
AD by serving the execution, even if the lender had filed a
financing statement, thereby depriving the secured lender of
collateral. 9  After 2000, however, filing with regard to
instruments (including negotiable instruments) became good
enough to beat judgment creditors with any instrument,
negotiable or not.58 0
573 See-Flax, 179 B.R. at 412.
571 See id.
675 See Monitor Co. v. Confianza Furniture & Appliance Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 140,
142-43 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955) (buyer of pledged certificates sold at an
execution sale entitled to inspect the books of the issuer, because JD had this right).
576 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2008).
577 See id. 5201(c)(4) (only negotiable instruments are capable of delivery).
578 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) (2007) ("'Instrument' means a negotiable
instrument or any other writing that evidence a right to the payment of a monetary
obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in
ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary
indorsement or assignment.").
579 See Berkowitz v. Chavo Int'l, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 144, 150, 542 N.E.2d 1086, 1089,
544 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (1989).
,80 U.C.C. § 9-312(a). Note should be made of the scandalous opinion in
Highland Capital Management, LP v. Schneider, 8 N.Y.3d 406, 410, 866 N.E.2d
1020, 1023, 834 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (2007), which threatens to transform all
promissory notes into article 8 securities. In Highland, sellers of promissory notes
backed out of an oral commitment to sell. Under article 8, there is no statute of
frauds. So the plaintiffs successfully argued that, since ownership of the notes could
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7. Partnership Interests
JD may be a partner in some partnership. New York
Partnership Law provides a "charging order" procedure whereby
the court "charges" the partnership interest of JD.5 s1
Presumably, this means that the court issues a turnover order
requiring the partnership to pay over to JC any distributions the
partnership may make to JD.
A charging order is not the exclusive mode for creating a lien
on partnership distributions. The sheriff may levy pursuant to
an execution by serving a partner of JD.5 82 Even service upon a
limited partner binds the general partnership interest of a JD.58 3
The capital account of a partner, however, may not be levied.8 4
This capital is partnership property and is, in effect, like any
other asset of the partnership, which creditors of individual
partners cannot generally reach.8 5 Whereas creditors of the
partnership can reach individual partner assets, the converse is
not true.
The commencement of a charging order proceeding does not
create a lien. Rather, the lien arises when the court issues an
order. It is therefore open for an execution creditor to seize
priority by levying the partnership prior to the issuance of the
have been registered on the books of the issuer (even though the issuer maintained
no registration system), the notes qualified as securities under section 8-102(a)(15)(i)
of the UCC (obligation must be "represented by a security certificate ... the transfer
of which may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by... the
issuer"). Highland, 8 N.Y.3d at 413-16, 866 N.E.2d at 1025-27, 834 N.Y.S.2d at
697-99. Since mere hypothetical books suffice, it could be that all promissory notes
(if one of a class or series) could be article 8 securities. Happily, this rule only applies
to firms incorporated in New York.
U.C.C. § 8-110(a).
581 See N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 54(1) (McKinney 2008). A court may also appoint a
receiver of the judgment debtor's partnership interest. See id.
582 See Princeton Bank & Trust Co. v. Berley, 57 A.D.2d 348, 355, 394 N.Y.S.2d
714, 719 (2d Dep't 1977); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(3) ("Where property consists
of an interest in a partnership, any partner other than the judgment debtor, on
behalf of the partnership, shall be the garnishee.").
513 See Executive House Realty v. Hagen, 108 Misc. 2d 986, 991, 438 N.Y.S.2d
174, 179 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981).
-14 See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 226 A.D.2d 594, 595, 641 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348
(2d Dep't 1996).
"" See Princeton Bank, 57 A.D.2d at 356, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (real estate of
partnership immune from execution by creditor of a partner).
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charging order.586 In this respect, the charging order is quite
identical to the turnover order under CPLR 5225(b).
8. Payment or Delivery by the Garnishee
Suppose the sheriff garnishes AD on behalf of JC, and JC
either pays the debt or delivers property to the sheriff. According
to CPLR 5209:
A person who, pursuant to an execution or order, pays or
delivers, to the judgment creditor or a sheriff or receiver, money
or other personal property in which a judgment debtor has or
will have an interest, or so pays a debt he owes the judgment
debtor, is discharged from his obligation to the judgment debtor
to the extent of the payment or delivery. 58 7
A similar provision for pre-judgment attachment exists.588 These
provisions are designed to assure AD that paying the sheriff is
safe and will not result in a double liability. They provide a "safe
harbor that preempts the judgment debtor's ... claim that the
garnishee should have investigated the validity of the
execution. 589
CPLR 5209 has its dark side. It protects banks that honor
garnishments, even though the bank account contains exempt
funds.590 The burden is on JD to come forward and claim that
the levy affects exempt property. 591 This effect of CPLR 5209 has
become a cause celebre. Collection agents with judgments
against the elderly have begun to garnish bank accounts that
586 See Garland D. Cox & Assocs. v. Koffman, 48 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 400 N.E.2d
302, 302, 424 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (1979).
,81 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209. The reference to "order" means turnover pursuant to
CPLR 5225(b). See Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d 457, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
8 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6204.
55 Chin Sung Yu v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 248 A.D.2d 235, 235, 670 N.Y.S.2d 187,
187 (1st Dep't 1998). CPLR 5209 therefore becomes a reason not to permit an
interpleader, when only one levy exists, and where CPLR 5209 protects AD from any
double liability. See Weg & Myers, P.C. v. Security Sys. by Hammond, Inc., 167 Misc.
2d 1042, 1043-44, 641 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1996).
590 See Chin Sung Yu v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 248 A.D.2d 235, 235, 670 N.Y.S.2d
187, 187 (1st Dep't 1998). To add injury to injury, bank agreements typically award
a fee to the bank if a garnishment is received, even if the account contains only
exempt funds. See McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985);
Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607 (SJF)(ARL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30076, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007).
1 See McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 550 (2d Cir. 1985); Granger,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30076, at *20; Jonas v. Citibank, N.A., 414 F. Supp. 2d 411,
418 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (bank paid over social security funds).
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obviously contain nothing but social security funds-exempt
under federal law.592 The strategy is that the elderly person is
too intimidated or confused to seek a refund from the collecting
agent.593 Under New York law, a debtor must be given notice
that property to be levied might be exempt.5 94 This notice
includes the address of JC's attorney.595 These rules mitigate but
do not remove the risk that a bank will indifferently pay exempt
funds to the sheriff before JD can interfere. The matter is no
doubt ripe for legislative reform. 96
CPLR 5209 has a design flaw: It applies only if, at the time
of payment, JD still has a property interest in the payment
intangible that AD owes. 597 Suppose JD absolutely transfers to
SP AD's obligation to pay, but SP has authorized JD to collect
from AD as agent of SP. AD is then garnished. If AD pays the
sheriff after the assignment, CPLR 5209 can be of no help, if we
read it literally. CPLR 5209 requires, as of the time of the
payment, that there be a debt AD owes to the judgment debtor.5 9
If JD has assigned absolutely to SP, AD owes nothing to JD.
Rather, AD owes SP and no one else.
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals has managed
to rule otherwise. In Tri-City Roofers, Inc. v. Northeastern
Industrial Park, 99 JD obtained a judgment against AD and
immediately assigned it absolutely to SP.600  Because the
payment intangible in question was secured by a judgment, the
592 See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
... See Ellen E. Schultz, The Debt Collector vs. the Widow: Viola Sue Kell
Thought Her Social Security Benefits Were Safe in the Bank; She Was Wrong, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 28, 2007, at Al.
... See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(e) (McKinney, 2008).
... See id. 5222(a).
596 A class action has recently been certified to challenge the use of restraining
notices with regard to bank accounts containing only electronically deposited social
security funds. See Sims v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 06-CV-5991(CPS)(JMA), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11972 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008).
... See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209.
598 See id.
599 61 N.Y.2d 779, 461 N.E.2d 298, 473 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1984).
'0 SP in this case was the attorney to D. The court refers to SP's recourse
against D if SP did not collect the full judgment. "Having assigned its judgment with
recourse, it is only the possibility of recourse by its assignee that gives [the assignor]
the required status as a party aggrieved ..... Id. at 781 n.*, 461 N.E.2d at 299, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 162. This "recourse" is consistent with the absoluteness of assignment.
It is in the nature of a warranty of the product sold.
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UCC did not apply.6 1 The sheriff then levied AD on behalf of JC.
AD paid the sheriff. The court ruled, "A debtor, in order to be
charged with a duty to pay a debt to an assignee, must first have
actual notice of the assignment."60 2 This slides over the fact that,
by its terms, CPLR 5209 applies only if AD is paying to the
sheriff "a debt he owes the judgment debtor."6 3 Where no debt is
owing because of an absolute assignment, the section does not
seem to apply by its terms.
In Tri-City, the UCC would have helped AD expressly, if it
had applied. According to section 9-406(a) of the UCC:
[A]n account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment
intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor
until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification,
authenticated by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount
due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to
be made to the assignee.604
But is paying the sheriff the same as paying the assignor? The
answer is properly yes. The levy implies that the sheriff succeeds
to whatever rights JD had, including the right to receive cash in
satisfaction of antecedent debt. Therefore, since AD extinguishes
the debt by paying JD instead of SP, AD likewise extinguishes it
by paying the sheriff. This remains so until SP notifies AD that
AD must pay only SP.
The foregoing implies that, even if JD has absolutely
assigned the payment intangible to SP prior to the execution
lien, JD still retains an interest in the property until such time
as SP notifies AD to pay SP exclusively. And the meaning of Tri-
City is that the principle of UCC section 9-406(a) is part of the
-1 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(9) (2007).
602 61 N.Y.2d at 780, 461 N.E.2d at 299, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 162. If AD has notice of
the assignment, then CPLR 5209 or CPLR 6204 does not protect AD from having to
pay the assignee. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 46 Misc. 2d 456, 459-
60, 259 N.Y.S.2d 612, 616 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
603 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209.
1 U.C.C. § 9-406(a). An account is an obligation for goods or services, for a
policy of insurance, for any kind of suretyship, for energy provided, for hire of a
vessel, for a credit card, and for lottery winnings, but does not account obligations
for rights evidenced by chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts,
investment property, letter of credit rights, or money advanced. Id. § 9-102(a)(2).
Chattel paper is a security agreement or lease of personal property. Id. § 9-
102(a)(11). A payment intangible is defined as a "general intangible under which the
account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation." Id. § 9-102(a)(61); see
also id. § 9-102(a)(42).
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common law in New York. °5 In other words, JD still has an
interest in a payment intangible, if JD retains the right to collect
it as agent of SP.60 6
Prior to 2000, the predecessor to this UCC provision applied
only if AD owed an account or chattel paper or if AD owed a
general intangible and D had assigned the general intangible for
security.0 7 If, however, D made an absolute assignment of a
general intangible, the UCC did not apply.60 8 Article 9 now
applies both to the sale and the hypothecation of "payment
intangibles. 6 9
Where SP is the absolute assignee of AD's obligation, the
situation is simple enough. Prior to notification, AD is privileged
to pay the sheriff. After notification, AD must pay only SP.
What if, however, SP only claims a security interest in AD's
obligation and AD knows about it? Is AD free to pay the sheriff.?
The answer is yes, unless SP has notified AD "that payment is to
be made to the assignee."6 0 Typically, secured parties permit
their debtors to collect payment intangibles until default occurs.
After default, SP can notify AD that D's power to receive
payment has terminated.611
These principles were overlooked in Lincoln Rochester Trust
Co. v. S.C. Marasco Steel, Inc., 12 where AD knew of and
"consented to" SP's perfected security interest when a sheriff
levied for JC.6 1 3 AD paid JC directly. It is not clear whether
consent meant that AD had undertaken to pay SP and no one
else. If JD had authority to collect, AD should have been able to
605 In other words, New York does not follow the New York rule (first in time is
first in right; AD pays at her own risk). On the misnamed New York rule, see Luize
E. Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 MINN. L. REV. 899, 971-74
(1984).
606 On this humble point, the house of securitization crumbles to pieces;
securitized assets turn out not to be bankruptcy remote after all. See David Gray
Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055,
1094 (1998). For an energetic attempt to argue against this disturbing point, see
Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004).
607 U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (1972).
60 See id.
6o9 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2007).
610 Id. § 9-406(a).
611 See id. § 9-607(a)(1).
612 66 Misc. 2d 295, 320 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Monroe County Ct. 1971).
61 Id. at 296, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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discharge its obligation to JD by paying JC directly. CPLR 5209
says this expressly.614 Yet AD was made to pay again. CPLR
5209 was nowhere cited.615
Modern constitutional restrictions on pre-judgment
attachment may have an important limitation on CPLR 6204,
which provides:
A person who, pursuant to an order of attachment, pays or
delivers to the sheriff money or other personal property in
which a defendant has or will have an interest, or so pays a debt
he owes the defendant, is discharged from his obligation to the
defendant to the extent of the payment or delivery. 616
In the classic case of Harris v. Balk,617 a North Carolina AD was
garnished by a plaintiff (P) on a casual visit to Maryland. Upon
return to North Carolina, AD was sued by the defendant (D) and
made to pay again. The Supreme Court reversed but sounded
the following note:
Thus it is ... the duty of the garnishee to give notice to his own
creditor, if he would protect himself, so that the creditor may
have the opportunity to defend himself against the claim of the
person suing out the attachment .... While the want of
notification by the garnishee to his own creditor may have no
effect upon the validity of the judgment against the garnishee
(the proper publication being made by the plaintiff), we think it
has and ought to have an effect upon the right of [AD] to avail
himself of the prior judgment and his payment thereunder.
This notification by the garnishee is for the purpose of making
sure that his creditor shall have an opportunity to defend the
claim made against him in the attachment suit.
618
What worried the Harris court was the possibility that P was
pursuing a fraudulent quasi in rem suit in Maryland. 619  The
above-quoted advice must be viewed, albeit anachronistically, as
an Erie guess on the nature of Maryland law. Had CPLR 6204
614 N.Y C.P.L.R. 5209 (McKinney 2008).
615 The court did note that actions under CPLR 5239 are brought too late if a
sheriff or receiver disburses funds. Here AD paid JC directly. So a CPLR 5239
proceeding was indeed not too late. But AD should have prevailed on the face of
CPLR 5209.
616 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6204.
617 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
618 Id. at 227.
619 See id. at 227-28.
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been the law of Maryland, AD could have paid the Maryland
sheriff without worry or notice to D.
But there is this important limitation. Under Shaffer v.
Heitner,620 attachment is worthy of full faith and credit elsewhere
only if D has minimum contacts in the adjudicating state.621 If
AD in New York pays on the basis of 6204 and if D has no such
contact with the state of New York, then 6204 is not entitled to
full faith and credit, and AD can be made to pay again in some
other state (though not in New York).622 For this reason, 6204's
scope is adversely affected by the modern innovation in
Shaffer.623
620 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
621 See id. at 212.
622 To obtain an order of attachment, P must post an indemnity bond, but this
bond need only issue for the benefit of D. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b), (e) (McKinney
2008). Where AD is made to pay twice, there is no express rule in the CPLR that AD
is entitled to damages, much less to a bond securing P's obligation to pay damages.
623 CPLR 5209 and 6204 purport to discharge AD when AD pays the sheriff or
JC pursuant to execution or order. See id. 5209, 6204. But they do not immunize JC
from restitutionary claims when AD pays by error. In Banque Worms v.
BankAmerica Int'l, 77 N.Y.2d 362, 570 N.E.2d 189, 568 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1991), the
Court of Appeals proclaimed that the "discharge for value rule" from Restatement of
Restitution section 14 was the law of New York, not the rule of mistaken payment.
Id. at 366, 570 N.E.2d at 191, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 543. According to this rule:
A creditor of another or one having a lien on another's property who has
received from a third person any benefit in discharge of the debt or lien, is
under no duty to make restitution therefor, although the discharge was
given by mistake of the transferor as to his interests or duties, if the
transferee made no misrepresentation and did not have notice of the
transferor's mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14(1) (1937).
The facts of Banque Worms did not involve a judicial lien. Rather, D owed money to
C. D ordered its bank to wire money to C's bank. 77 N.Y.2d at 364-66, 570 N.E.2d at
190-91, 568 N.Y.S.2d 542-42. D then countermanded this order but, by mistake, D's
bank wired C's bank. The discharge for value rule implied that C did not have to
give it back. Transposed to the realm of judicial liens, if JD's bank pays the sheriff
with funds wired to JD by mistake, the mistaken fund wirer cannot get the money
back from JC. In A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, No. 89 Civ. 7987 (JFK),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1997), the court Erie-
guessed that Banque Worms does not apply to attachment liens, even though "lien"
appears prominently in the Restatement of Restitution. The gist of the reason was
that the plaintiff did not yet have a judgment and therefore there might not be any
debt at all. Also, since the sheriff was holding the funds pending the judgment, the
plaintiff had notice of the error before it actually received the funds. Id. at * 11-12. If
A.I. Trade Financial is correct, the law of discharge for value differs, depending on
whether the creditor has a money judgment or not at the time JD's bank honors the
sheriffs levy.
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D. Power of Sale
1. Unencumbered Property
In discussing the sheriffs power to sell, we start with the
simplest case: property capable of delivery that is unencumbered
by any other lien. Such property must be levied by the sheriff
taking custody.624
Although the CPLR nowhere says so, the expectation is that
such property, when levied, should be sold. But levy is not the
only means by which the sheriff obtains possession of property
not capable of delivery. 25 Under turnover procedure, a court
may order JD or AD to turn personal property of any sort over to
the sheriff.626
Could a sheriff proceed directly to sale without a levy or a
turnover order? Pre-CPLR case law says no.627 Indeed, if there is
to be a sale under these circumstances, it would have to be done
promptly, as the execution lien supposedly dies when the
execution is returned at the end of sixty days (unless
extended).628
CPLR 5233, governing sales, presents only an indirect
obstacle to the sale-without-levy. CPLR 5233(a) requires that
the "property shall be present and within the view of those
attending the sale unless otherwise ordered by the court."629 If
property capable of delivery has been levied, the sheriff easily
meets this requirement. But this does not quite prove that the
sheriff cannot skip *the levy and just sell. By the terms of CPLR
5233(a), the court can "otherwise order" that the property need
not be visible to the bidders at the auction.
Property not capable of delivery or debts are eligible for
paper levy.631 CPLR 5232(b) contemplates that debts should be
624 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b).
625 See, e.g., id. 5225.
626 See id.
627 See Hathaway v. Howell, 54 N.Y. 97, 112 (1873).
628 Claude Neon, Inc. v. Birrell, 177 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
629 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233(a) (last sentence).
630 Id.; see also Manhattan Taxi Serv. Corp. v. Checker Cab Mfg. Corp., 253 N.Y.
455, 459, 171 N.E. 705, 706 (1930) (suggesting court has discretion to alter the rule
that property must be in view, but invalidating the sale where it was not).
61 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) ("All property not capable of delivery... shall be
subject to the levy.").
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paid to the sheriff.632 But instead of collecting, could the sheriff
sell instead? Nothing in CPLR 5233 prohibits it, but, once again,
"[t]he property shall be present and within the view of those
attending the sale unless otherwise ordered by the court."633 A
court would have to "order otherwise" the sale of invisible
property.
Sale must be by auction.3 4 Rules for advertisement are set
forth.6 5 A sale can occur after the sixty-day life of an execution.
This is because, by case law, the sheriffs duty to return the
execution is suspended by the levy with regard to property
capable of delivery636 (by statute with regard to property not
capable of delivery) .637 Levies of property capable of delivery are
perpetual,638 though the levy of property not capable of delivery
terminates after ninety days (unless extended).639
The sheriff has much (but not total) discretion in scheduling
and designing the sale.64 ° If property cannot be sold, the sheriff
is invited to apply to the court "for a determination whether the
property can legally be sold."64 1 This provision was added in light
of People v. Lo Ji Sales, Inc.,642 where a bookstore owner was
criminally fined for selling pornography. When the fine was
enforced by filing a certificate of judgment with the county
clerk,643 the sheriff levied the personal property of the debtor,
632 Id. ("The person served with the execution shall forthwith.., pay all such
debts upon maturity, to the sheriff or to the support collection unit ... .
63 Id. 5233(a).
634 See id. Receivers are not necessarily subject to this rule. But see Levitin v.
Homburger, 932 F. Supp. 508, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court ordered receiver to sell
general partnership pursuant to CPLR 5233).
65 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233(b). These advertisements must be posted six days
before the sale. Where the advertisements are posted less than six days before, the
debtor may have the sale overturned. See Wholesale Serv. Supply Corp. v. Rubin, 27
A.D.2d 957, 957, 279 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (2d Dep't 1967).
636 See Kennis v. Sherwood, 82 A.D.2d 847, 848, 439 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (2d Dep't
1981).
17 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(c).
638 Cf. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Conner, 103 N.Y. 502, 510-11, 9 N.E. 238,
239-40 (1886).
639 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
640 See Morgan v. Maher, 60 Misc. 2d 642, 644, 303 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1969) (in real estate sale, sheriff could not reject high bid because it
was too low without a showing that excessive debtor equity would be lost).
641 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233(d).
12 93 Misc. 2d 1012, 403 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Oneida County Ct. 1978).
w Thereafter, a fine is collected via execution issued to the sheriff. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 420.20 (McKinney 2008).
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which consisted, not surprisingly, of pornography, the very stuff
that the debtor was fined for selling. The sheriff convinced the
court that the levied property should not be sold, but rather
should be destroyed by shredding, a solution that, in the era of
the Internet, can only strike us as quaint. The solution reached
by the Lo Ji court is now ratified by CPLR 5233(d).644
Sales can be reversed. For example, if the sheriff sells to an
infant, the infant may rescind the sale for want of capacity. 45
CPLR 5237 suggests that JC can be forced to disgorge proceeds if
the sale is overturned for "an irregularity ... or a vacatur,
reversal or setting aside of the judgment upon which the
execution or order was based."6 46  This suggests that other
reasons-such as, JD having no interest in the property-do not
become cause to rescind the sale. At least one court has thought
that the utter failure of JD's title is nevertheless grounds for the
buyer to obtain restitution.647 This is odd, in that, when the
sheriff sells, she does not warrant any amount of title.648 Caveat
emptor is usually the rule at the sheriffs auction.649
2. Encumbered Property
Suppose the sheriff has levied personal property encumbered
by SP's senior perfected security interest and has sold the thing
to X. On the theory that the sheriff can sell whatever JD had at
the time the execution was delivered, X owns JD's equity as
encumbered by SP's security interest.6 0 X as owner of the equity
64 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1979, Legal Doc. No. 65(U).
61 Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d 451, 455, 303 N.Y.S.2d
463, 467-68 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969) (infant was nineteen years old).
646 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5237. One such irregularity would be that JD has died and JC
has not obtained permission from the surrogate court to proceed. Id. 5208.
11 Travitsky v. Oysterman's Dock Co., 65 A.D.2d 554, 554-55, 408 N.Y.S.2d 959,
960 (2d Dep't 1978).
64s Marino v. Perna, 165 Misc. 2d 504, 507, 629 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1995).
649 Hoffeld v. United States, 186 U.S. 273, 276 (1902) (Colorado law); Clute v.
Emmerich, 99 N.Y. 342, 350, 2 N.E. 6, 6 (1885).
6 0 Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d at 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 467 (ordering the sheriffs sale
overturned, however, because the buyer was an infant with no capacity to buy).
Where the sheriffs possession stems from a turnover order, the sheriffs power of
sale is judged from the time the turnover order was "secured," since that is the
moment of lien creation. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
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is now deemed a nonrecourse 651 article 9 debtor65 2 with the
present right to possess, to redeem in case of SP's repossession,653
and to receive a surplus after the sale.654
Perversely, if the security agreement with SP is in default
(highly likely if the sheriff is in the levying vein), SP has a senior
right of possession. So SP can repossess the collateral from the
sheriff before the sale65 and from X after the sale.656  If SP
repossesses from the sheriff, JC is entitled to any surplus from
the foreclosure sale.657
If a sheriffs sale violates SP's senior right of possession, the
sheriff has committed the tort of conversion. Conversion is an
offense against a present possessory right.65 Where the sheriff
rightfully possesses because SP has not asserted a senior right,
the sheriff has not acted wrongfully. In such a case, SP must
demand possession; only a refusal in light of a demand triggers
the conversion cause of action.659
In Teddy's Drive-In, Inc. v. Cohen,660 a tax compliance officer
enforcing a state tax warrant (equivalent of a sheriff under an
execution) levied encumbered equipment. 661 At the auction, SP (a
corporate insider of JD) stood on a table and announced
ownership of a senior security interest. The officer continued
with the sale.66 '2  The Teddy's court held that the officer was
guilty of the tort of conversion.663 The court is not clear on
651 That is, X has no obligation to pay JD's debt to SP. Just because X bought
JD's equity interest does not mean that X has assumed SP's in personam liability.
652 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28)(A) (2007) (defining debtor as "a person having an
interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not
the person is an obligor").
"' Id. § 9-623(a).
654 Id. § 9-615(d)(1).
655 William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 823, 276
N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
656 U.C.C. § 9-609.
57 Id. § 9-615(a)(3). JC must make a demand for the surplus "before distribution
of the proceeds is completed." Id. § 9-615(a)(3)(A).
11 See Hart v. City of Albany, 272 A.D.2d 668, 668, 706 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536-37
(3d Dep't 2000) (citing Meese v. Miller, 79 A.D.2d 237, 242, 436 N.Y.S.2d 496, 500
(4th Dep't 1981)).
659 See Tompkins v. Fonda Glove Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 265, 80 N.E. 933, 934
(1907).
660 47 N.Y.2d 79, 390 N.E.2d 290, 416 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1979).
61 See id. at 81, 390 N.E.2d at 290, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
62 See id. at 81, 390 N.E.2d at 291, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
See id. at 82, 390 N.E.2d at 291, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
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whether SP demanded possession. Instead, the court speaks in
terms of the officer's limited immunity as a public official, which
falls away where the officer has notice of SP's claim.664 The case
should be read as holding that the officer's sale is rightful unless,
prior to the sale, SP has demanded possession and the sheriff has
refused it. 665
The question arises as to the consequence of the officer's
liability. To answer that, let us consider the following scenario:
Eleventh Scenario
Monday: The sheriff levies a thing worth $100 pursuant to JC's
execution.
Later: At the execution sale, SP announces that she owns a
perfected security interest for $80. SP demands possession of
the thing. The sheriff refuses to give up the thing and sells it to
X for $20. The sheriff is holding the $20 for eventual
distribution to JC.666
Still later: SP wins a money judgment against the sheriff.
The first issue is: What are SP's damages? One wishes to say
$80, the amount of the secured claim-should not SP's recovery
be limited to the amount of the loan? One must, however,
contend with the ancient notion of jus tertii. According to the
Court of Appeals in Valentine v. Long Island Railroad Co. 667:
The rule undoubtedly is that a bailee cannot plead jus tertii
against his bailor .... The reason for the rule is that by such a
plea the bailee... might through the claim of some third person
keep the property for himself.66
This rule suggests that the sheriff must pay $100. The sheriff is
a bailee (coupled with an interest) and SP is the bailor. The
thing is worth $100 and the sheriff converted it, and no reference
to SP's limited interest is permitted. Happily, the Valentine
664 See id.
665 According to the lower court, "when [SP] announced he held a chattel
mortgage on the goods to be sold, he was, in effect, stating that he held title."
Teddy's Drive-In, Inc. v. State, 63 A.D.2d 1070, 1071, 406 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (3d
Dep't 1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 79, 390 N.E.2d 290, 416 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1979). If "title"
means "the right to possess," then indeed SP was demanding a superior right of
possession.
666 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5234(a) (McKinney 2008) ("No distribution of proceeds
shall be made until fifteen days after service of the execution except upon order of
the court.").
667 187 N.Y. 121, 79 N.E. 849 (1907).
1 Id. at 126, 79 N.E. at 851.
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court said (albeit in dictum and without authority): "But there
are a number of exceptions to this rule, as for instance where the
property has been taken from the bailee by process of law .... ,669
Ergo, based on this exception, we can confidently assume that
the sheriff owes $80.
It is a fundamental principle that a conversion judgment
constitutes the sale of the stolen property to the defendant.60 As
applied to the Eleventh Scenario, the sheriff becomes the owner
of SP's security interest. This the sheriff can assert against X,
thereby more or less reimbursing the sheriff. Equilibrium is
restored.
A harder question is with regard to the $20 in proceeds that
X paid in the Eleventh Scenario. One would think that, since
SP's security interest was not foreclosed, SP would have no right
to these proceeds. Yet article 9 holds that SP has both a security
interest on X's thing and a claim to the money X paid for JD's
equity. According to section 9-315(a) of the UCC:
(1) a security interest.., continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale ... ; and
(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.67'
So JC does not own the $20 surplus after all. CPLR 5234(a)
commands the sheriff to distribute these proceeds to JC, but JC
and also the sheriff6 72 commit the tort of conversion if they
convert SP's cash to their own use. This is the notorious and
unacceptable "two for one" effect that article 9 provides when
collateral is sold subject to a security interest.673
66 Id. at 126-27, 79 N.E. at 851.
670 See Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N.Y. 26, 30, 182 N.E. 235, 236 (1932).
671 U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (2007).
672 United States v. Yonkers Child Care Ass'n, 566 F. Supp. 1509, 1511
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (sheriff liable for distributing to JC moneys on which the IRS had a
senior lien).
6'73 David Gray Carlson, Bulk Sales Under Article 9: Some Easy Cases Made
Difficult, 41 ALA. L. REV. 729, 741 (1990). That this effect exists is exacerbated by
new section 9-615(g) of the UCC, which provides:
A secured party that receives cash proceeds of a disposition in good faith
and without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the holder of a
security interest or other lien that is not subordinate to the security
interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made:
(1) takes the cash proceeds free of the security interest or other lien;
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Suppose SP claims the $20 as proceeds. Apparently, this
reduces SP's claim against X's thing to $60. Yet X paid $20
because this was the value of the equity in light of a surviving
security interest of $80. With SP claiming only $60, X obtains a
windfall. The windfall would be removed if JC could be
subrogated to SP's security interest for $20. But JC never owned
the $20 that SP received. Subrogation presumably frowns on JC
paying SP with SP's own money. There is no good solution to
this problem, which must be laid at the doorstep of article 9's
regrettable two-for-one rule.
Sales procedure is particularly mystifying when SP is a
pledgee. In the case of pledged property, the sheriff may not levy
at all." 4 Yet, perhaps the sheriff can sell under CPLR 5233,
since CPLR 5233 does not expressly require there to be a levy.
All of this is very unclear.
There is yet another unanswered question with pledges.
Suppose it is agreed that the sheriff can sell pledged property.
Perhaps the sheriff has levied article 8 certificated securities
because section 8-112(a) of the UCC overrides CPLR 5232(b)'s
anti-levy rule.6  Or perhaps a court has ordered SP to turn over
the property to the sheriff under CPLR 5225(b). 7  It is still the
case that SP has a senior right of possession; if the sheriff sells,
the sheriff commits the tort of conversion. Can SP take back
possession and then not foreclose, thereby defeating JC's right to
a valuable equity? In hypothecations, repossession is in
anticipation of foreclosure. This is not so with pledges.
(2) is not obligated to apply the proceeds of the disposition to the
satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or other lien;
and
(3) is not obligated to account to or pay the holder of the security
interest or other lien for any surplus.
U.C.C. § 9-615(g). Since this new provision protects a junior SP from a senior JC but
does not protect a junior JC from a senior SP, it must be concluded that the baleful
two-for-one rule is intentionally imposed.
674 N.Y. C.P.L.R 5232(b) (McKinney 2008).
6,- See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5233. Under old Civil Practice Act 688, pledged property
could be sold without interfering with the possessory rights of SP. Monitor Co. v.
Confianza Furniture & Appliance Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1955).
676 See U.C.C. § 8-112(a).
677 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) ("[Wlhere it is shown... that [JC]'s rights to the
property are superior to those of [AD], the court shall require [AD] to pay the money,
or... to deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of sufficient value
to satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff.").
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Possession is a mode of perfection. Therefore, a pledgee might
play dog in the manger, taking back the collateral and refusing to
foreclose, even though JC might have a valuable equity.
Whether this is possible is not clear.
E. Priority
Suppose only one execution is delivered to a sheriff, and the
sheriff has obtained cash either through sale or collection of
payment intangibles. According to CPLR 5234(a), the sheriff
first distributes the proceeds to payment of fees, expenses, and
taxes.678 The sheriff then pays the creditor." 9 The surplus is
returned to the debtor.8 0 The sheriff may not distribute proceeds
until fifteen days have passed since the execution was delivered
to the sheriff.68'
Where two or more executions are delivered to the sheriff,
priority is in order of delivery, 6 2 except that executions for child
support have priority over all other executions.683
Executions may be delivered to different court officers, such
as a marshal for the federal court or a lower court. 4 In such
cases, there is a "first to levy" rule.68 5 The first officer to levy
establishes priority for all her "clients" who have served
678 Taxes do not include any capital gain tax that will be realized because of the
execution sale. Roberson v. Roberson, 45 A.D.3d 1494, 1494-95, 846 N.Y.S.2d 528,
529 (4th Dep't 2007).
679 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(a).
611 See id.
68" See id.
682 Beef & Bison Breeders, Inc. v. Capitol Refrigeration Co., 105 Misc. 2d 275,
278, 431 N.Y.S.2d 986, 988 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980).
683 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b); id. 5241(h). The priority for family support
executions was added in 1993. Ch. 59, § 16, 1993 N.Y. Laws 360 (McKinney). In
enforcement of child support obligations, New York has established support
collection units in every social services district. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 111-h(1)
(McKinney 2008). This unit receives payment from the defendant in a support
matter and distributes it to the plaintiff. The CPLR often gives to the support
collection unit the rights of plaintiffs counsel or the sheriff. For example, the
support collection unit may issue restraining notices, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a), and
executions to the sheriff or to itself, see id. 5230(b). The support collection unit may
also levy upon property, just as a sheriff would. See id. 5232(a)-(b). It may issue
executions for support obligations, pursuant to CPLR 5241(b), just as a sheriff may.
See generally Lombardi v. Suffolk County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8721 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 7, 2007) (describing support collection units generally).
84 In New York City, the mayor is authorized to appoint up to eighty-three
marshals for the civil court. See N.Y. CITY CIv. CT. ACT § 1601(1) (McKinney 2008).
' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
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executions on her.6 6 The slow-footed officer who did not manage
to levy must apply, hat in hand, to the swifter officer for the
abject orts and leftovers. 68 7 This rule, however, applies only if the
property is "levied upon within the jurisdiction of all the
officers." 688 This is one of the few hints in the CPLR that a sheriff
is only supposed to levy within the county of her jurisdiction.6 9
Meanwhile, at the very end of this rule is appended an exception:
"[E]xcept that such executions for child support shall have
priority over any other assignment, levy or process. "69 So if the
second, slower officer has a child support execution, she can take
away the proceeds from the first sheriff.691
The rule of dueling sheriffs reflects the notion of in custodia
legis.692 According to this doctrine, if a court, however humble in
dignity, brings property under its control, all other courts must
kotow to the court with control over the property in question.693
A final rule mediates between those who claim under
executions and those who claim equity liens-liens arising from
turnover orders and receiverships.694 The first event between the
levy under an execution and the filing of the turnover order or
686 See id.
67 See id. ("and thereafter shall be applied in satisfaction of the executions or
orders of attachment delivered to those of the other officers who, before the proceeds
are distributed, make a demand upon the officer who, before the proceeds are






692 In re Estate of Livingtson, 30 Misc. 2d 71, 74, 211 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1961), affd, 14 A.D.2d 264, 220 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1st Dep't 1961) ("Once
levied upon the property is deemed to be in custodia legis.").
693 See Garro v. Republic Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 284 A.D. 660, 663, 134
N.Y.S.2d 151, 154-56 (4th Dep't 1954) ("If [sic] may be questioned whether the
Supreme Court... may ... direct an officer of the City Court of Utica to thus turn
over proceeds of a sale in his hands to a person other than the judgment creditor in
the City Court.... ."). Under former section 680 of the Civil Practice Act, the first
creditor to serve an execution was the winner, even if the second creditor's sheriff
was the first to levy. Ace Food Corp. v. Rochlin, 23 Misc. 2d 274, 274-75, 200
N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960). A first-to-levy rule did exist for
the justice courts--courts not of record. See Distler & Schubin, supra note 8, at 467.
On courts not of record, see N.Y. JUD. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2008) (any court not
enumerated therein is not a court of record).
694 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
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appointment of a receiver establishes priority.6 95 So where JC,
obtains a lien by serving the sheriff with an execution, and where
JC 2 obtains (and the clerk files) a turnover order or the
appointment of a receiver, JC 2 has priority even though JC 1 had
the first lien.6 96 These orders have been called an "equitable
levy."697  If this metaphor is accepted, then our last rule
resembles the "first to levy" rule. Finally, if two equity liens
exist, "the proceeds of the property or debt shall be applied in the
order of filing. "698
The last sentence of CPLR 5234(c) provides:
Where delivery, transfer, or payment to the judgment creditor, a
receiver, or a sheriff or other officer is not completed within
sixty days after an order is filed, the judgment creditor who
secured the order is divested of priority, unless otherwise
695 Id. at 5234(c). In Citrus Bowl, Inc. v. Colonial Farms, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 220,
222, 262 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965), affd, 27 A.D.2d 942, 278
N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dep't 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 832, 239 N.E.2d 730,
293 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1968), a receiver preceded any levy by JCs and so had priority.
JC 1 was given priority over a subsequent tax lien. The United States tried to argue
that it had priority under what is now numbered as 31 U.S.C. § 3713, which
provides:
(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when--
(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and--
(i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a
voluntary assignment of property;
(ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or
(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or
(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or
administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor
(2) This subsection does not apply to a case under [the Bankruptcy Code].
31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000). The court rejected the claim of the United States, as the
equity lien associated with the receiver did not constitute any of the enumerated
events. Citrus Bowl, 47 Misc. 2d at 222, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 260. On appeal, however,
the United States won priority over JC 2 on the basis of the timing of its lien. See
Citrus Bowl, 22 N.Y.2d at 834, 239 N.E.2d at 730, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
696 Graze v. Bankers Trust Co., 45 Misc. 2d 610, 611, 257 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); H & H Poultry Co. v. Lafayette Nat'l Bank, 45 Misc. 2d
480, 481, 257 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). Even if the levy is
senior, the receiver might equitably be given control of the property, so long as JC 1 's
seniority from the earlier levy is respected. Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350
F.2d 61, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1965).
697 See First Nat'l Bank of Amsterdam v. Shuler, 153 N.Y. 163, 172, 47 N.E. 262,
264-65 (1897) (appointment of receiver).
696 City of N.Y. v. Panzirer, 23 A.D.2d 158, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (1st Dep't
1965).
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specified in the order or in an extension order filed within the
sixty days.
699
No case has ever applied this woeful sentence. It should be
noted, however, that it applies only where the sheriff has levied
on the same property covered by the equity order.7 °° Why the
equity lien holder should lose out after sixty days when the
sheriff has successfully levied is a mystery, especially when
turnover orders require AD to deliver non-monetary property
directly to the sheriff. And how important is this principle, if it
can be dispelled by the incantation of preservative words in the
order itself? If there is an occult wisdom residing within this
sentence, it has eluded me.
F. Setoffs
AD may have the power to offset JD's obligation to pay AD
because JD owes AD for a mutual debt.7 ' Execution liens
potentially come into conflict with this right. To give AD's right
of setoff a high degree of protection, the legislature has enacted
section 151 of the Debtor and Creditor Law.70 2 Courts, however,
699 N.Y. C.P.L.R 5234(c).
700 See id. 5234(a); Panzirer, 23 A.D.2d at 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88.
701 "Debts are mutual when the debts and credits are in the same right and are
between the same parties, standing in the same capacity .... Where, for example,
one party owes a fiduciary duty to the other, or has a claim for trust funds, and the
other side's claim is a simple unsecured debt, mutuality is lacking." In re
Westchester Structures, Inc. v. Hellman Elec. Corp., 181 B.R. 730, 739 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995).
702 According to this provision:
Every debtor shall have the right upon:
(c) the application for the appointment, or the appointment, of any
receiver of, or of any of the property of a creditor;
(d) the issuance of any execution against any of the property of a
creditor;
(e) the issuance of a subpoena or order, in supplementary proceedings,
against or with respect to any of the property of a creditor; or
(f) the issuance of a warrant of attachment against any of the property
of a creditor,
to set off and apply against any indebtedness, whether matured or
unmatured, of such creditor to such debtor, any amount owing from such
debtor to such creditor, at or at any time after, the happening of any of the
above mentioned events, and the aforesaid right of set off may be exercised
by such debtor against such creditor ... receiver or execution, judgment or
attachment creditor of such creditor, or against anyone else claiming
through or against such creditor ... receivers, or execution, judgment or
attachment creditor, notwithstanding the fact that such right of set off
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have failed to see how limited section 151 really is. In many
cases, AD's setoff right needs no protection and would continue to
exist even if section 151 had never been enacted. 0 3 As a result,
section 151 has sometimes been misinterpreted.
The common law makes setoff of a mutual debt a defense
against an obligation to pay.70 4 One way of putting the matter is
to say that any obligation to pay is contingent if there is a
countervailing debt that the payor could assert against the
payee.
For example, suppose AD (a bank) owes JD for the amount of
a checking account ($100). Later, AD lends JD $75, payable on
demand. AD now has a setoff opportunity705-a right to assert a
setoff in lieu of payment. AD may or may not choose to assert
this right. If AD chooses not to assert it and instead pays the
$100, AD loses the setoff opportunity. 7 6 Like the ability to speak
a foreign language, setoffs are subject to the rule of "use it or lose
it., 707
Given the setoff opportunity, if the sheriff levies against AD,
JC can only take whatever JD had-a right contingent on AD not
declaring the setoff. So, after the levy, it is open for AD to assert
the setoff against JC, thereby reducing the debt from $100 to
$25.70' All that JC obtains is a conditional lien on AD's obligation
to pay $75 to JD and an absolute lien on AD's obligation to pay
shall not have been exercised by such debtor prior to the making, filing or
issuance, or service upon such debtor of, or of notice of, any such petition;
assignment for the benefit of creditors; appointment or application for the
appointment of a receiver; or issuance of execution, subpoena or order or
warrant.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 151 (McKinney 2008).
Where AD is a bank, AD must notify JD of the setoff on the same business day. N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 9-g(2) (McKinney 2008).
" See infra notes 706-710 and accompanying text.
704 See Green v. Disbrow, 79 N.Y. 1, 9 (1879).
705 1 use the term "setoff opportunity" to distinguish the actual manifested act of
setoff. The act of setoff extinguishes AD's debt. The setoff opportunity implies an
ongoing existence of two mutually existing obligations between JD and AD. 1 GRANT
GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING:
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 4.02[G] at 309 (2d ed. 2000).
106 See Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems with Setoff. A Proposed Legislative
Solution, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 51, 60 n.37 (1988).
707 See id.
108 Baker v. Nat'l City Bank of Cleveland, 511 F.2d 1016, 1018 (6th Cir. 1975)
("[Tihe ... setoff is not complete until three steps have been taken: (1) the decision
to exercise the right, (2) some action which accomplishes the setoff and (3) some
record which evidences that the right of setoff has been exercised.").
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the remaining $25. Where the setoff opportunity precedes the
lien, section 151 of the Debtor and Creditor Law is not needed to
vindicate AD's power to declare a setoff in lieu of paying the
sheriff.0 9
Suppose, on these facts, that JD deposits an additional $50
with AD. This deposit is instantly made conditional on AD's
right of setoff.71 0 JC obtains no senior lien on this new deposit.
In these cases, AD has no need of section 151 to protect its right
of setoff.71'
Section 151 adds content in two circumstances. First, it
enables setoff when AD's claim against JD is not yet mature,
whereas AD's obligation to JD is fully mature. One thing section
151 achieves is to permit AD to assert a setoff of mature debt
against unmatured debt.712 Some old cases had - asserted
otherwise. 13 To be distinguished is contingent debt, which AD
709 These are the facts of In re Industrial Commissioner v. Five Corners Taverns,
Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 639, 393 N.E.2d 1005, 419 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1979), where the court
wrote as if section 151 was absolutely central to the result.
710 See Cibro Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Fowler Finishing Co., 92 Misc. 2d 450,
452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1977) (bank lender prevailed as
to deposit of non-proceeds into proceeds account). The mirror opposite of this
proposition is Lopez v. New York, 152 Misc. 2d 817, 820, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1016
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1991), where JD sought to offset its own judgment against
JC, even though JC's attorney had a charging lien on JC's claim. The setoff was not
permitted to interfere with the charging lien, which came into existence at the
inception of JC's judgment. Id. at 820, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
711 Sepinuck, supra note 706, at 77 ("[C]ourts have almost uniformly held that
the setoff rights of a garnishee defeat the rights of the garnishor.").
712 See Siegel v. New York, 262 A.D. 388, 390, 28 N.Y.S.2d 958, 961 (3d Dep't
1941).
713 See Appleton v. Nat'l Park Bank of N.Y., 211 A.D. 708, 711, 208 N.Y.S. 228,
231 (1st Dep't 1925), affd mem., 241 N.Y. 561, 150 N.E. 555 (1925). In In re Hunt,
250 B.R. 482 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000), a credit union sought to lift the automatic stay
in bankruptcy in order to assert a setoff against exempt pension funds owed to the
debtor. Clearly the court should have granted the relief (assuming no adequate
protection of the credit union's setoff right). A bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical
judicial lien on the day of bankruptcy. If the bankruptcy trustee had claimed the
pension funds, the credit union could have set off the debtor's obligation to repay a
loan. Since the bankruptcy trustee had no right against the credit union, neither did
the debtor, whose right to exempt property is derivative of the trustee's right. The
court, however, held otherwise and ruled that exemptions under New York law are
valid against the common law right of set off. This must be counted as a bad Erie
guess indeed of the law of New York. Exemptions are good against judicial liens, not
setoff opportunities. Cf N.Y. BANKING LAw § 9-g(1) (McKinney 2008) (no setoff
against social security proceeds).
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may never owe. While unmatured debt may be set off, contingent
debt may not be."'
Let us now take another scenario where section 151 always
has bite. Suppose that AD has no setoff opportunity at the time
the sheriff levies. JC obtains a lien on AD's obligation to pay
$100. Suppose thereafter AD lends JD $75. Since the sheriff has
the unconditional right to $100, AD has no setoff right at all,
without the aid of section 151. AD owes $100 to the sheriff and,
separately, AD has a claim against JD for $75. The two debts-
AD owes the sheriff and JD owes AD-are no longer reciprocal
debts. Under the common law, AD has no setoff right. 15 Section
151 of the Debtor and Creditor Law reverses this result by
declaring that AD may set off "any amount owing from such
debtor to such creditor, at or at any time after," JC obtains a
lien.71 6
In short, section 151 is not needed to protect the pre-existing
setoff opportunity of AD. The very nature of AD's conditional
obligation to pay implies that AD may assert the setoff against
the sheriff. The function of section 151 is to authorize AD to
assert a setoff where AD's claim is still contingent and where no
common law setoff opportunity existed at the moment of the levy.
114 Trojan Hardware Co. v. Bonaquisti Constr. Corp., 141 A.D.2d 278, 282, 534
N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (3d Dep't 1988); Sepinuck, supra note 706, at 67-68. In Trojan
Hardware, JD opened a bank account (A) with AD to assure performance of a
construction project for a town. The A account was assigned for security to the town.
JD then opened a second account (B) and deposited funds from an unconnected job.
JD also borrowed funds from AD. JD defaulted and AD declared the setoff of account
B. A sub-contractor, however, claimed that account B had trust funds in it for the
benefit of the sub-contractor, of which AD had knowledge. A trial was set to
determine whether this was so. 141 A.D.2d at 279, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 789. Before the
trial, JC obtained a judgment against JD and levied the A account. The town had
been pledged this account, but there would probably be a surplus. AD argued that it
should not have to turn the surplus over to the sheriff because the sub-contractor
might win at trial, in which case AD's claim against JD would be revived. AD
wanted to preserve the surplus in case it needed to offset against its claim against
JD. Id. at 280, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The court upheld summary judgment for JC
against AD in a CPLR 5225(b) turnover action. Id. at 282, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
716 Wolcott v. Sullivan, 1 Edw. Ch. 399 (N.Y. Ch. 1832), aff'd, 6 Paige Ch. 117
(N.Y. Ch. 1836).
716 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 151 (McKinney 2008).
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The nature of setoff and the role of section 151 was
misconceived in United States v. Sterling National Bank & Trust
Co.,717 which presented the following chronology:
February 13, 1970: The IRS assesses $8,000 in taxes against D
and therefore has a lien on D's bank account with AD.
June 23: D borrows $6,000 from AD.
June 9, 1971: The IRS serves notice of levy on AD, pursuant to
6331(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
July 2: AD purports to manifest a setoff of $3,800. A balance of
$1,300 is left, which AD tenders to the IRS.718
The IRS then sued AD for the amount of the setoff.719
The Sterling court properly held for the IRS, which had a
lien as of February, 1970. So no setoff opportunity ever arose for
AD. Rather, AD owed the IRS and later AD advanced funds to
JD. AD's obligation to pay belonged to the IRS before a setoff
opportunity could ever arise. 20
The analysis of the Sterling court, however, was
unsatisfactory. The Second Circuit thought the only question
was whether JD had a property interest in the bank account at
the time of the levy.72' If so, the IRS had priority, even if its lien
arose at a time when AD could have asserted a setoff.
The cases cited deal only with the right of setoff, and not with
whether the full amount in the account is 'property' of the
bank's customer. The literal language of § 151... would
indicate that the full amount in the account is the customer's
property. Under any realistic definition of 'property' the full
amount in [JD]'s account was his property or his right to
property. Until the bank acted to restrict his right to draw on
the funds, [JD] was entitled to write checks up to the full
amount in the account. Clearly then all the funds in [JD]'s
checking account were his property at the time that the IRS
served the bank with notice of levy.
722
Read carefully, the Sterling court seems to be saying that section
151 of the Debtor and Creditor Law does not apply to liens
717 494 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974).
718 See id. at 920-21.
719 See id. at 921.
720 See Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1957). The
matter would have been different if the setoff opportunity pre-existed the creation of
the tax lien. See United States v. Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221, 223 (W.D. La. 1966).
721 See Sterling, 494 F.2d at 922.
722 Id.
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created by federal law, which is fair enough. But the court also
says that section 151 does not negate the idea that JD has
"property" in a bank account. 23  Since that is so, the IRS wins.
This is a misconception. Where the setoff opportunity pre-exists
the IRS liens, JD has only conditional property, and the IRS
succeeds only to that.2 In short, the Second Circuit thought
that either there is property or there is no property. In fact,
there is a third category--conditional property. 5
The Sterling misconception soon blossomed into error. In
Aurora Maritime Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co.,726 JC
obtained a federal maritime attachment lien. 727 In non-admiralty
federal cases, ordinary attachments are issued pursuant to state
law.728 Maritime attachments, however, are thoroughly federal
in nature. In Aurora, however, AD owed JD and JD owed AD at
721 See id.
724 The case can also be read as not saying anything at all about AD's right of
setoff. Rather, the case holds that, where a taxpayer has "property" in AD's
obligation, AD must pay; competing property rights must be litigated in some other
forum:
[A] person served with a tax levy has only two defenses for a failure to
comply with the demand, which are either that the person is not in
possession of the taxpayer's property or the property is subject to a prior
judicial attachment or execution. Therefore, the defense of lien priority is
not before us.
Id. at 921 (footnote and citations omitted). See Aurora Mar. Co. v. Abdullah
Mohamed Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (reading Sterling in this way).
121 Sterling was wrongly decided for a reason not related to the discussion in the
text. According to section 6323(b)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code, the tax lien is no
good against
a savings deposit, share, or other account, with an institution described in
section 581 or 591, to the extent of any loan made by such institution
described without actual notice or knowledge of the existence of such lien,
as against such institution, if such loan is secured by such account.
I.R.C. § 6323(b)(10) (2000). Although the taxpayer's promissory note directly
referred to a "continuing lien and/or right of set-off' against his bank account, the
Second Circuit in Sterling simply ignored this dispositive provision. The lower court
ruled that this provision only applies to consensually created security interests,
which a setoff right could never be. The lower court suggested that, if the bank had
taken possession of a passbook, the bank's right of setoff would have been good
against the IRS. See United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 917, 926
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Yet what good would that do if the bank cannot have a contractual
lien on its own obligation to the taxpayer? In truth, section 6323(b)(10) seems tailor-
made to a bank's right of setoff, and the bank should have prevailed on its basis.
726 85 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996).
727 See id. at 46.
728 FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
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the time of the garnishment.729 So, regardless of what section
151 means, JC should have taken subject to AD's senior right of
setoff. The Aurora court ruled that New York Debtor and
Creditor Law was preempted, and therefore, JC ought to have a
lien on the entire amount AD had owed JD, as if no setoff
opportunity existed.7 30 But even if we concede that section 151 is
preempted, JC still only obtained AD's conditional right of
payment.73' Even without section 151, the setoff opportunity pre-
existed and should have been assertable against the maritime
attachment lien. 2
The New York courts have also misunderstood the scope of
section 151. In Aspen Industries, Inc v. Marine Midland Bank,7 33
the New York Court of Appeals read section 151 as authorizing
AD to pay JD in spite of a restraining notice, so long as AD's
claim against JD exceeds JD's claim against AD.734 In Aspen, AD
(a bank) had a very large claim against JD relative to JD's small
checking account balance. JD continued to deposit funds.736
Properly, AD had a setoff right regardless of section 151 of the
Debtor & Creditor Law. 37 But it did not use the setoff right.738
Rather, it honored JD's checks.7 39  The Court of Appeals ruled
that since AD could have set off the entire checking account, it
did not cause any damage to JC when, in violation of the
729 See Aurora Mar. Co., 85 F.3d at 46.
730 See id. at 47.
731 See id. at 46-47.
732 The lower court in Aurora thought that section 151 permits setoff against
liens only when the setoff is actually manifested before the competing lien arose.
Because of this assumption, the lower court ruled that section 151, under the
circumstances, was not in conflict with the admiralty attachment lien. JC prevailed
simply because AD had not manifested the setoff before JC obtained the lien. See
Aurora Mar. Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co., 890 F. Supp. 322, 328-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). This is exactly the wrong reading of section 151. Under this
reading, AD never has a right of setoff against JC unless AD manifests the setoff
before JC's lien. The opposite is true. AD has a right to setoff no matter when JC's
lien arises. See In re Indus. Comm'r v. Five Corners Taverns, 47 N.Y.2d 639, 645,
393 N.E.2d 1005, 1008, 419 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1979). The lower court acknowledged
Five Corners but thought it applied only to liens under New York law, not to federal
liens.
733 52 N.Y.2d 575, 421 N.E.2d 808, 439 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1981).
'3 See id. at 580-83, 421 N.E.2d at 811-12, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.
75 See id. at 577-78, 421 N.E.2d at 809-10, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 317-18.
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restraining notice, it put JD into funds. 740 This opinion plays fast
and loose with the "use it or lose it" nature of setoffs. Having
chosen to put JD in funds, AD chose not to use the setoff.741 It
therefore was not under the shelter of section 151 when it
honored JD's checks.742 Having elected not to set off, it should
have preserved the money it gave to JD for the benefit of JC.
G. Income Executions
Aside from reaching debts due or certain to become due743 or
property (contingent or vested),7" JC can also reach income by
serving an income execution.745 Income is considered a third
thing, compared to property and debts.746 An income execution is
appropriate when "a judgment debtor is receiving or will receive
money from any source. 747 Because income is this third thing, it
cannot be the basis of pre-judgment attachment. CPLR 6202
makes only debt or property "as provided in CPLR 5201" subject
to attachment.748 Meanwhile, where JD has income, JC is
completely free to use regular executions to obtain debts or
property aside from the income.749
There are two types of income executions. The one available
to judgment creditors in general I will call regular income
executions. 750  The other is available for family creditors who
740 See id. at 581, 421 N.E.2d at 811-12, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.
741 See id. at 578, 421 N.E.2d at 810, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
742 See id. at 581-82, 421 N.E.2d at 811-12, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.
" See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2008).
'44 See id. 5201(b).
14' For a history of the income execution, see generally Kerry Daniel Marsh,
Note, Wage Garnishment in New York State: Practical Problems of the Employer, 34
ALB. L. REV. 395 (1970).
741 See Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 244 N.E.2d 259, 262, 296
N.Y.S.2d 783, 787-88 (1968); Brown v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 53 Misc. 2d 182, 185,
278 N.Y.S.2d 256, 259 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1967) (earnings not reachable under
CPLR 5227 turnover proceeding).
747 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b). A restraining order, however, cannot be served upon
"the employer of a judgment debtor or obligor where the property sought to be
restrained consists of wages or salary due or to become due to the judgment debtor
or obligor." Id. 5222(a); see also Silbert v. Silbert, 25 A.D.2d 570, 570, 267 N.Y.S.2d
744, 746 (2d Dep't 1966).
74 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6202; see also Glassman, 23 N.Y.2d at 358, 244 N.E.2d at
260, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 785; Gulf Int'l Bank B.S.C., N.Y. Branch v. Othman, No. 93
Civ. 3161 (CSH), 1993 WL 524889, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1993).
741 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank/N. v. Reif, 732 F. Supp. 354, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
750 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231.
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claim alimony or child support.751 Unlike other executions, the
sheriff is included as among those authorized to issue an income
execution for enforcement of a support obligation.7 52
An income execution has different formalities from a simple
execution. It must include the name and address of the person
from whom JD will receive money,75 3 the amount of money, and
frequency of payment.754 It must set forth a long description of
the law of income execution, warning that the burden is on JD to
step forward and object if the amounts withheld are excessive.755
The income execution must be served on the sheriff of the
county where JD resides.756 Where JD is not a resident of the
state, JC must deliver the income execution to the sheriff of the
county where the debtor is employed.7 57 Here is one of the few
provisions in the CPLR that refers to the geographical
limitations of a sheriffs jurisdiction. Its effect is to immunize
debtors who work outside the state for an employer who is
present in New York. In Brown v. Arabian American Oil Co.,758
JD worked in Saudi Arabia and AD was properly served in
751 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 416(a) (McKinney 2008)
(defining support). A provision similar to CPLR 5241, applying only to family
support creditors, permits injunctive orders to employers to pay wages. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R 5242(2). There is also extensive legislation on executions for medical
support. These are not traditional garnishments, but rather orders to employers to
enroll the debtor's family into health benefits a debtor might have obtained for his
family if he had been willing to apply for them. See id. 5241(b)(2)(i); see also In re
Oneida County Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Heidi S. v. Paul S., 41 A.D.3d 1189, 1190,
837 N.Y.S.2d 456, 457 (4th Dep't 2007).
752 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(b)(1); In re Smith v. ABC Co., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3467, at *9 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County Sept. 29, 2005). Prior to the CPLR, a court
order was necessary to garnish wages. See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35,
5231.09. JC also had to show a regular execution returned unsatisfied before an
income execution could be had. See Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc. 2d
574, 576, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
" See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(a). It need not include the social security number. See
Rahman v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 111 Misc. 2d 30, 32, 443 N.Y.S.2d 348, 350 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1981).
"' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(a).
15 See id. 5231(g). This section was added in 1987 to address constitutional
objections that debtors were insufficiently notified of the rules of garnishment. See
Follette v. Cooper, 658 F. Supp. 514, 515, 517-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated in part,
671 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). The notice is not required for income executions
under CPLR 5241. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(c) (support enforcement).
... See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b).
757 See id.
71 53 Misc. 2d 182, 278 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1967), affld, 30
A.D.2d 819, 293 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1968).
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 159
Manhattan.75 9 Since JD neither lived nor was employed in
Manhattan, JC could not comply with the above requirements.76 °
Accordingly, the levy was quashed."' Yet in Oystermen's Bank &
Trust Co. v. Manning,7 62 a sheriff refused to serve an income
execution on a California resident.7 63 The Manning court simply
ignored the jurisdictional limitation in CPLR 5231(b) and
ordered the California sheriff to serve the debtor in California.764
It cited as authority CPLR 5240, which invites courts to change
the rules whenever they want.76 5
The jurisdictional limits connecting the sheriff with the JD's
domicile or place of work overturn older decisions, which
permitted New York garnishment of wages paid by foreign
employers to foreign workers because the employer happened to
be present in New York.766 The statute, therefore, does not go as
far as the Constitution allows. In non-wage cases, if a court has
jurisdiction over AD, the court can indeed order AD to pay or
deliver property to the New York sheriff.767
The procedure in the case of an income execution is that the
sheriff serves the income execution on JD, either by personal
service or by certified mail.765  The income execution demands
that the debtor pay the sheriff directly,769 with the warning that
119 See id. at 183-84, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58.
760 See id. at 184-85, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.
761 Id. at 185, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 259; accord Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46
Misc. 2d 574, 575-76, 579-80, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375-76, 379 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965).
762 59 Misc. 2d 144, 298 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
763 See id. at 146, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
7 See id. at 147, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 358; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (McKinney
2008) (authorizing such orders).
711 See Manning, 59 Misc. 2d at 147, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 358; supra note 763. But
see Kaplan, 46 Misc. 2d at 578, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 378 ("Section 5240 permits a certain
amount of tinkering on the structure by the judicial handyman, but it does not
permit the construction of an entirely new wing using jurisprudential
architecture.").
766 See Morris Plan Indus. Bank of N.Y. v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 330, 67 N.E.
510, 512 (1946).
767 See Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l Fin. Co., B.V., 41 A.D.3d 25, 31,
40, 836 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9, 15 (1st Dep't 2007) (turnover order requiring debtor to bring
certificated shares from Indonesia).
71 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(d).
769 See id. 5231(a). If the debtor is paying ten percent to the sheriff directly, no
other creditor can insist that an income execution be levied on the employer.
Citibank v. East, 121 Misc. 2d 861, 861-63, 469 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558-59 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Queens County 1983).
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the employer will be garnished if the debtor defaults. 70  This
procedure was designed "to avoid annoyances to third parties and
to give the judgment debtor an opportunity to make payment
without embarrassment." 771 If JD does not start paying within
twenty days after service,772 or if the sheriff is unable to
effectuate service within twenty days, the sheriff garnishes the
employer.773 The income execution for support operates on a
different basis. The debtor must be served first.774 Unless the
debtor alleges a mistake of fact, the employer is served fifteen
days thereafter.775
After being served with the income execution, the employer
has the duty to withhold wages until the judgment is paid.776
Importantly, the maximum a creditor can obtain from a regular
income execution is ten percent of income.777 This amount
coheres with the exemption of
ninety per cent of the earnings of the judgment debtor for his
personal services rendered within sixty days before, and at any
time after, an income execution is delivered to the sheriff or a
motion is made to secure the application of the judgment
debtor's earnings to the satisfaction of the judgment ....
The sixty-day limit is significant. Where earnings have been due
for over sixty days, the earnings are not exempt. 79 Or if a bank
770 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(a). The form of the income execution for support is
rather different. Notably, the income execution must notify the debtor that, unless
she claims a mistake of fact, the execution will be served on the employer in fifteen
days. See id. 5241(c)(iv).
771 County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cummings, 42 Misc. 2d 949, 950, 249
N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
772 At least as of 1970, few JDs ever paid the sheriff. See Marsh, supra note 745,
at 402-03.
773 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(e). Levy is contingent upon the sheriff receiving in
advance, a fee required by CPLR 8011(b). See Pegalis v. Varelas, 123 Misc. 2d 920,
921, 474 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1984).
774 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(d).
771 See id. 5241(f).
7 See id. 5231(f). An employer is prohibited from firing a worker whose wages
have been garnished. See id. 5252(1). The sheriff has the duty to calculate interest,
and if she does not, the employer is not liable for paying the amount that the income
execution requires to be paid. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 116 Misc. 2d 780,
783, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
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account consists of old wages,8 ° only an amount equating with
ninety percent of the earnings over the past sixty days are
exempt. 8 1  Indeed, once in the bank account, the earnings are
"debts" that can be levied pursuant to a simple execution. 2
Where past earnings are less than sixty days old, they are ninety
percent exempt; the balance can be reached by a simple non-
income execution.8 3 Sums not yet earned can be reached only by
an income execution.&l
With regard to bank accounts containing wages, CPLR
5205(d)(2) exempts earnings only in cases where an income
execution has actually been served.78 5 Where only a non-income
execution has been served, no wages are exempt, if we read the
CPLR literally. 76 Happily for wage earners, no court has yet
noticed that the plain meaning of CPLR 5205(d)(2), which
permits one hundred percent garnishment of recent earnings in a
bank account under a non-income execution.78 7
7"0 That bank accounts are exempt if they contain exempt wages depends upon a
tracing rule applicable to exemptions. See infra text accompanying notes 1113-1119.
78 In re Lubecki, 332 B.R. 256, 260-61 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005).
712 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(f).
783 See id. 5205(d)(2).
78' In Girard Trust Bank v. Gotham Football Club, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 142, 144, 295
N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1st Dep't 1968), AD owed JD football bonuses for a season. First,
if JD played in fifty percent of the defensive or offensive plays, JD would receive
$2,000. If JD showed a good attitude, JD would get $1,000 at the end of the season.
After the season but before the bonuses were paid, JC 1 served an income execution
on AD and obtained ten percent of the bonuses. JC 2 served both an income execution
and an ordinary execution on AD. JD claimed the bonuses were exempt because they
consisted of earnings for "personal services rendered within sixty days before ... an
income execution is delivered to the sheriff." Id. at 145, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 744. The
court agreed with the proposition and remanded to see whether any part of the
above two bonuses were earned before the sixty day period. See id. at 147-48, 295
N.Y.S.2d at 746-47 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2)). The court seemed to think
that if the fifty percent level was reached within the sixty day period, all earnings
were within the exemption. See id. at 147, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 746. In fact, CPLR
5205(d)(2) refers to "earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services
rendered within sixty days before... an income execution is delivered to the
sheriff." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2). So the issue is not earning (that is, the vesting of
AD's obligation to pay), but rather is rendering services. Properly, both bonuses
should have been prorated.
785 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2).
" See id. 5205(d).
787 The attempt to obtain one hundred percent of wages via a regular execution
was rejected in Cadle Co. v. Newhouse, 20 F. App'x 69, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2001). In
Power v. Loonam, 49 Misc. 2d 127, 129, 266 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867-68 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1966), the court ruled that a restraining notice had no effect as to ninety
percent of a bank account, even though no income execution had been served.
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The ten percent limit of CPLR 5231(b) coheres with federal
legislation, which commands that state legislation permit the
garnishment of no more than twenty-five percent of income."'
The ten percent maximum is reduced where a wage earner is at
or near the minimum wage.78 9 With regard to regular income
executions, garnishment is altogether prohibited if disposable
earnings for the week are less than thirty times the minimum
wage. 90 For this purpose, disposable earnings are defined as
take-home pay-"part of the earnings ... after the deduction
from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be
withheld."79' The amount withheld cannot exceed twenty-five
percent of disposable income or thirty times the minimum wage,
whichever is less.792
The limits for income execution for domestic support
obligations are far more creditor-generous. If the debtor has a
new spouse or dependent child, up to fifty percent of take-home
pay can be withheld.793 If arrears on past support obligations
exist, this number rises to fifty-five percent.794 Where there is no
current spouse, sixty percent of take-home pay can be reached,
sixty-five percent if arrears exist, which are more than twelve
weeks old. 79' These limits, which are consistent with the Federal
" See Federal Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(1) (2000). See
generally id. § 1671. This Act permits garnishment to rise to sixty-five percent if
family support obligations are due and owing. See id. § 1673(b)(2)(B).
789 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b)(i)-(ii).
790 See id. 5231(b)(i).
791 Id. 5231(c)(ii).
792 See id. 5231(b)(ii).
'9' See id. 5241(g)(i).
114 See id. Amounts paid must first be applied to current obligations; only the
surplus can be applied to retire the arrears. See In re Smith v. ABC Co., 2005 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 3467, at *13-14 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County Sept. 29, 2005).
795 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(g)(ii). For purposes of these limits, property settlements
are not considered support obligations; the creditor must resort to regular income
executions, where only ten percent can be obtained. See Brody v. Brody, 196 A.D.2d
308, 311, 609 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (1st Dep't 1994); Maloney v. Maloney, 140 Misc. 2d
852, 856, 532 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1988). In Kahn v.
Trustees of Columbia University, 109 A.D.2d 395, 396-97, 492 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34-35
(1st Dep't 1985), JC had served a regular income execution with regard to a
judgment for conversion of a joint bank account and also had a support turnover
order pursuant to CPLR 5242. JD asserted that, since the payment order exceeded
twenty-five percent of earnings, AD should not pay the income execution. See id. at
397-98, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 35. The court ruled, rather questionably, that the money
judgment for conversion of the bank account was for the "support" of JC and could
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Consumer Credit Protection Act,796 apply only "[wihere the
income is compensation paid or payable to the debtor for personal
services. " 91 In comparison, a covenant not to compete-that is, a
covenant to offer no personal services-can be one hundred
percent garnished.7 9
There is an odd entanglement between regular income
executions and support income executions. A support income
execution can capture up to sixty-five percent of personal
earnings.199 But if it absorbs more than twenty-five percent, no
other regular income execution can be honored. 0 If, on the other
hand, the support income execution captures, say, twenty-three
percent of earnings, then the regular income execution may get
two percent. Family support obligations have priority over
executions on other kinds of debt.0 l So where the family's
income executions are second in time but occupy the twenty-five
percent or more of wages, ordinary income execution creditors
will obtain nothing.0 2
A divorced JD may be paying support voluntarily when
served with a regular income execution. May JD claim that the
voluntary support payments exhaust the twenty-five percent
maximum to which JC is entitled, thereby defeating the
income execution?80 3 The statute requires that a support income
execution must exist to soak up the twenty-five percent before
JC's regular income execution is blocked.804 Nevertheless, courts
be included in the fifty percent limit imposed by CPLR 5241(g). Id. at 401-02, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 37-38.
796 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2000); see Kennedy v. Kennedy, 195 A.D.2d 229, 232,
607 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776 (4th Dep't 1994). Major conforming adjustments were needed
in 1987. Samuel J.M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 159, 205-08 (1988).
797 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(g).
798 See Kennedy, 195 A.D.2d at 235-36, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
... See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2).
800 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b)(iii).
801 See id.; see also id. 5241(h).
.02 See Long Island Trust Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1981).
..3 See N.Y. C.P.L.R 5231(b)(iii).
so4 See Tilden Fin. Corp. v. Corwin, 149 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 566 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990). A support order within the meaning of CPLR 5242,
however, is to be treated like a garnishment for purposes of calculating the twenty-
five percent limit. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 98 Misc.
2d 307, 309, 413 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1978).
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have used the mandate of CPLR 524005 to change the rules to
give JD the credit the statute so stingily denied."0 6
A strange collision between CPLR 5231(b) and section 151 of
the Debtor and Creditor Law can occur. The latter section
permits ADs to set off their obligation to JD against JD's
obligation to them, thereby defeating a levy."°7 In Franklin
National Bank v. Brita Homes Corp.,808 AD made cash advances
to JD on commissions not yet earned. The court ruled that these
loans were not earnings and so could not be garnished by an
income execution .8 9  But when the commissions were earned,
presumably AD's setoff right would defeat the levy. So any JD
who can arrange to be paid in advance l1 can render herself
judgment-proof from income executions. Advance pay is a mere
loan, not earnings. The setoff right of the employer assures that
JC never gets a dime. Of course, since CPLR 5240 invites courts
to do whatever they want, the tools no doubt exist to prevent
such shenanigans.
The regular income execution only encumbers ten percent of
income .81 But, according to CPLR 5205(d), ninety percent of
earnings are exempt,8 12 "except such part as a court determines to
be unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of the judgment
805 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240; see also id. 5231(i) ("At any time, the judgment creditor
or the judgment debtor may move, upon such notice as the court may direct, for an
order modifying an income execution.").
806 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank/N. v. Reif, 732 F. Supp. 354, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1990);
Am. Express Centurion v. Melia, 155 Misc. 2d 587, 590-91, 589 N.Y.S.2d 290,
292-93 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1992). In Spatz Furniture Corp. v. Lee Letter
Services, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 291, 295-96, 276 N.Y.S.2d 219, 224-25 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966), affd, 54 Misc. 2d 359, 282 N.YS.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't
1967), JC, consented to a reduction, and so AD reduced withheld amounts paid to
JC 1, which meant that JCl's payout took longer. This was held prejudicial to JC 2. So
AD had to pay, in effect, damages to JC 2. Had JC 1 moved for a court order reducing
the withholding, AD would have avoided this liability.
807 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 151 (McKinney 2008).
808 35 A.D.2d 550, 313 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1970).
80. See Franklin Simon & Co. v. Pease & Elliman, Inc., 238 A.D. 614, 616, 265
N.Y.S. 199, 201 (1st Dep't 1933); Franklin Nat'l Bank, 35 A.D.2d at 550, 313 N.Y.S.
at 249-50. Contra Goldwater, Inc. v. C.B. Snyder Nat'l Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 669,
672, 265 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
810 If the advances are contractually mandated, however, they are leviable debts.
Publishers Distrib. Corp. v. Indep. News Co., 55 A.D.2d 571, 572, 390 N.Y.S.2d 77,
78 (1st Dep't 1976).
811 See N.Y. C.P.L.R 5231(b) (McKinney 2008).
812 See id. 5205(d)(2).
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debtor and his dependents."13 If some of the nintey percent is
unnecessary in this way, the judgment creditor can obtain an
installment payment order under CPLR 5226.14 This permits
low-priority creditors to jump to the head of the line. Suppose
JC 1 has served an income execution and is receiving the ten
percent of the income permitted by CPLR 5231(b). JC 2 might
steal a march and obtain an installment payment order that
requires JD to pay extra "unnecessary" wages directly to JC 2,
even though JC1 has not been paid in full.
8 15
Putting aside the above point, priorities are different for
income executions, compared to non-income executions. Plain
vanilla executions are subject to a "first to levy" rule: The officer
who first levies establishes priority for all creditors who have
delivered executions to that officer. 16 Income executions are not
subject to a first-to-levy rule. Where different officers deliver
executions to the debtor at different times, the creditor who first
delivered an income execution to an officer has priority. 17
Priority is also preserved after the officer returns an income
execution unsatisfied.818 So if the second sheriff receives an
income execution after the first sheriff has returned an income
execution, the first income execution still has priority, provided a
new sheriff receives an income execution from the same JC
within twenty days of the return.1 9 With simple executions,
return means that the associated execution lien is dead. 2 ° On
the other hand, an income execution dies if a debtor quits his job;
813 Id. 5204(d) (emphasis added).
814 See Judware v. Judware, 71 Misc. 2d 795, 796, 337 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117-18
(Fam. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1972). A receivership is possible as well. See
Edelman v. Edelman, 83 A.D.2d 622, 622, 441 N.Y.S.2d 529, 529 (2d Dep't 1981).
815 See Schwartz v. Goldberg, 58 Misc. 2d 308, 308, 295 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1968).
816 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
817 See id. 5231(); Nat'l Bank of N. Am. v. State Tax Comm'r, 106 A.D.2d 377,
378, 482 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (2d Dep't 1984) (minor misspelling of AD's name in
execution did not invalidate JC,'s priority).
818 See N.Y. C.P.L.R 5231(). CPLR 5230(c), however, makes clear that income
executions need not be returned in sixty days, as is true of regular executions. Yet
CPLR 5231() refers to the return of income executions.
819 See id. 5231(j) (last two sentences).
820 There is some doubt as to this, however. See supra text accompanying notes
242-248.
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a new income execution served on a new employer has priority
over the earlier execution directed toward the first employer.
82 1
With regard to income executions for support, a levy
pursuant to CPLR 5242 takes priority over any other levy.s22 If
two such levies exhaust the applicable limit on deductions, the
levies share pro rata.823
It seems to be assumed that a radical chasm exists between
ordinary executions and income executions. But is this
distinction justified on the language of the CPLR? Why couldn't
a sheriff who has received an income execution levy a bank
account? Nothing in the CPLR prevents such a conclusion. An
income execution has extra requirements that exceed the
requirements of an ordinary execution, but perhaps that means
that every income execution is also a regular execution.
Nevertheless, income executions have extra disabilities,
compared to ordinary executions. Income executions must be
served on JD twenty days before any levy. 24  In the case of
support income executions, the execution may be issued by the
sheriff directly;8 21 this is not true for ordinary executions.8 26 So
where a sheriff issues a support income execution, this could not
also serve as an ordinary execution.
At least one court8 2 ' and the leading treatise8 28 deny the
proposition that income executions are also ordinary executions,
mainly in the name of making sense of the entire system. But
there is no real need for this denial. For instance, suppose JC,
serves an income execution on the sheriff, and JC 2 serves an
ordinary execution. The sheriff then levies AD with regard to a
bank account. The world will not end if the sheriff gives priority
to JC, as the first to deliver an execution.
821 See Lischer v. Halsey-Reid Equip., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 637, 639, 313 N.Y.S.2d
136, 138-39 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1970).
822 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5242(d).
823 See id.
824 See id. 5231(d).
821 See id. 5241(b)(1).
821 See id. 5230(b).
827 See Yeh v. Seakan, 119 Misc. 2d 681, 683, 464 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1983).
828 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 5202.07 ("With an income execution, the
only thing that the sheriff can levy upon is the judgment debtor's paycheck and not
his property in general.").
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Ordinary executions are subject to the rule of CPLR
5202(a)(1) and (2), empowering post-lien transferees to take free
of the earlier lien.129  This rule seems not to apply to income
executions. In In re Beneficial Finance Co. of New York °83 0 JC
served an execution on the sheriff. Thereafter, JD assigned his
wages 31 to SP, and SP notified the employer of the
assignment.8 32  Nevertheless, JC's execution lien had priority
over the voluntary assignment. 33 This could be true only if SP
did not qualify for the exceptions in either CPLR 5202(a)(1) or
(2), suggesting that somehow income executions are simply
different from ordinary executions. But why should this be so? If
the preamble of CPLR 5202(a) applies to create a lien on wages
when the income execution was delivered to the sheriff,8 34 why
shouldn't the exceptions to the preamble apply as well?
H. Executions Liens as Voidable Preferences
One of the things bankruptcy is supposed to do is to prevent
unsecured creditors from rushing to the court house to obtain
judicial liens.8 3' A key tool for accomplishing this goal is
voidable preference law. To oversimplify, voidable preference
law guarantees that any judicial lien attaching to a debtor's
property within ninety days of the debtor's bankruptcy petition is
a voidable preference.8 36  This federal principle has a chilling
effect on obtaining a lien under state law, as JD can always
defeat the lien by filing for bankruptcy within ninety days. 37
829 See supra text accompanying notes 32-165.
8.0 43 Misc. 2d 546, 547, 251 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1964).
8' Wage assignments are not covered by article 9 of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 9-106
(2007). Rather, they are governed by article 3-A of the New York Personal Property
Law. Voluntary wage assignments seem to have gone the way of the dinosaur. There
has been no reported litigation concerning them for at least twenty years.
832 Beneficial Fin., 43 Misc. 2d at 548, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
83 See id. at 549-50, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59.
814 See N.Y. CPLR 5202(a) (McKinney 2008).
8-8 See Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 308 (1911)
("[T]he policy and purpose of the [B]ankruptcy [A]ct [is] to hold the estate in the
custody of the court for the benefit of creditors after the filing of the petition .... To
permit creditors to attach the bankrupt's property between the filing of the petition
and the time of adjudication would be to encourage a race of diligence to defeat the
purposes of the act and prevent the equal distribution of the estate among all
creditors of the same class, which is the policy of the law.").
886 See Young v. Scandore Paper Box Corp. (In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd.), 13 B.R. 596,
600 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
87 See id. (delivery of execution and levy within ninety-day preference period).
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In order to avoid a preference, the trustee must prove six
elements. First, there must be a transfer of debtor property a38 A
"transfer" is defined broadly to include "the creation of a lien." 9
Second, the transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditora4 °
Third, the transfer must be "for or on account of an antecedent
debt owed by the debtor.8141  This requirement is guaranteed in
the case of a judicial lien, as the debt on which it is based
precedes the declaration of the lien. Fourth, the lien must be
created when the debtor is insolvent.8 42 Fifth, the transfer must
occur within ninety days of bankruptcy.8 43 Finally, the lien must
allow the creditor to get more than she would have received if the
lien were never created and the creditor simply took the dividend
from a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor's estate instead.&4
This test is automatically met whenever an unsecured creditor
becomes secured and the debtor is insolvent on the day of
bankruptcy. 45 If the trustee proves the prima facie case against
a judicial lien, no defense will save it from doom.
It would seem that, so long as the judicial lien is more than
ninety days old at the time of bankruptcy, JC (if not an insider)
will be a secured creditor in the bankruptcy. This assures that
JC will always obtain the value of the collateral in question.8
46
But things are not so simple. Federal law casts a strange hoodoo
on the clock when it is time to figure out when a debtor actually
transferred property. The question of "when" is crucial for no
88 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
839 Id. § 101(54)(A).
840 See id. § 547(b)(1).
841 Id. § 547(b)(2).
842 See id. § 547(b)(3). Insolvency is presumed in the ninety-day period preceding
the bankruptcy petition. See id. § 547(f).
'4' See id. § 547(b)(4)(A). There is a one-year period for insiders, which will
typically be triggered in intra-family litigation. See id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
'4 See id. § 547(b)(5).
845 See GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 705, § 2.05, at 157. In fact, the debtor is
presumed to be insolvent at all times ninety days before the bankruptcy petition. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(f). In Barr v. National Aircraft Services, Inc. (In re Cosmopolitan
Aviation Corp.), 34 B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), a judicial lien survived
even though it was created within ninety days of bankruptcy because the trustee did
not carry the burden of proof on section 547(b)(5). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g). But given
the presumption of insolvency, the trustee should have prevailed.
846 See 11 U.S.C. § 725 (2000).
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less than three of the six elements of the trustee's prima facie
case of voidable preference. 47
According to section 547(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
transfer is deemed to occur when it occurs, but only if it is
"perfected" within a grace period of thirty days after the
transfer."8 The grace period was lengthened in 2005 to thirty
days from the mean-spirited ten-day grace period of the original
Bankruptcy Code. 49
Perfection is defined as follows by section 547(e)(1)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Code: "[A] transfer of a fixture or property other
than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee."5 0 So every transfer must be tested
against a hypothetical judicial lien under state law. If the
transfer is no good against a subsequent judicial lien, it is an
unperfected transfer. 51
Suppose perfection does not occur within the thirty-day grace
period. Then, according to section 547(e)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the transfer does not occur when it occurs.8 52  Rather, it
occurs when it is perfected. 53 This can be very bad news for a
creditor. It can place a transfer within the ninety-day period,
even though the transfer really occurred earlier.5 4
A New York judicial lien must, therefore, be tested against
yet another hypothetical New York judicial lien. We discover
that, under CPLR 5202(a), an execution lien is created when an
execution is delivered to the sheriff.85 5 But CPLR 5234(b) and (c)
impose a complex priority rule.5 6 Where all creditors have
'4' See 11 U.S.C § 547(b). Timing of the transfer is important for figuring out
whether the transfer was on antecedent debt, whether the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer, and whether the transfer was within ninety days of
bankruptcy (one year for insiders). See id.
" See id. § 547(e)(2)(A).
8" See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 403, 119 Stat. 23.
850 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B).
85' See id.
'52 See id. § 547(e)(2)(B).
I See id. What if a transfer is never perfected? Since voidable preferences are
pre-bankruptcy transfers, section 547(e)(2)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the unperfected transfer is deemed to be made slightly before the bankruptcy
petition. See id. § 547(e)(2)(C).
'I1 See id. § 547(e)(2)(B).
'5 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2008).
858 See id. 5234(b), (c).
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served executions on the same enforcement officer, priority is
decided by the order in which the executions are delivered.8 57 If
we stopped here, we could affirm that execution liens are always
self-perfecting transfers, and we would never have occasion to
apply the time-deferring rule of section 547(e)(2)(B).58 But it
is also possible for executions to be delivered to different
enforcement officers. If this occurs, the first officer to levy
establishes priority for her portfolio of creditors, compared to the
creditors who served slower, flatfooted officers. For example,
imagine the following scenario:
Twelfth Scenario
December 1, 2006: JC 1 serves an execution on the federal
marshal.
January 1, 2007: The start of the preference period.
March 1: The marshal levies on the debtor's property.
April 1: JD files for bankruptcy.
Now imagine a hypothetical creditor--JC2. This creditor
could serve an execution on the sheriff on December 2. If the
sheriff were to levy before the marshal-say on February 28-
then JC 2 would have priority to any proceeds generated by
the sheriffs execution sale. This possibility proves that JC,'s
execution lien was not perfected until March 1. Only after
March 1 does JC 2 lose the capacity to get a senior judicial lien.
So, according to section 547(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, JC 1
received a transfer on March 1, well within the preference
period.5 9 JC1 , therefore, has received a voidable preference, even
though, under New York law, JC 1 has an execution lien on
December 1.860
In order to arrive at the conclusion that March 1 is the date
of the transfer (because that was the date of perfection and
perfection was more than thirty days after the lien was created
on December 1), I imagined JC 2 who (1) served an execution on
an officer other than the federal marshal, and (2) this make-
believe sheriff levied before the federal marshal did. Am I
allowed to imagine, not only the creation of a subsequent judicial
lien, but also a levy pursuant to the creation? To ask the same
857 See id. 5234(b).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B).
"'9 See id.
860 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a).
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question in different words, in my fiction, my dream of passion,
may I force my soul so to imagine a subsequent perfected judicial
lien, 6' or am I limited to imagining the creation of an
unperfected execution lien (which would be potentially but not
necessarily senior to JC,'s actual judicial lien)? Unfortunately,
the Bankruptcy Code does not spell out any limitations on what a
bankruptcy trustee may hallucinate in testing the perfection of
JC,'s judicial lien. Nevertheless, several New York bankruptcy
courts have limited the imaginary exercise to the creation of a
competing judicial lien. They have not permitted the bankruptcy
trustee to imagine a levy following that creation.8 62 At least one
court, however, has ruled that an execution lien is unperfected
until the sheriff levies; therefore, any judicial lien is invalid if the
levy is within ninety days of bankruptcy. 63
In fact, even if the bankruptcy trustee's imagination is too
impoverished to conceive of a levy, the bankruptcy trustee can
still show that execution liens are unperfected until the time of
levy. 64 In New York, we do not even need to imagine a
competing levy. 6" An alternative scenario goes as follows.
Suppose on February 28, JC 2 obtains a turnover order requiring
the debtor or a third party to turn property over to the sheriff,
and suppose this turnover order is filed with the clerk on the
same day. Such an equity lien is guaranteed priority over JC 1 at
any time before the sheriff levies on behalf of JC 1 . CPLR 5234(c)
makes clear that the filing of a turnover order establishes
priority for JC 2.166 JC 2's senior judicial lien is a self-perfecting
one.8 67  Therefore, by simply imagining equity lien creation
"61 See Musso v. Ostashko, 468 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[Tihe so-called
'strong arm' provision of the Bankruptcy Code-gives the bankruptcy trustee the
rights of a hypothetical perfected judgment lien creditor as of the petition date."
(emphasis added)). Although this remark concerns section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, not voidable preference law, both concepts require the imagination of
attributes of a hypothetical judicial lien.
"82 See, e.g., Balaber-Strauss v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In re Marceca), 129
B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Syed Indus. Corp. v. Cohen (In re Syed Indus.
Corp.), 58 B.R. 920 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Barr v. Nat'l Aircraft Servs., Inc. (In re
Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp.), 34 B.R. 592 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); James Talcott
Factors, Inc. v. Blatter (In re Blatter), 16 B.R. 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
863 See Sapir v. Mancuso (In re Kambourelis), 8 B.R. 138, 142 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1981).
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(without any subsequent lien perfection), I can show that JC,'s
execution lien is not perfected.
The matter stands differently with income executions. CPLR
5231(j) makes clear that the first creditor to serve any
enforcement officer with an income execution establishes
priority. 68 True, an ordinary income execution falls to an income
execution for a domestic support obligation. But the perfection
test of section 547(e)(1)(B) requires that I imagine a creditor
suing for breach of a simple contract. 69 This imaginary limit
precludes me from finding JC1 unperfected when JC, serves an
income execution. 70 Therefore, so long as the income execution
is served more than ninety days before bankruptcy, the creditor
in question has not received a voidable preference.8
Where JC is an intra-family creditor seeking to enforce a
support obligation, the lien arising from an income execution
may not be a voidable preference, even if JC serves the execution
within the preference period. After 2005, JC's claim for a
domestic support obligation is entitled to the highest possible
bankruptcy priority for unsecured creditors-higher even than
administrative claims. 72  If the debtor has sufficient
unencumbered assets to pay this highest of all the priorities,
then JC has not received a voidable preference. 3  Under the
hypothetical liquidation test of section 547(b)(5), if JC were to
surrender her judicial lien and enter into a hypothetical chapter
7 liquidation, JC might still receive a one hundred percent
dividend. 4  Accordingly, the judicial lien might not be
preferential. Such a finding does not even require a level of
assets sufficient to cover JC's priority. JC will have the highest
right of distribution. So what JC loses by surrendering the
judicial lien JC gets back under her section 507(a)(1) priority.75
This means that a bankruptcy trustee can never undo a judicial
lien for a domestic support obligation.
86 See id. 5231().
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (2000).
870 See New Life Builders, Inc. v. Perfetti Builder's Hardware, Inc. (In re New
Life Builders, Inc.), 241 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999).
871 See id.
872 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
873 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2000).
874 See id.
876 See id. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
[Vol. 83:43
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 173
Income executions in New York are not voidable preferences
if the sheriff has served the employer more than ninety days
before a debtor's bankruptcy petition.87 6 This was the holding of
In re Riddervold v. Saratoga Hospital.7  The court ruled that JC
did not receive a voidable preference, even though actual
payments and services performed by JD occurred during the
preference period.
Although many have attacked this position, 79 it is perfectly
correct. JD's "job" is what article 9 would call an account (if
article 9 applied to wages).8 80  The fact that the account is
contingent on JD's work does not change the fact that the
account existed as soon as JD was hired. When JC delivered the
income execution to the sheriff prior to the preference period, JC
obtained a property interest in that account at that time. 8 ' The
only case on this subject, however, misses this point.8 2
876 See Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp. (In re Riddervold), 647 F.2d 342, 346-47
(2d Cir. 1981).
877 See id. at 346.
878 See id. The avoidance action was brought by JD, not the bankruptcy trustee,
pursuant to section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 344. Debtors are able
to bring voidable preference cases to recover exempt property only if they have not
made voluntary transfers of the property in question. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A)
(2000). The wages were exemptible under section 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code-a wild card that allows any type of property to be exempted. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(d)(5) (West 2007). In 1981, however, the New York legislature would prohibit
New York debtors from choosing federal exemptions. Today, debtors wishing to
challenge garnishments as voidable preferences must assert the cash exemption in
section 283 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. See Price v. Mfrs. & Traders
Trust Co. (In re Price), 266 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001). Or they could
show that bank accounts contain wages from the ungarnished portion. See In re
McMahon v. Nourse (In re McMahon), 70 B.R. 290, 293 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987). But
only wages earned within sixty days before the garnishment are properly exempted.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2) (McKinney 2008); In re Wrobel, 268 B.R. 342, 344
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001). Meanwhile, nothing in CPLR 5205 would sustain an
exemption in the ten percent of wages actually paid over to the sheriff.
879 E.g., Morehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (In re Morehead), 249 F.3d
445, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Coppie, 728 F.2d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1984).
88' Article 9 disavows jurisdiction over wage assignments. See U.C.C. § 9-
109(d)(3)(2007).
"' See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable
Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 238 (1995). The reasoning in Riddervold,
however, is different. There, Judge Henry Friendly ruled that, when AD paid the
sheriff after the levy, AD was not transferring JD's property. Rather, after the levy,
JC owned the wages. Riddervold, 647 F.2d at 346 ("Service of the income execution
on the employer in effect works a novation whereby the employer owes 10% of the
employee's salary not to the employee but to the sheriff for the benefit of the
judgment creditor."). This is untenable as stated. Imagine that JD pays JC the
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Once the bankruptcy commences, failure of the creditor to
take voluntary affirmative steps to halt the "continuing levy" of
garnishment violates bankruptcy's automatic stay provision.88 3
For this the creditor could be liable in damages.88 4  The
garnishment itself, though a valid lien on the debtor's pre-
petition property, dissolves of its own accord under the authority
of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.8 5  In that case, a voluntary wage
assignment was proclaimed automatically dissolved in the name
of bankruptcy's fresh start principle, even though the assignment
was valid under Illinois law.886  If pre-petition voluntary wage
assignments dissolve from post-petition wages, surely an
involuntary assignment (i.e., a garnishment) does too.8 7
II. EQUITY LIENS
In ancient days, the writ of execution was deemed the "legal"
remedy for a money judgment.8 8 Equitable remedies existed, but
these were subject to the rule that equity disdained to intervene
amount of the judgment on the side. Properly, this payment cancels the levy. The
ten percent payable to JC should now be paid to JD. On Judge Friendly's reasoning,
since JC owns the wages outright, payment to JC would not affect JC's continuing
right to receive ten percent of the wages.
For the view that a federal property rule for transfer of wages renders
Riddervold erroneous, see Matthew Frankle, Note, Wage Garnishments in
Bankruptcy: Riddervold Revisited, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 927, 952-56 (1999). For
opinions within the Second Circuit that decline to follow Riddervold on the
erroneous premise that Riddervold is overruled by Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S.
393, 397 (1992), see Price v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. (In re Price), 272 B.R. 828,
829 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); Arway v. Mount Saint Mary's Hosp. (In re Arway), 227
B.R. 216, 217 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). These cases are based on the premise that a
debtor has no property right in an employment contract until she actually does the
work. In other words, a contingent right to payment is falsely equated with no right
to payment.
882 In re Lawrence, 18 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
883 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (2000) (forbidding "the enforcement, against the
debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the
commencement of the case under this title"). On a creditor's duty under section
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to put the debtor back into possession of property, see
GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 705, § 13.09.
"" See Sucre v. MIC Leasing Corp. (In re Sucre), 226 B.R. 340, 348 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998).
885 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
88 See id. at 244-45.
887 See In re Rutty, 39 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (assuming that the
debtor owns postpetition wages in a chapter 7 case, in spite of garnishment).
888 See Cohen, Supplementary Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1009-10.
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if a legal remedy proved adequate.8 9 So, unless the sheriff
returned an execution unsatisfied, or nulla bona, or unless the
property was "equitable" (inherently not subject to execution),
the equitable remedies were not available. 9 °
If the execution was indeed nulla bona, the creditor could file
a "creditor's bill in equity."8 '' The creditor's bill was a grab-bag of
equitable remedies, including the right to a turnover order
directing JD or AD to pay or to surrender property to the sheriff,
the right to have a receiver appointed to liquidate property, the
right to discovery against JD or AD in order to locate JD's loot,
and restraining orders, prohibiting JD or AD from transferring
JD's property.
When New York adopted the Field Code in 1848, a series of
provisions introduced many of the above ideas under the rubric of
a supplementary proceeding.8 92 As with the creditor's bill, a
supplementary proceeding was initially possible only if the
execution was returned nulla bona. In 1935, however, the
legislature abolished the requirement of the execution nulla
bona. 93 Today it is possible for judgment creditors to proceed
directly to the equitable remedies.
8" See id. at 1024.
890
Proceedings supplementary to execution are remedies in equity for the
collection of the creditor's judgment, and were intended as a substitute for
the creditor's bill, as formerly used in chancery. In such cases it was the
settled rule that unless the creditor had exhausted all his remedies at law,
or in case he was not a position to avail himself of all the ordinary remedies
which courts of law gave for the enforcement of judgments, the bill in
equity could not be maintained, and would be dismissed.
Importers' & Traders' Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Quackenbush, 143 N.Y. 567, 571, 38
N.E. 728, 728-29 (1894) (citations omitted). As a practical matter, if JD did not
contest the bill, inquiry into the adequacy of the legal remedy was waived. See
Cohen, Supplementary Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1013.
891 See Cohen, Supplementary Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1012.
892 The Field Code was displaced by the Throop revision of the Code of Civil
Procedure in 1876, which in turn was overthrown by the Civil Practice Act in 1920.
Isadore H. Cohen, Attachment of Property Fraudulently Transferred in New York:
The Influence of Abstractions on the Rights of Creditors, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 516
(1949) [hereinafter Cohen, Property Fraudulently Transferred]. The CPLR went
effective on September 1, 1963.
"" See Ch. 630, §§ 773-74, 1935 N.Y. Laws 1266; Utils. Eng'g Inst. v. Mangan,
276 A.D. 922, 922, 94 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (2d Dep't 1950).
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A. Creation
Heretofore we have considered mainly the execution lien.
Yet CPLR 5202(b) also provides liens in connection with the
"secur[ing ofi an order for delivery of, payment of, or appointment
of a receiver of, a debt owed to the judgment debtor or an interest
of the judgment debtor in personal property."8 94 Strangely, when
these equity liens come up against levies pursuant to executions,
the equity lien's priority depends on when the order "is filed." 95
If a sheriff levies property after the judgment creditor has
"secured" an order from a judge but before the county clerk "files"
the court order, the sheriff has priority.896 Or if JC1 "secures" an
order first, but the clerk "files" JC 2's order first, JC 2 prevails. 97
This gap is no doubt the result of legislative negligence.
Once created, the equity lien is vulnerable to "a transferee
who acquired the debt or property for fair consideration and
without notice of such order." 98  This vulnerability exists
whether or not the property is capable of delivery. 99 In this
sense, the equity lien is weaker than the execution lien, where
the sheriff has levied property capable of delivery. Following
such a levy, bona fide transferees for value do not take free of the
execution lien. This is no doubt because a levy of such property
implies dispossession of JD-a warning to anyone who seeks a
transfer from JD. With equity liens, however, JD or perhaps AD
stays in possession, at least initially. This provides no notice to
bona fide transferees.
Oddly, suppose JD obeys a turnover order and hands
property capable of delivery over to the sheriff. Though
894 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2008).
895 See id. 5234(c).
" See id.
897 See id. ("Where two or more such orders affecting the same interest in
personal property or debt are filed, the proceeds of the property or debt shall be
applied in the order of filing."). An untenable suggestion appears in the leading
treatise: perhaps an order to a third party under CPLR 5225(a) is merely a judgment
against the third party, which must be enforced by execution. See WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 35, 5225.06a. The language of CPLR 5225(b) is clearly injunctive; ifAD
violates it, she is in contempt of court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5210. Besides, if the
property is not capable of delivery, execution culminates in a paper levy, which is
not enforced by the sheriff, but rather must be enforced by a turnover proceeding.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-308. So the suggestion ends up, in this
context, uselessly requiring two turnover proceedings instead of one.
"9" N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
89 See id. 5202(a)(2).
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dispossessed, JD still has the power to give better title to a good
faith transferee for value. So if the sheriff possesses by levy, JD
is disempowered. If the sheriff possesses turned-over property,
JD's power continues. Obviously, such nonsense cannot be
defended.
Suppose, however, that the sheriff holds an auction where X
is the buyer. Can X be confident that JD's power to convey free
of the lien has finally been laid to rest? Can JD sell out X years
after the sheriffs sale? There is nothing on the face of the CPLR
to give X any such assurance-yet more testimony to the
negligence with which the CPLR was drafted.
According to CPLR 5202, equity liens arise, not when an
equitable action is commenced, 90 but when the action terminates
with the "securing" of an order.90 1 Thus, if JC 1 commences a
turnover proceeding and JC 2 manages a levy before the
conclusion of the turnover proceeding, JC 2 snatches the laurel
wreath of priority from the diligent brow of JC 1.90 2  This is a
change from prior law. In Metcalf Bros. & Co. v. Barker, 3 for
example, JC commenced a turnover proceeding with regard to
fraudulently conveyed assets eighteen months before a
bankruptcy proceeding was commenced.9 4 It secured a turnover
order five months before bankruptcy.90 5  The order was filed
within four months of bankruptcy. 906 Under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, any lien obtained within four months of bankruptcy was
null and void.90 7 The creditor, however, escaped this avoidance
theory because its equity lien was created when the turnover
proceeding was commenced, more than a year beyond the fatal
900 At least when a creditor sought the appointment of a receiver, the
supplementary proceeding was deemed commenced when a subpoena was served on
the debtor, when a subpoena was delivered to a third party (but the lien bound only
property controlled by the third party), or when the debtor received notice that the
creditor would seek the appointment of a receiver, whichever was earlier. N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. ACT § 808 (1938).
901 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
902 See In re Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 27, 778 N.Y.S.2d
503, 508 (2d Dep't 2004). This is indicated by the negative pregnant in the first
sentence to CPLR 5234(c). See City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 A.D.2d 158, 159-60,
259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285-86 (1st Dep't 1965).
903 187 U.S. 165 (1902).
" See id. at 175.
905 See id. at 168-69.
9o6 See id. at 172.
917 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67(f), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (1899).
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four-month period. 908 In modern times, the equity lien would
have been judged from the time it was secured or perhaps filed. 909
Commencement of a turnover proceeding does not create a
lien, 910 but it does perpetuate a levy. According to the eighth
sentence of CPLR 5232(a):
At the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made by service
of the execution.., the levy shall be void except as to property
or debts which have been transferred or paid to the
sheriff.. . or as to which a proceeding under sections 5225 or
5227 has been brought.911
Significantly, the mere bringing of the turnover proceeding
extends the execution lien past the ninety days. Where there has
been no levy, the turnover order must be "secured" before the
creditor has a lien. This state of affairs is, of course, absurd.
The rejection of the rule of Metcalf Brothers for lien creation
has a convoluted history. In the nineteenth century, writs of
execution could not reach intangible property of the debtor-a
limitation abolished in 1952.912 The only way for a creditor to
reach intangible property was by bringing a supplementary
proceeding, as the remedy of execution was per se not possible. 913
In such supplementary proceedings, the creditor had a lien at the
commencement of the case, or so it was agreed by the end of the
nineteenth century.914
90 See In re Wickwire Spencer Steel Co. v. Kemkit Scientific Corp., 292 N.Y.
139, 142, 54 N.E.2d 336, 337 (1944).
909 For the record, a bankruptcy trustee would prevail for a different reason. In
Metcalf, JC obtained a lien on fraudulently conveyed property by commencing a
supplementary proceeding. Today, provided the trustee could find some other
unsecured creditor who could have avoided the same fraudulent conveyances, the
trustee could subrogate to the unsecured creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2000)
and could recover from JC as a transferee of a transferee. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2)
(2000); David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 179-80 (2003).
910 See County Nat'l Bank v. Inter-County Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 65 Misc. 2d 446,
449, 317 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970).
911 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
912 See Ch. 835, § 687-a(2), 1952 N.Y. Laws 1851.
913 See Cohen, Supplementary Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1011-12.
"' See id. at 1015-17 (describing the back-and-forth history of equitable lien
commencement). Earlier, it was sometimes suggested that equity must treat all
creditors equal, so that anyone who intervened in a creditor's bill proceeding shared
in the bounty. Comment, Priorities of Creditors Under Judgment Creditor's Bills, 42
YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1933).
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With regard to tangible property, however, courts declared
that if JC1 commenced a supplementary proceeding, she had a
lien.915 But courts also insisted that, if the sheriff levies for JC 2
before the turnover or receivership order was entered, JC 2 took
priority.916 Of course, in ancient days, JCi was not entitled to an
equitable remedy unless the legal remedy of execution was
impossible; the sheriffs levy for JC 2, therefore, undercut JC 1's
entitlement to any equitable relief.91 7 How could JC1 claim the
legal remedy was inadequate when JC 2 had successfully
executed? When, in 1935, the legislature abolished the
requirement of the nulla bona execution, this justification for the
priority of the sheriffs levy dissolved. Nevertheless, the priority
of JC2's levy absurdly continues on.911
After 1952, it became possible for the sheriff to levy property
not capable of delivery.919 This new power of the sheriff extended
the battleground between the execution and the equity liens.
Both tangible and intangible property were now up for grabs. As
matters stood on the eve of the CPLR, the creditor who
commenced an equity proceeding had a lien, but the lien would
fall to an actual levy by the sheriff. Where two creditors each
commenced supplementary proceedings, the first to commence
the action would prevail. 9 ° Bona fide purchasers could take free
and clear of a receiver until the receiver was actually
915 Doubt was expressed on that score. First Nat'l Bank of Amsterdam v. Shuler,
153 N.Y. 163, 172, 47 N.E. 262, 264 (1897) ("But in respect of chattels subject to be
taken on execution ... the mere commencement of the action creates no lien as
against other creditors, and, if any lien whatever exists, it is so incomplete and
imperfect that it is subject to be overreached by a subsequent levy in favor of other
creditors, made before the appointment of a receiver.").
916 See Davenport v. Kelly, 42 N.Y. 193, 198-99 (1870); Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25
N.Y. 489, 495-96 (1862) (equity action started at 2:00 p.m.; levy occurred at 5:00
p.m.); see also Kitchen v. Lowery, 127 N.Y. 53, 60, 27 N.E. 357, 358 (1891) ("[Tlhe
commencement of an action in the nature of a creditor's bill creates a lien upon the
choses in action and equitable assets of the judgment debtor. It does not create a lien
upon his tangible personal property subject to a levy by an execution, unless he
procures a receiver to be appointed."); Note, Priorities Among Judgment Creditors
Pursuing Statutory and Equitable Remedies in New York, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 504,
510 (1929) ("It would seem therefore that... manual seizure is the acme of
vigilance.").
9 Note, supra note 916, at 507.
9 See Distler & Schubin, supra note 8, at 494.
919 See Ch. 835, § 687-a(1), 1952 N.Y. Laws 1851.
920 See Hubbard v. J.P. Lewis Co., 128 A.D. 416, 419, 112 N.Y.S. 1050, 1052 (4th
Dep't 1908).
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appointed. 921 No express bona fide purchaser rule existed outside
the context of receivership.922
The CPLR drops the notion that commencement of the
supplementary proceeding is the moment of lien creation.
Substantively, the greatest effect of the CPLR's innovation is to
change the rules for two creditors who both seek equitable relief.
Today, the first creditor to secure the relief9 23 and have the order
filed by the clerk prevails.924
Deferral of lien creation from commencement to the
conclusion of a supplementary proceeding is regrettable. Of
considerable interest, then, is a recent case that ignores CPLR
5202(b) in favor of the non-statutory idea of in custodia legis. In
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen,925 JD fraudulently conveyed certificated
equity shares to X.926  JC 1 commenced a turnover proceeding
against X under CPLR 5225(b). 927 X responded by claiming the
transfer was in good faith and for a fair consideration. While the
district court pondered the bona fides of X, it required X to hand
921 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 808 (1937) (last sentence). This provision was
somewhat complex. Former section 807 provided that a receiver has title to a
debtor's property upon being appointed. Section 808 then imposed a "relation back"
rule to the beginning of the proceeding. The bona fide purchaser protection occurred
only in section 808, meaning that no bona fide purchaser protection existed after the
receiver's appointment. See Cohen, Third Party Orders, supra note 277, at 1208-09.
922 A concurring Court of Appeals judge once suggested that bona fide
purchasers took free and clear of turnover orders. See Lynch v. Johnson, 48 N.Y. 27,
33 (1871) (Earl, J., concurring).
923 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2008).
924 See id. 5234(c) (second sentence). So, for example, the result in Hubbard v.
J.P. Lewis Co., 128 A.D. 416, 112 N.Y.S. 1050 (4th Dep't 1908), would surely be
different. In Hubbard, JC1 commenced a supplementary proceeding seeking
appointment of a receiver. Before the receiver was appointed, AD (who had been
served with notice of the supplementary proceeding) paid JD. Thereafter, JC2 had
the receivership extended to JC 2's judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(b) ("Where a
receiver has been appointed, the court, upon motion of a judgment creditor, upon
such notice as it may require, shall extend the receivership to his judgment.");
Bostwick v. Menck, 40 N.Y. 383, 389-90 (1869) (holding that when a receivership is
extended to JC 2, JC 1 still has priority). The effect of the extension was that JC 2 had
a lien as of the day he commenced the action seeking the extension. Since AD had
paid after JC,'s commencement (but before JC 2's extension), the receiver could
require AD to pay the receiver the amount of JC,'s judgment. Beyond that, AD had
the right to pay JD free and clear of JC 2. In other words, commencement of the
supplementary proceeding was the moment of lien creation. Under the modern
CPLR, commencement of the supplementary proceeding does not create a lien, and
so AD would have escaped liability altogether.
925 716 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1983).
9 See id. at 127.
See id. at 128.
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over the equity shares to an officer of the court. Thereafter, the
sheriff, on behalf of JC 2, levied the shares.928 On these facts, if
the matter were governed by the CPLR alone, JC 2 should have
prevailed, as JC 2 levied before JC 1 obtained a turnover order.929
The court nevertheless held for JC1; the shares were in custodia
legis at the time of the levy.3 0 Therefore, the court officer held
the property in trust for JC 1.93' The most JC 2 could have was the
surplus.932
The Clarkson court emphasized that the moment of in
custodia legis was when X actually delivered certificated shares
to an officer of the court.93 3 But this seems unnecessary to the
decision. Once the Clarkson court had jurisdiction over the
person of X, the property that X held was already in custodia
legis.934 In general, jurisdiction over the person possessing
property is jurisdiction over the property itself.935
Does Clarkson simply override CPLR 5202(b)? One
limitation is that in custodia legis is a doctrine wherein different
courts respect each other's power over person and property. So,
928 The Clarkson Court does not discuss the form this levy took. Stock
certificates are property capable of delivery. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4). But, where
the stock is in the "lawful possession of [a] pledgee[]," no levy by seizure is
permitted. Id. 5232(b). Paper levies have been upheld, but only for the fallow
purpose of generating poundage fees for the sheriff. See supra text accompanying
notes 450-476.
929 See N.Y. C.P.L.R 5234(c). Actually, not only had JC commenced a turnover
proceeding, but JC, was the first to levy. The lower court, therefore, concluded that
JC,'s levy continued to be valid after the ninety day expiration period, even though
JC1's turnover proceeding was commenced before the levy. See Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 540 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). It can also be noted that the court
ordered property to be delivered to a receiver.
... See Clarkson, 716 F.2d at 129.
9' See id. at 130.
922 See id.
9 See id. at 129.
9 See Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U.S. 470, 473 (1935) (determining that a
bankruptcy estate was in custodia legis the minute a bankruptcy petition was filed,
even though a state receiver had physical possession); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) ("Where the action is in rem the effect is to draw to the
federal court the possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the
exercise by the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily impairs, and
may defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court already attached. The converse of
the rule is equally true, that where the jurisdiction of the state court has first
attached, the federal court is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over the same
res to defeat or impair the state court's jurisdiction." (emphasis added)).
" For the Full Faith and Credit worth of this lien, see supra text accompanying
notes 996-1016.
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in Clarkson, where a state sheriff sought to levy from a federal
receiver, in custodia legis established the dignity of the federal
court against the state court. Where a state sheriff tries to levy
property as to which a turnover proceeding has commenced in
New York state court, in custodia legis might not apply because
there are not two courts competing for jurisdiction. Rather, there
is only one court, disappointingly misruled by the terms of the
CPLR.
B. Scope
When a creditor secures a turnover order or receivership,
does the creditor have a lien on all of a debtor's property, or only
on the property to which the order refers? According to CPLR
5202(b), where a creditor has secured a turnover order or
receivership with regard to a debtor or an interest of the
judgment debtor in personal property, a creditor's interest in the
debt or the property is superior to the rights of a transferee. 936
The emphasized word "the" testifies in thunder against the
generality of the lien on all JD's property. If this reading is
correct, then a turnover order against AD encumbers the debt
owed or property held by AD. A turnover order against JD can
be general in nature, but if limited to specific assets, the lien
would presumably be limited as well.
If this is so, then the CPLR accords with a distinction that
anciently existed. Prior to the CPLR, liens were created with the
commencement of a supplementary proceeding. Where the
proceeding was aimed at AD who owed a debt or held JD's
property, then the lien was limited to that debt or that property.
Where commencement was against JD, then the lien was general
in nature.937
C. Debt v. Property
In the context of execution liens, the New York Court of
Appeals has attempted to obliterate the difference between debts
garnishable under CPLR 5201(a) and property leviable under
CPLR 5201(b).9 38  Yet this distinction has refused to be
936 See N.Y. C.P.L.R 5202(b) (McKinney 2008).
7 See Distler & Schubin, supra note 8, at 486.
3 See ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 674-75, 350
N.E.2d 899, 901-02, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512-13 (1976).
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obliterated.9 Just as it lives on in the realm of the execution
lien, so it lives on in the realm of the equity lien.
If the res in question is a debt, the creditor must proceed
under CPLR 5227, which presupposes that the proper party to
enjoin is AD.94° If, however, the res is also "property," then a
court must determine who possesses this property. 941 If JD
possesses it, JD is the proper party to enjoin under CPLR
5225(a), and JC may proceed by motion.942 If AD possesses
property, then AD should be enjoined pursuant to CPLR 5225(b),
which requires a "special proceeding."943 Because, under ABKCO
Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc.,9" the difference between
... See supra text accompanying notes 331-394.
940 If JC brings a proceeding under CPLR 5225(b) and it should be brought
under CPLR 5227, courts are prepared to overlook the gaffe. See JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293, 303, 846 N.Y.S.2d 171, 179 (1st Dep't
2007); City of N.Y. v. Midmanhattan Realty Corp., 119 Misc. 2d 968, 968-69, 464
N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). But see V P Supply Corp. v.
Normand, 27 A.D.2d 797, 797, 279 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (4th Dep't 1967) (reversing for
many reasons, including trying to collect a debt under CPLR 5225(b)).
941 It is reversible error to order a turnover without finding that "the judgment
debtor is entitled to the possession of such property" held by a third party. See
Beauvais v. Allegiance Sec., Inc., 942 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1991).
942 JC, however, must prove JD is in possession. An Internet report that JD
owns a car, for example, does not meet the minimal standard of proof. See Erin
Capital Mgmt. v. Celis, 19 Misc. 3d 390, 391, 854 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 2008).
9" A special proceeding is governed by article 4 of the CPLR. JD is not a
necessary party to such a supplementary proceeding. See RCA Corp. v. Tucker, 696
F. Supp. 845, 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Nevertheless, JD is entitled to notice of the CPLR
5225(b) proceeding. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2008). A federal court need
not find separate jurisdictional grounds for a supplementary proceeding if there was
subject matter jurisdiction over the original law suit. See RCA Corp., 696 F. Supp. at
850. Filing a CPLR 5227 proceeding against AD is the equivalent of moving for
summary judgment against him. See A.F.L. Falck, S.p.A. v. E.A. Karay Co., 722 F.
Supp. 12, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Since JC brings a "special proceeding" in the case of
CPLR 5225(b) and 5227, AD has a right to a jury if there are facts in dispute. See
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 410. If AD does not dispute the indebtedness, no costs against him
may be assessed. See id. 5227. A bank's failure to pay over a joint account because
the bank is unsure of non-debtor ownership is not considered disputing the existence
of the bank's debt to JD. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank,
143 Misc. 2d 436, 438, 541 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (Rochester City Ct. 1989). Where JC
had a judgment against all the partners in a partnership, a special proceeding under
CPLR 5225(b) is not necessary for the court to order the partners to pay. See Jones
v. Palermo, 105 Misc. 2d 405, 407-08, 432 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1980).
~"39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
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debt and property has been largely (but not entirely) erased,
CPLR 5225(b) and 5227 are "essentially interchangeable."945
The Second Circuit had occasion to address these issues in
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A.9 46
In this case, D was a subcontractor in a toll road project in
Mexico. The project failed, and the contractor could not pay D.
The Mexican government intervened and intimated that it
perhaps might issue notes directly to D or perhaps to the
contractor, who would use them to pay D. Whether the Mexican
government had actually committed itself to do this was in
dispute.
When D defaulted on notes issued under a New York
indenture, P commenced a diversity suit in federal court. Prior
to judgment, P alleged that D planned to assign its rights
(whatever they might be) to Mexican creditors. P requested from
the district court a preliminary injunction to prevent the
dissipation of this asset.
Provisional remedies in federal court are governed by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 64 and 65. Rule 64 incorporates
state law by reference, with regard to pre-judgment attachment.
Concluding that state law would not support an injunction, the
district court instead issued a preliminary injunction under Rule
5, only to be reversed by the United States Supreme Court, on
the antiquarian ground that, in 1789, the year of the Judiciary
Act, a court of equity would not have given a like injunction. 48
The Supreme Court, however, took no position on whether
attachment under New York law would have sustained a similar
injunction. 49  Had it condescended to examine the matter,9 0 it
would have found that pre-judgment attachment under article 62
of the CPLR to be a close question. Under article 62, the court
issues an order of attachment only if the plaintiff can show
941 Mendel v. Chervanyou, 147 Misc. 2d 1056, 1058, 559 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. Kings County 1990).
946 190 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1999).
17 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 312-13 (1998).
948 See id. at 332-33.
14' See id. at 318 n.3.
9,o On other occasions, the Supreme Court has cast off its imperious sloth and
has declared its ability to affirm a lower court opinion on grounds not considered by
the court below. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711 (1996).
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statutory grounds for it. 951  One of the grounds is that the
defendant is "a foreign corporation not qualified to do business
in the state."9"2 "Qualified to do business" means that the
corporation has filed the application described by article 13 in the
New York Business Corporation Law. If that ground does not
suffice, P would have to show that "the defendant, with intent to
defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a judgment
that might be rendered in plaintiffs favor, has
assigned... property ... or is about to do [sol." 953 In New York,
insider preferences are fraudulent conveyances.954 Plausibly, the
desire to prefer Mexican creditors over their American
competitors might constitute grounds for attachment, if patriotic
affinity is the same as giving preferences to insiders. 95
If these preferences were fraudulent conveyances, an order of
attachment could have issued. If delivered to the sheriff, a lien is
created.956 The sheriff must levy under the order of attachment.
The language relevant to our analysis is CPLR 6214(a):
The sheriff shall levy upon any interest of the defendant in
personal property, or upon any debt owed to the defendant, by
serving a copy of the order of attachment upon the garnishee, or
951 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201 (McKinney 2008).
952 Id. 6201(1).
913 Id. 6201(3).
"4 See Am. Panel Tec v. Hyrise, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 586, 587, 819 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769
(2d Dep't 2006); In re Mega Pers. Lines, Inc. v. Halton, 9 A.D.3d 553, 555, 780
N.Y.S.2d 409, 410-11 (3d Dep't 2004) (reversing grant of summary judgment and
holding there was an issue of fact as to whether the transfer was fraudulent); In re
P.A. Bldg. Co. v. Silverman, 298 A.D.2d 327, 328, 750 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (1st Dep't
2002); Siemens & Halske GmbH v. Gres, 32 A.D.2d 624, 624, 299 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910
(1st Dep't 1969).
955 A near miss is CPLR 5229:
In any court, before a judgment is entered, upon motion of the party in
whose favor a verdict... has been rendered, the trial judge may order
examination of the adverse party and order him restrained with the same
effect as if a restraining notice had been served upon him after judgment.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5229. This provisional remedy is available to federal courts under Rule
64. See Sequa Capital Corp. v. Nave, 921 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But it
requires the entry of a verdict. See Brookhaven Anesthesia, Assocs. v. Flaherty,
No. 2003-1258 S C, 2004 WIL 2101821, at *1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 2004)
(unpublished table decision). In Grupo Mexicano, the preliminary injunction was
issued months before the plaintiff was granted summary judgment. See Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 312-13.
956 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203.
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upon the defendant if property to be levied upon is in the
defendant's possession or custody .... 957
The emphasized language indicates that a valid levy has
occurred if the defendant (D) possesses or has custody of personal
property. In Grupo Mexicano, the availability of attachment
devolves to whether D with a claim against AD "possesses" that
claim. 5 s If possession means dominion 9 9 or the legal ability to
exclude others,96 ° then indeed a levy could be achieved by serving
an order of attachment on D.961 While it was never clear in
Grupo Mexicano that the Mexican government was an AD, the
defaulting contractor certainly was.962 So, at least to this extent,
there could have been a levy, provided that D generally
"possesses" the accounts receivable that are owed to him.
If attachment was available, would this have sustained the
injunction that the Grupo Mexicano majority struck down?
Under CPLR 6210, a court is authorized to issue "a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the transfer of assets by a
garnishee as provided in subdivision (b) of CPLR 6214. ''963 Oddly,
CPLR 6210 authorizes a temporary restraining order that simply
reiterates what CPLR 6214(b) already provides. CPLR 6214(b)
states that a "garnishee" is prohibited from making "any sale,
assignment of transfer of, or any interference with any such
957 Id. 6214(a) (emphasis added).
958 See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 190 F.3d
16, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1999).
9 See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 362-63 (1925) (noting that under New
York law, a debtor has dominion over a receivable until the account debtor is
informed of the assignment). But see Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905) ("It is
not a question of possession in the foreign state, for possession cannot be taken of a
debt... as tangible property might be taken possession of."), overruled by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). The idea of possession as "sole and despotic
dominion ... in total exclusion" of others is Blackstonian. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766).
1o See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIz. L. REV. 371, 384 (2003); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces:
Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 805,
861-62 (1995).
6 But see Michelsen v. Brush, 233 F. Supp. 868, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (stating
that CPLR 6214 "contemplates service of the attachment order on the defendant
only with respect to property 'in the defendant's possession or custody'. . . and,
hence, the duty 'forthwith' to 'transfer or deliver all such property' extends only to
property of the tangible kinds capable of delivery that is in defendant's 'possession or
custody.' ").
92 See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 18.
9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6210 (McKinney 2008).
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property."964  CPLR 6210 must be referring to prospective
garnishees not yet garnished. The idea is that P obtains an order
that can be served on the soon-to-be garnished person, even
before the sheriff levies.
In order to justify a temporary restraining order under
CPLR 6210, courts would have to find that D can be a garnishee
under CPLR 6214(b). The first two sentences of CPLR 6214(b)
certainly treat the garnishee as someone different from D. The
subsequent five sentences could be referring to D. One of these
(the fifth sentence) forbids "the garnishee" from making or
suffering any transfer. The CPLR defines a garnishee as "a
person who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, or a person other
than the judgment debtor. .. 965 Accordingly, one state authority
thought this sentence does not apply to D.9 66 A federal court has
ruled that CPLR 6210 refers only to ADs, never, to Ds.967 Yet at
least one state justice thought CPLR 6210 applies to D and
therefore restrained D for a time. 6 Therefore, whether an
injunction could have restrained D in Grupo Mexicano is a close
question. A post-Grupo Mexicano court has ruled, however, that
where a creditor is likely to succeed on the merits of a fraudulent
conveyance, a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 can issue.969
This holding, if correct, reduces the significance of the Supreme
Court's antiquarian dalliance in Grupo Mexicano to near zero.
In any case, by the time Grupo Mexicano was remanded from
its unedifying stay with the Supreme Court, the district court
had granted P a judgment,9 0 so the question of pre-judgment
attachment was superseded, and the Supreme Court's advice
about the preliminary injunction was useless and moot. The
preliminary injunction had become a permanent injunction-a
964 Id. 6214(b).
965 Id. 106(j).
966 Fin. Inv. Co. (Bermuda) v. Gossweiler, 145 A.D.2d, 535 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d
Dep't 1998) (D not guilty of contempt under the fifth sentence for selling property
after receiving the order of attachment).
96 In re Contichem, No. 99 CIV. 10493, 1999 WL 977364 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27,
1999).
96' Louie v. David & Chiu Place Restaurant, Inc. 261 A.D.2d 150, 689 N.Y.S.2d
476 (1st Dep't 1999) (CPLR 6210 order later dissolved, as P was unlikely to succeed
on the merits).
969 Trafalgar Power, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 341 (N.D.N.Y.
2001).
970 Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 19.
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restraining order. 971 The propriety of this injunction was not
disputed." 2  In addition, the district court ordered JD to
"'irrevocably assign or transfer' to [JC] a sufficient amount of toll
road receivables or government notes ... to satisfy the
judgment."97 3 On further appeal, the issue became whether this
court order was justified as a turnover order under CPLR 5225 or
5227.974
JD claimed not,975 because its receivables were "debts," not
"property. '976  If so, then JC could proceed only under CPLR
5227, which would have required action against two Mexican
ADs, neither of whom were present in New York. But JD's
argument foundered on the shoals of ABKCO Industries, Inc. v.
Apple Films, Inc.,9  which sought to erase the distinction
between debts and property. 978 So the Grupo Mexicano court
analyzed only whether the receivables were property.979
According to CPLR 5201(b), a judgment can be enforced
against property only if it "could be assigned or transferred."9"'
The court therefore remanded for a finding on this score.981 But
even if the receivables were assignable, the court declined "the
invitation to hold that an asset characterized as property for the
971 See id.
972 See id. at 20. Probably because the court, or even JC's attorney, as officer of
the court, can issue restraining notices. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a).
9" Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 19; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(c) ("The court may
order any person to execute and deliver any document necessary to effect payment
or delivery.").
974 See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 20-22.
975 JD argued that, but for the illegal preliminary injunction, it would have
dissipated its assets, and therefore, the turnover order should be dissolved as a kind
of remedy to address the earlier illegality. This claim was summarily rejected. See
id. at 20; cf. Gadsby & Hannah v. Socialist Republic of Rom., 698 F. Supp. 483,
485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (where illegal restraining order kept bank accounts in place,
a turnover order, which could have been authorized, was denied).
976 See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 22.
977 39 N.Y.2d 670, 674-75, 350 N.E.2d 899, 901-02, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513
(1976); see Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 23 ("ABKCO virtually erases the distinction
in [CPLR] 5201 between 'debt' and 'property' by recharacterizing-as '[piroperty
against which a money judgment may be enforced'-debts that otherwise are placed
out of reach by [CPLR] 5201(a)'s requirement that the debt being pursued be either
past due or certain to become due upon demand.").
978 See ABKCO, 39 N.Y.2d at 675-76, 350 N.E.2d at 902, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
513-14.
9 Accord Beauvais v. Allegiance Sec., Inc., 942 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1991)
(debt could be recovered under CPLR 5225(b)); see Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 24.
990 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney 2008).
"' See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 25-26.
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purposes of [CPLR 5201 is necessarily characterizable as
property for purposes of [CPLR] 5225 and 5227 as well."9 2
Rather, the court ruled:
A judgment creditor seeking a turnover order therefore must
show: First, that the asset it seeks to collect has been made
available to judgment creditors by [CPLR] 5201; and second,
that the party against which the creditor has chosen to proceed
has the ability to produce the asset.98 3
This second requirement seems merely to be a restatement of
CPLR 5225(a)'s requirement that "the judgment debtor [be] in
possession or custody of money or other personal property."981
Therefore, we have the same issue as we had for our analysis of
pre-judgment attachment: Is a debtor in "possession" of her
property not capable of delivery?95 The answer must be yes.
The premise of Grupo Mexicano is that debt is property.
Property must have a possessor, if possession means the power to
exclude (and not mere manucaption of tangible property). So
defined, who but JD is eligible to be the possessor? Certainly not
AD. For AD the debt is the opposite of property; it is liability.9"'
Therefore, turnover is possible because, in general, a debtor
possesses her general intangible property.9 7
The rule that emerges from Grupo Mexicano is that persons
over whom a court has jurisdiction can be ordered to fetch
982 Id. at 25.
91 Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
981 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(a).
985 The Grupo Mexicano court also held open the possibility that, if New York
law did not permit the turnover order, the district court could "craft an enforcement
device that deviates from that available under state law." 190 F.3d at 25. This would
appear, at first, to exceed the scope of Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires deference to state law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). But
state law basically permits a court to do what it wants. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 ("The
court may... make an order.., extending.., the use of any enforcement
procedure.").
11 According to CPLR 5232(a), "[alll property not capable of delivery in which
[JD had] ... an interest.., thereafter coming into the possession or custody of such
a person.., shall be subject to the levy." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a). So the CPLR oddly
refers to AD as having possession of its own obligation to JD.
987 My conclusion is contradicted by Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905),
overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a case on which I will, with
some embarrassment, substantially rely. See infra text accompanying notes
996-1020. There, the Court states: "It is not a question of possession in the foreign
State, for possession cannot be taken of a debt or of the obligation to pay it, as
tangible property might be taken possession of." Harris, 198 U.S. at 223. In my view,
the word possession implies a power to exclude, not physical grasping of a thing.
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property located outside New York.9"' In In re Gaming Lottery
Securities Litigation,9 9 the court did not hesitate in ordering a
judgment debtor to collect an amount due from a Scottish bank
and bring the proceeds into New York.99°  It found Grupo
Mexicano to be consistent with such an order.991 Similarly, in
Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP International Finance Co.,
B.V.,992 a debtor was ordered to deliver certificated shares to a
New York sheriff, even though the shares were not located in
New York and even though a court in Indonesia ordered the
debtor not to do this.9 3 In Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd. ,9'
the Second Circuit certified this very question to the New York
Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, following this certification, an appellate panel,
in a split decision, has ruled against such a power. The case
involved a pre-judgment attachment, but since a levy of a
garnishee is, in effect, an injunction, the case serves as good
authority for our purposes.
In Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor,995 P sued various Ds
as guarantors of a bad loan. The Ds owned shares in limited
liability corporations ("LLCs") located outside New York. P
988 See Grupo Mexicano, 190 F.3d at 25 n.9.
... No. 96 CIV. 5567(RPP), 2001 WL 123807 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001).
990 Id. at *1-3, *8; accord Miller v. Doniger, 28 A.D.3d 405, 405, 814 N.Y.S.2d
141, 141 (1st Dep't 2006) (out-of-state bank account); Starbare II Partners, L.P. v.
Sloan, 216 A.D.2d 238, 239, 629 N.Y.S.2d 23, 23 (1st Dep't 1995) (out-of-state
artworks).
91 See Gaming Lottery, 2001 WL 123807, at *3, *9-10.
992 41 A.D.3d 25, 836 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep't 2007), appeal denied, 10 N.Y.3d 705,
886 N.E.2d 803, 857 N.Y.S.2d 38 (2008).
9 See id. at 33-34, 36-37, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 10-13. The Gryphon court
distinguished pre-judgment attachment cases:
The defendants' citations to cases involving attachment are inapposite.
Clearly, it would violate the sovereignty of another state if a New York
sheriff tried to attach property in another state. However, a turnover order
merely directs a defendant, over whom the New York court has jurisdiction,
to bring its own property into New York. We find no reason why such an
order would offend another state's sovereignty, unless the other state has
ordered the defendant not to move its property from that state ....
Id. at 31, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 9. In fact, garnishment in New York is injunctive in
nature. See supra text accompanying notes 270-277. So if a turnover order against a
debtor is capable of binding the debtor to bringing property to New York, so is a
garnishment, provided, of course, that the New York court has jurisdiction over the
person of the garnishee.
4 544 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2008). The highly confused procedural context of this
case is discussed supra notes 535-546 and accompanying text.
5 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep't 2008).
2009] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART TWO 191
obtained an order of attachment against the Ds (all non-
domiciliaries who had nevertheless contractually agreed to a
New York forum). The president of at least some of the LLCs
(and himself a D) was levied while visiting New York in
connection with the litigation. The appellate panel ruled that the
order of attachment was inappropriate. Admittedly, the
president was a proper garnishee under CPLR 5201(c)(1), which
provides:
Where property consists of a right or share in the stock of an
association or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for
which a certificate of stock or other negotiable instrument is not
outstanding, the corporation, or the president or treasurer of
the association on behalf of the association, shall be the
garnishee.
The majority of the panel ruled that the situs of the property
(LLC interests) was located outside the state. Therefore, no
order of attachment (and by implication no turnover order) could
be issued against a proper garnishee.
The weight of authority probably holds that a New York
court may order a person over whom it has jurisdiction to bring
assets back to New York, but until this is done, is there a lien on
the assets not yet located in New York? Ironically, the answer
seems to be that, just as the ABKCO court sought to erase the
distinction between debt and property, the United States
Constitution arguably insists upon preserving it.
With regard to debts, the leading authority is good old
Harris v. Balk,996 a civil procedure classic overruled for its
jurisdictional holding 97 but not for its proposition about the
nature of debt, which it presumably borrowed from state law.998
In Harris, as every first-year law student knows, the Supreme
Court remarked: "The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt
clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes."999 Harris
suggests that a turnover order issued in New York against a
person subject to its jurisdiction creates a lien on a debt that
w 198 U.S. 215 (1905), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
97 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980) ("We
recently abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk . . ").
998 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 218-37 (2004).
9" Harris, 198 U.S. at 222. Some cogent discussion of these two holdings of
Harris appears in WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 5209.04.
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must be recognized nationally. In Harris, JC was in Maryland,
and JD and AD were in North Carolina. On a Maryland sojourn,
AD was garnished on behalf of JC.'1° AD paid up.'00' Upon
returning to North Carolina, JD sued AD on the debt and won at
all levels of the North Carolina courts.'002 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed. 10 0 3  AD's payment to the Maryland sheriff
extinguished JD's claim against AD, and the North Carolina
courts were obliged to give this Maryland fact full faith and
credit.
In Harris, AD actually paid the Maryland sheriff. 0°4 But the
result did not turn on actual payment. If AD had returned to
North Carolina without paying, the debt still would have
belonged to the Maryland sheriff, as garnishment is an
involuntary assignment of property. 1005 JD would have been
dispossessed of this payment intangible (to the extent of JC's
judicial lien)'0016 and would lack the right to collect it. This
analysis, however, no longer pertains in pre-judgment situations
because of Shaffer v. Heitner,'007 but it still holds in the post-
judgment venue of Grupo Mexicano.l°°0
100 See Balk v. Harris, 30 S.E. 318, 318 (1898), rev'd, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
1001 See id.
1002 See id. at 318-19.
1003 See Harris, 198 U.S. at 228.
1004 See Harris, 30 S.E. at 318.
1005 See Harris, 198 U.S. at 223 ("If the debtor leave [sic] the foreign State
without appearing, a judgment by default may be entered... [and] may be sued
upon in any other State where the debtor might be found.").
1006 In Harris, AD owed JD $180. JC claimed $300 from JD. If JC claimed less
than $180 from AD, the garnishment would not have entirely extinguished AD's
obligation to JD. JD would still have the right to a surplus.
1007 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977) (holding that all personal jurisdiction requires
minimum contacts).
1008 In ancient times, New York scorned Harris v. Balk and held that debt did
not cling to the debtor; therefore, unless a debt had a connection to New York, it
could not be garnished. Heydemann v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 837,
841 (2d Cir. 1936). The legislature, however, overruled this delicate attitude in 1936
and pushed garnishability to the Harris v. Balk maximum. Morris Plan Indus. Bank
of N.Y. v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 329-30, 67 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1946).
Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 58 A.D.3d 270, 869 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep't 2008),
has revived the old tradition of denying Harris v. Balk. In that case, a proper
garnishee of intangible property was held immune from an order of attachment
because the situs of the intangible property (interests in LLCs) was outside New
York. When a dissenting judge pointed out that Harris v. Balk supported the order
of attachment, the majority responded by relying on a case asserting the branch rule
for banks. Id. at 274, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (citing In re Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Advanced Employment Concepts, Inc., 269 A.D.2d 101, 703 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't
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In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that debts
have a location separate from the debtor. Rather, wherever a
debtor is, his debt is there too. 100 9 But the Harris court hints at a
constitutional distinction between debts and property, when it
remarks (in contradiction to what I said earlier), "[it is not a
question of possession in the foreign State, for possession cannot
be taken of a debt or of the obligation to pay it, as tangible
property might be taken possession of."10 1° In other words,
according to the Supreme Court, possession of intangible
property is impossible. Possession is a word relevant to tangible
property only.
Four years later, the Supreme Court would widen the divide
between tangible and intangible property in the oft derided case
of Fall v. Eastin,10 11 where a Washington divorce court ordered a
husband to convey Nebraska land to his wife. 11 2 When he
ungallantly refused, the Washington court issued a decree
declaring the wife to be a Nebraska freeholder. 10 13 The husband
then conveyed to X a mortgage on, and later a deed in lieu of
foreclosure to, the debatable land."1 4 In Nebraska, the wife tried
to quiet title against X, but the Nebraska court snubbed the
2000)). As we have seen, there is a special rule for bank branches, which may
already be passe, but which certainly should not be extended to LLCs. See supra text
accompanying notes 324-330. The majority also cited a treatise claiming that, in
spite of Harris v. Balk, intangibles might have a situs different from AD's own
person. The Falor majority also wrote: "However, although the Harris Court found
that the situs of the intangible in that case (an oral promise to repay a $180 debt)
had been fixed, 'the same intangible may not have the same situs in other
contexts.'" Falor, 58 A.D.3d at 274, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (citing DAVID D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 487, at 826 (4th ed. 2005)). This quote immediately precedes
Professor Siegel's discussion of Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259,
296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968), holding that the situs of a lease obligation is where the real
estate is. This treatise certainly does not endorse the abandonment of Harris. It is
making the point that obligations to pay rent is usufructuary to the land in question.
1009 See Harris, 198 U.S. at 222.
1010 Id. at 223.
1011 215 U.S. 1 (1909); e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867,
889 n.134 (1985) ("obscure and turgid... unexplained dissents"). The classic
deconstruction is set forth in Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land
Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 620 (1954).
1012 See Fall, 215 U.S. at 14.
1013 See id. at 4.
1014 See id. at 2.
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Washington decree and held for X. 10 15 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the insult.10 16
Fall applies equally well to judicial liens on tangible
personal property. 10 17 According to New York law, the turnover
order creates a lien.1018 But if the tangible personal property is
located, say, in Nebraska, a Nebraska sheriff could, sans offense
to the Constitution, levy the property in question pursuant to a
Nebraska judgment. When it comes to judicial decrees declaring
JC in State A to be the owner of real or tangible personal
property located in state B, Full Faith and Credit accords JC
neither faith nor credit. In short, Fall suggests a disjunction
between liens on intangible property and liens on tangible
property not located in New York.
Nevertheless, it is open for Nebraska to recognize a lien on
tangible property located in Nebraska.1 19 Should JD in New
1015 See id. at 14.
1016 The matter would have been different if the wife had sought confirmation
from a Nebraska court. In such a case, the Nebraska court would have been obliged
to recognize the judgment of the Washington court. See id. at 12. Any subsequent
conveyance by the husband to X would have been void. But where X was already the
owner by the time the wife sought enforcement, the Nebraska court was apparently
within its rights to snub the Washington decree.
1017 See id. ("Plaintiff seems to contend for a greater efficacy for a decree in
equity affecting real property than is given to a judgment at law for the recovery of
money simply.").
1010 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2008).
1019 New York courts are inclined to honor foreign attachments when the
Constitution does not require it. See Oppenheimer v. Dresdner Bank A.G., 41 N.Y.2d
949, 950, 363 N.E.2d 358, 358, 394 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634 (1977) (bank garnished in
Germany did not have to pay a second time in New York); see also JPMorgan Chase
Bank v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293, 312-13, 846 N.Y.S.2d 171, 186 (1st Dep't
2007) (excusing AD from a turnover action while in New York because JD was
subject to insolvency proceedings in India, which entailed a statute prohibiting
assignments by JD). In American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Paste-Ups
Unlimited, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 219, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), however, a Washington state
lien was dishonored. In American Fidelity, a New York insurance company held a
negotiable instrument in New York and was served with a garnishment order in the
State of Washington. Various conflicting garnishments and liens were asserted, and
so the insurance company interpleaded in New York. There is no reason why the
garnishment should not have created a lien, even though the instrument was in New
York. Nevertheless, the court held that the Washington garnishment was
ineffective.
The American Fidelity court's authorities are all inapposite. Two cases hold only
that a local court has jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of local assets. See Clark
v. Willard, 294 U.S. 211, 213 (1935); Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. 307, 312 (1866).
These cases certainly do not preclude injunctions requiring a person properly served
with process to bring assets of a debtor into the state. A third case holds only that,
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York be ordered to deliver Nebraska-located property to a New
York sheriff, and should JD file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee will have to test the New York judicial lien by inquiring
into whether a Nebraska sheriff would take priority over the
New York lien by levying in Nebraska. 2" If so, then JC is not a
secured creditor in the bankruptcy. Rather, JC's New York
judicial lien falls afoul of the trustee's status as a hypothetical
judicial lien creditor in Nebraska.
Does Fall v. Eastin cohere with Harris v. Balk? Should Fall
provide the rule for intangible as well as tangible property?
Imagine an alternative history in Harris, in which, not AD, but
JD traveled from North Carolina to Maryland. JD is served with
process by JC 1. The Maryland court enters a money judgment
and then issues an injunction 6 la Grupo Mexicano, ordering JD
to assign all receivables to JC1 immediately, adding that the
assignment shall be deemed accomplished when the turnover
order is entered. Meanwhile, JC 2, back in North Carolina,
obtains a levy of AD. Is not the Maryland injunction worthy of
Full Faith and Credit? The order compelling AD to pay the
Maryland sheriff was so entitled. The order compelling JD to
assign to the sheriff should be equally entitled. If AD
interpleads, as he is well advised to do, I think the interpleader
court awards the funds to JCi on the authority of Harris v. Balk.
And what distinguishes the case from Fall v. Eastin? Harris
reigns over intangible personal property. Fall presides over all
other kinds of property. If I am right, the distinction between
debt and property, which the New York legislature has sought to
preserve and the New York courts have tried to abolish, is
enshrined in the Constitution itself.
where neither a person nor assets are in a state, the state court may not assert
jurisdiction solely on the basis of a special appearance to contest service of process
by publication. See Bank of Jasper v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, Ga., 258 U.S. 112,
119 (1922). A fourth case cited is Heydemann v. Westinghouse Electric
Manufacturing Co., 80 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1936), which turned on a statutory
garnishment restriction that the New York legislature later repealed. See Patel
Cotton Co. v. Steel Traveler, 108 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The American
Fidelity holding should, therefore, be viewed as a bad Erie guess about New York
law, in light of the Openheimer case.
1020 A bankruptcy trustee is deemed to be a judicial lien creditor as of the time of
the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000). Presumably, the trustee
has a hypothetical judicial lien as of the bankruptcy petition in all fifty states and
other territories of the United States.
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D. Pledged Property
When JD pledges property to SP in exchange for a loan, JD
typically has no right of possession until she pays up. Yet, JD
may have a valuable equity in the pledged property. We have
already seen that execution liens are difficult in this context. If
the pledged property is "capable of delivery," the sheriff may not
levy it by seizure because she may not interfere with the
possession of pledgees. °21 Yet, since the property is capable of
delivery, the sheriff may not paper-levy because such levies are
only good for property not capable of delivery. One proposed
answer is that JD's right to a surplus is property not capable of
delivery and thus can be garnished. This conclusion divides the
encumbered thing from SP's obligation to pay the surplus, if
any. 0 2
2
JC also has the option of obtaining some sort of equity lien
on the surplus. A receivership is possible, 10 23 but a turnover
proceeding seems the most logical alternative. 24 Can the
language of CPLR 5225(b) accommodate JC? The pledgee is "a
person in possession.., of.. . personal property in which the
judgment debtor has an interest," as CPLR 5225(b) requires. 10 25
But JC must also show that JD "is entitled to the possession of
such property or that the judgment creditor's rights ... are
superior to those of the transferee.' 10 26  The first possibility
clearly cannot be shown. 10 21 JD has no right of possession
against SP. Can JC show that her rights are superior to those of
SP?
In this respect, new article 9 muddies the previously
crystalline waters of New York law. According to old UCC
section 9-311, "[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may be
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way
of... attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial
1021 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b).
1022 See supra text accompanying notes 445-477.
1023 See In re Myer, 273 A.D. 387, 389, 77 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (1st Dep't 1948).
1024 See Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the
possibility of a turnover order in dictum); Key Lease Corp. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust
Co., 117 A.D.2d 560, 561, 499 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (1st Dep't 1986); Samuels v. Samuels,
99 A.D.2d 986, 986, 473 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (1st Dep't 1984) (ignoring JD's claim that
the third party was a pledgee).
1025 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b).
1026 Id.
1027 See Key Lease, 117 A.D.2d at 561, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
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process)."1 28  Under this language, JC could have shown that
JC's right to JD's equity is superior to those of SP (with the
proviso, of course, that SP's security interest remains intact).
The new UCC section 9-401 is less satisfactory. It states,
"whether a debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this
article."129 In other words, article 9 refuses to say whether JC
has access to JD's equity.
Meanwhile, the CPLR is likewise opaque. CPLR 5201 states
that enforcement of a money judgment is possible "against any
property which could be assigned or transferred. '10 30 Can equity
in collateral be assigned or transferred? New UCC section 9-401
refuses to say. Yet we learn from section 2-403 of the UCC that
"[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had.""0 3' This implies a power to convey the equity in pledged
goods. "Equity" in this context would include the right of
redemption,10 32 and the right to receive a surplus if the pledgee
forecloses.0 33 Similar statements can be found in article 3 for
instruments0 34 and article 8 for securities.10 35 So on this basis,
we can affirm that CPLR 5225(b) permits access to the equity
interest of JD in pledged collateral.
The ambiguity engendered by new section 9-401 has
manifested itself in Capital Ventures International v. Republic of
Argentina,0 36 in which JC sought pre-judgment attachment of
excess collateral held by JD. JD argued that it had promised SP
not to transfer equity. Therefore, JD reasoned, the equity could
not be levied because the property could not be assigned. The
1028 U.C.C. § 9-311 (1972).
1029 Id. § 9-401(a).
1030 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b).
1031 U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
1032 See U.C.C. § 9-623; see also Leumi Fin. Corp. v. Wydler, Balin, Pares &
Soloway, 60 Misc. 2d 1021, 1028, 304 N.Y.S.2d 988, 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1969) (suggesting JC could redeem pledged stock by paying SP the amount of the
secured debt).
1033 See U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(1).
103 See id. § 3-203(b) ("Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is
a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the
instrument ... ").
1035 See id. § 8-302(a) ("[A] purchaser of a... security acquires all rights in the
security that the transferor had .... ").
003' 280 F. App'x 14 (2d Cir. 2008).
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court agreed and ruled that the surplus was not leviable.1°0 3 This
is an unfortunate interpretation. Of course, JD has the power to
convey the equity. To be sure, it would be a breach of contract to
do so. But so what? On the reasoning of the Capital Ventures
court, if the appearance of a judicial lien constitutes an event of
default (as it always does), then no judicial lien can attach
because JD has, in effect, promised that there would be no
judicial liens. Mere promissory restriction on transfers is surely
not what CPLR 5201(b) is talking about when it requires
property to be assignable. Rather, the restriction must be built
into the property right itself.
An oddity about CPLR 5225(b), as applied to pledged
property, is that, if the court so orders, the pledgee must hand
the property over to the sheriff for sale. 10 38 Now the sheriff could
not levy the same pledged property, probably out of a misplaced
fear that a levy would compromise perfection of the pledgee's
security interest. Somehow that delicate attitude disappears
when turnover orders are issued. One way or another, the sheriff
ends up getting her grubby fingers on the pledged property.
It will be recalled that a sheriff who holds an execution sale
over the protest of SP with a right of possession commits the tort
of conversion.10 39 Presumably, in the context of a turnover order
requiring the pledgee to turn over the collateral to the sheriff, the
sheriff does not act wrongfully in holding the sale over the
opposition of the pledgee. The very fact that a court has ordered
the turnover implies that the pledgee's senior right of possession
has been set aside in the name of equity, so that a valuable
equity can be realized on behalf of JC.
E. Fraudulent Conveyance Recoveries
Under CPLR 5225(b), AD can be ordered to turn over JD's
propert to the sheriff. 4 ° But is it likewise true that a transferee
can be ordered to turn over property in which JD has no interest
at all-property which JD fraudulently conveyed to AD?
According to CPLR 5225(b), turnover can be had "against a
person who is a transferee of money or other personal property
1037 See id. at 16.
1038 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2008).
'039 See Teddy's Drive In, Inc. v. Cohen, 47 N.Y.2d 79, 82, 390 N.E.2d 290, 291,
416 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (1979); supra text accompanying notes 650-677.
1040 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b).
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from the judgment debtor where it is shown that... the
judgment creditor's rights to the property are superior to those of
the transferee." 41 The glove of this provision well fits the hand
of fraudulent conveyance.1042
Perhaps a creditor gets a lien on fraudulently conveyed
property earlier than the entry of a turnover order. We have
seen that the non-statutory notion of in custodia legis might push
the date of the lien to the commencement of a proceeding under
CPLR 5225(b).10 4' But beyond that, must we conclude that, since
a debtor who fraudulently conveys property has completely
alienated it, a receivership cannot reach the property because the
receiver only obtains power over "property in which the judgment
debtor has an interest"?14 4 A receiver, however, may also "do
any... act[] designed to satisfy the judgment. ' 10 45 This would
include the bringing of a fraudulent conveyance action against
the transferee, but any lien would depend upon securing a
turnover order under CPLR 5225(b). 10 46
Suppose, on the other hand, JD has fraudulently conveyed
personal property to X, and JC serves an execution on the sheriff.
By virtue of this delivery, does JC have a lien on X's property,
1041 Id.
1042 See id. CPLR 5225(b) is also a proper vehicle for piercing JD's corporate veil
to reach assets of JD's shareholder. See Trust v. Kummerfeld, 153 F. App'x 761, 762
(2d Cir. 2005); Ren-Cris Litho, Inc. v. Vantage Graphics, Inc., No. 96-7802, 1997 WL
76860, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997). What if JD has made a fraudulent conveyance
to X and X no longer has possession of the property conveyed? In such a case, X has
committed the tort of conversion, and a money judgment against X is appropriate.
Carlson, Logical Structure, supra note 909, at 171. Can this judgment be entered
under the aegis of CPLR 5225(b)? The answer is yes. So long as X is a transferee,
CPLR 5225(b) authorizes the proceeding, even if X is no longer in possession. See
FDIC v. Conte, 204 A.D.2d 845, 846, 612 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (3d Dep't 1994). The
Supreme Court has ruled that veil-piercing cases do not fall within the ancillary
jurisdiction of federal courts; some independent ground of jurisdiction must be
found. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 349 (1996). Fraudulent conveyance actions,
however, do fall within the ancillary jurisdiction. Epperson v. Entm't Express, Inc.,
242 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
1043 See supra text accompanying notes 927-936.
1044 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a).
1045 Id.
1046 See Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., No. 04 CV
4971(NG)(MDG), 2006 WL 2802092, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006).
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received in the fraudulent conveyance? Again, it is tempting to
say no. According to CPLR 5202(a):
Where a judgment creditor has delivered an execution to a
sheriff, the judgment creditor's rights in... an interest of the
judgment debtor in personal property... are superior to the
extent of the amount of the execution to the rights of any
transferee of the ... property .... 1o47
These are the words that create the execution lien. But they
apply only to property in which the debtor has an interest. Ex
hypothesi, JD has no interest in property she has conveyed away,
even if creditors have the right to reach that property now owned
by a transferee.
Nevertheless, New York's fraudulent conveyance statute (the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act) provides:
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor,
such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any
person...
b. Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed. 10 48
This language, which precedes the enactment of the CPLR, 149
suggests somehow that the execution delivered to the sheriff by
JC pursuant to a judgment against JD does indeed encumber X's
property. Otherwise, how could the sheriff levy upon it?
One riposte might be that the execution lien encumbers only
the property of JD. But where JD has fraudulently conveyed to
X, X holds the property in trust for creditors of JD. The sheriff,
as agent of such a creditor, rightfully dispossesses X, who has no
beneficial interest and, therefore, a duty to hand over the
property to creditors. So the execution lien does not encumber
X's property when the execution is delivered to the sheriff.
Rather, the sheriffs possession is what creates the lien. This
represents the moment when JC's equity interest in X's property
becomes a "legal" interest-a judicial lien.'150
1047 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (emphasis added).
1048 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278 (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
1049 New York enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1925. L. 1925
ch. 254, effective April 1, 1925.
1050 See Thurber v. Blanck, 50 N.Y. 80, 84 (1872). The Court of Appeals said: "In
the case of personal chattels, the sheriff seizes the property and takes it into his
possession, and renders himself liable to an action by the claimant. He acquires by
such seizure a specific lien. . . ." Id. at 86. The Thurber court goes on to make a
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Yet it must be admitted that, where JD conveys real
property to X prior to JC's judgment, docketing a judgment
against JD creates a lien against JC. 51 This is so even though
the docketing lien, created under CPLR 5203(a), attaches to "an
interest of the judgment debtor [not X] in real property, against
which property a money judgment may be enforced."10 52 Here,
the objection is that JD has no interest after conveying to X. Yet
New York courts think JC has a lien on X's property all the
same.10 53  Given this analysis, why shouldn't an execution
encumber X's personal property with a lien when JC delivers it
to the sheriff?10 54
The analysis assumes (erroneously, in my opinion) that when
JD fraudulently conveys to X, JD actually conveys nothing and is
still the owner.105 5  In other words, a fraudulent conveyance
is no conveyance. This regrettable conclusion is completely
unnecessary, however. JD alienates everything to X in a
fraudulent conveyance. X, however, holds in trust for JD's
creditors. The first creditor to avail herself of the trust (by the
sheriffs seizure or by obtaining a turnover order or like judicial
declaration) should have priority to X's trust.
Until 2008, no modern case existed in which the sheriff was
asked to levy the property of X directly, or grounds that it was
fraudulently conveyed. 10 56  Perhaps suspecting constitutional
problems, 0 57  judgment creditors are utilizing turnover
different rule for liens on intangible property, engendering some rather sarcastic
criticism in Cohen, Property Fraudulently Transferred, supra note 892, at 510-13.
1051 See Carlson, Money Judgment Part I, supra note 11.
1052 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
1053 See Blue Giant Equip. Corp. v. Tec-Ser, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 630, 631, 459
N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (3d Dep't 1983).
1 0 See id. at 631, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 949 (restraining notice served on X deemed
effective, even though CPLR 5222(b) is keyed to "property in which [X knows or has
reason to believe] the judgment debtor has an interest"). In Rich v. New York White
Line Tours, Inc., 266 A.D. 752, 41 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dep't 1943), JD made a
fraudulent conveyance to X. JC 2 sought to set it aside. The lower court ruled that
JC, had priority because JC, served an execution, and therefore, had an equitable
lien on X's property. On appeal, the court held that JC,'s lien died when sheriff
returned the execution unsatisfied.
1055 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
1056 For ancient cases, see Rinchey v. Stryker, 28 N.Y. 45, 54 (1863) (levying
sheriff unsuccessfully sued for trespass of chattels); Hall v. Stryker, 27 N.Y. 596, 605
(1863) (same).
1057 See Save Way Oil Co. v. 284 E. Parkway Corp., 115 Misc. 2d 141, 143, 453
N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1982) (stating that fraudulent conveyance
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procedures, which guarantee to X notice and a hearing before X's
property is "taken" to satisfy JD's debt to JC.15 8 Under such a
procedure, JC has a lien only after the court orders X to turn
over the loot.'0 59  Nevertheless, in SEC v. Universal Express,
Inc.,' °6 ° the clerk of the court in the Southern District of New
York issued an execution to the marshall in Boca Raton, who
seized jewelry from X, a cash buyer. 10 61 X did not raise the due
process issue and, at present, is litigating whether it was a bona
fide purchaser within the meaning of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. 1062
F. Injunctions That Do Not Create Liens
According to CPLR 5202(b), an equity lien arises from the
securing of an order for
(a) the delivery of a debt owed to JD;
(b) the payment of a debt owed to JD;
(c) delivery of an interest of JD in personal property;
(d) the appointment of a receiver of a debt owed to JD;
(e) the appointment of a receiver of an interest of JD in personal
property. 1063
Missing from the list are certain other injunctions
authorized by the CPLR. For example, a court can order JD to
make installment payments,'10 6 4 but, other than the leading
treatise, 10 65 no one has suggested that such an order puts a lien
law "tread[s] on thin constitutional ground [and] must be employed with the strictest
adherence to statutory requirements" (citation omitted)).
1058 See id. at 145, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
1059 See id.
1060 No. 04 Civ. 2322, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35342 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2008).
1061 See id. at *1-2.
1062 See id. at *3. How is it that a federal marshal in Florida can levy under an
execution issued pursuant to the CPLR? Ordinarily, federal JCs must register their
New York judgments with the district court in Florida, which then issues a Florida
execution to the marshal. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000). When JC is the United States
government, however, an execution "shall be issued from and made returnable to the
court which rendered the judgment, but may be executed in any other State, in any
Territory, or in the District of Columbia." Id. § 2413.
1063 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2008). A receiver can be authorized to
"administer, collect, improve, lease, repair or sell any real or personal property." Id.
5228(a). If JC1 has obtained the appointment of a receiver, JC 2 is not necessarily
entitled to a different receiver, but may have the receivership "extended" to JC 2,
with JC, having first priority. See id. 5225(b).
'" See id. 5226.
1065 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 5202.15.
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on the assets of a debtor. 10 66  Most notably, a court (or the
judgment creditor's attorney as officer of the court) can issue a
restraining notice to any person except the employer of JD. 67
According to CPLR 5222(b), the effect of serving a notice is that
the recipient is forbidden to transfer any property or pay any
debt in which JD has an interest.0 68  Nothing is said about
creating a lien on the property held or debt owed by the recipient
of the notice. If the recipient transfers or pays, she is in
contempt of court, but JC cannot pursue the property now in the
hands of a third party. 1 69
In International Ribbon Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc. ,oo
however, the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.0 7' In this
forgotten case, JC served a restraining notice on the debtor.1072
Shortly after, JD made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. 7 3  JC then sought a turnover against the assignee
pursuant to CPLR 5225(b).107 4  Obviously, a turnover was
appropriate only if JC already had a lien on the assignee's
property that was senior to the rights of the assignee.
1066 CPLR 5226 orders are the mode for reaching wages and other exempt
income above and beyond the ten percent limit on income executions. See supra text
accompanying notes 811-815. Oddly, a creditor can obtain appointment of a receiver
to receive income, Edelman v. Edelman, 83 A.D.2d 622, 622, 441 N.Y.S.2d 529, 529-
30 (2d Dep't 1981), in which case a lien is created.
1067 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a). A pre-judgment restraining notice is also possible
upon court order, but only if the plaintiff has received "a verdict or decision." Id.
5229.
'06 See id. 5222(b).
106 See id.
1069 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank/N. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 814 F. Supp.
1195, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp. v. Nat'l Aircraft Servs.,
Inc. (In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp.), 34 B.R. 592, 597 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983);
Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d 575, 579-80, 421 N.E.2d 808,
810-11, 439 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318-19 (1981). Although turnover proceedings do not
require service of a restraining notice, where JC has chosen to serve a restraining
notice on AD and where JC has not sent JD the notice warning that JD has the
right to exemptions, some courts prohibit JC's attempt to commence a turnover
proceeding until JC serves the required notice. See Weinstein v. Gitters, 119 Misc.
2d 122, 122-23, 462 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554-55 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1983); Chem.
Bank v. Flaherty, 121 Misc. 2d 509, 510, 468 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Queens County 1983).
1070 36 N.Y.2d 121, 325 N.E.2d 137, 365 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1975).
1071 See id. at 124-25, 325 N.E.2d at 138-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
1072 See id. at 123, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
1073 See id. at 123-25, 325 N.E.2d at 138-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 809-11.
1074 See id. at 124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
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Judge Charles Breitel ruled that, by virtue of the restraining
notice, JC was senior to the assignee. 175 He so ruled even as he
acknowledged that early drafts of CPLR 5222 had expressly
granted creditors a lien, a provision later deleted. 10 76 The thrust
of his analysis is the truism that an assignee takes the same
rights as the assignor had.10 77 Since the assignor was enjoined
from making conveyances, the assignee was likewise enjoined.0 78
The only way to escape the injunction was for the assignee to pay
JC the amount of JC's judgment. 0 79
If logic holds sway, this ruling cannot be contained to
assignments for the benefit of creditors. All assignments convey
only the rights of the debtor; any assignee is subject to the
restraining notice since JD was so restrained.
Oddly, Judge Breitel overruled his own opinion for the
Appellate Division in City of New York v. Panzirer.'080 There, JC1
served a restraining order on AD, who held proceeds from
the sale of JD's business. 10 8  JC, also commenced a turnover
proceeding. 1°0 2 JC 2 obtained a levy before the turnover order was
procured.'083 Judge Breitel, citing the very legislative history he
dismissed in International Ribbon, wrote:
The result, then, is that in order for a judgment to attain
status in the ranking of priorities there must either be a levy,
an order directing delivery of property, or the appointment of a
receiver. Any other measures taken by the judgment creditor,
1075 See id. at 124, 126, 325 N.E.2d at 138-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 811. The
court cited with approval In re Nassau Expressway, 56 Misc. 2d 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d
680 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968), where the city owed JD a condemnation award.
JC served a restraining notice and JD made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors in violation of the restraining notice. Id. at 602, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 682. While
denying that JC had a lien, the court ordered the city to pay JC-which, of course,
meant that JC did have a lien. See id. at 603, 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 682-84.
1076 See Int'l Ribbon, 36 N.Y.2d at 125, 325 N.E.2d at 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 811
(citing ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 3D PRELIMINARY REPORT
252 (1959) (Legislative Document No. 17); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT A562-63 (1961) (Legislative Document)).
1077 See In re Nassau Expressway, 56 Misc. 2d at 603-05, 289 N.Y.S.2d at
683-84.
1071 See id. at 604-05, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
1079 See id. at 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
1080 23 A.D.2d 158, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1965).
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no matter how diligent, on an absolute or comparative basis, do
not suffice to qualify for priority.10 4
While International Ribbon holds that a restraining notice gives
rise to a lien, the Court of Appeals soon stated the opposite
(albeit in dictum) in Aspen Industries, Inc. v. Marine Midland
Bank. °8 5  Astonishingly, it cited International Ribbon as
authority for its dictum, even though International Ribbon holds
the dead opposite. 1086
Still, one can find recent examples where a lien emerges
from CPLR 5222. In Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. ,1087 JC
served a restraining notice on AD, a trustee of JD.08 " After the
restraining notice, AD made an advance distribution to JD.10 89 It
then sought to set off its loan to JD against JC's levy. 090 The
court did not permit the setoff, although setoffs are generally
good against levies.1091 Is this not attributing the power of a lien
to the lowly restraining notice?
Similarly, in Rafkind v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. ,1o92 the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had enjoined a
bank from paying a bank account." 93 Admittedly, the injunction
had a federal origin, but Judge John Martin cited CPLR 5201(b)
to the effect that "[a] money judgment may be enforced against
any property which could be assigned or transferred. '"1 94 Judge
Martin reasoned that, since JC could not bring a turnover
proceeding against the bank under CPLR 5227, the SEC was
senior. 0 9 If this is correct, then restraining notices generally
108 Id. at 160, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 286, 288.
108 52 N.Y.2d 575, 579-80, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810-11, 439 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318-19
(1981).
1086 Int'l Ribbon Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 121, 123-25, 325
N.E.2d 137, 138-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809-11 (1975); accord Garland D. Cox &
Assocs., Inc. v. Koffman, 67 A.D.2d 1025, 1025, 413 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261, (3d Dep't
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.Y.2d 878, 400 N.E.2d 302, 424 N.Y.S.2d 360
(1979); Steingart Assocs., Inc. v. Lots of Fun, Inc., 127 Misc. 2d 60, 61, 485 N.Y.S.2d
193, 195 (Sullivan County Ct. 1985).
1087 143 Misc. 2d 721, 541 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1989).
1088 See id. at 722, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
1089 See id.
100 See id. at 723, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
1091 See id. at 722-23, 725, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 927, 929; see also N.Y. DEBT. &
CRED. LAW § 151 (McKinney 2008).
1092 No. 92 Civ. 6099, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18625 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1992).
1083 See id. at * 1.
1094 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney 2008).
1095 See Rafkind, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18625, at *3-5.
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have a lien effect on bank accounts. Judge Martin's decision,
however, is open to the criticism that, just because the bank
could not pay its debt, does not mean that JD cannot transfer the
ownership of it. The restraining notice bound the bank only, notjD. 1096
A different sort of injunction that has been denied lien status
is one in connection with selling shares in a cooperative
apartment. Such shares are considered personal property. 10 97 If
they represent the debtor's principal residence, they are exempt
property under CPLR 5206(a)(1). 98 According to CPLR 5206(e),
a creditor is invited to commence a special proceeding for the sale
of the shares if they exceed $50,000 in value. 1 99 If the homestead
were real estate, there would tend to be a judicial lien arising
from the docketing of the judgment in the local county where the
real estate is located. 100 But where the homestead is in personal
property, the special proceeding, which culminates in a court
order, should be viewed as a turnover order. 10' In other words, if
a court orders the sale of cooperative shares, a lien arises when
the court actually orders the sale. In In re Pandeff," '2 however,
the court ruled otherwise. It relied on the premise that the order
in question was not among those referred to in CPLR 5202(b).
This decision must be viewed as wrongly decided. CPLR 5206(e)
empowers the court to order a sale. A lien is a power of sale. The
court order directing a sale must, therefore, be a lien if syllogism
still has bite in the state of New York. If this order was ninety
days old by the time of the debtor's bankruptcy petition, 110 3 then
the creditor should have been deemed a secured creditor in JD's
bankruptcy.
"o Cohen, Third Party Orders, supra note 277, at 1203; Recent Decisions,
Pleading and Practice-Supplementary Proceedings-Right of Assignee of Judgment
Debtor to Funds Held by Bank Under Third Party Restraining Order, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 928, 944 (1935).
1097 See State Tax Comm'n v. Shor (In re State Tax Comm'n), 43 N.Y.2d 151, 154,
371 N.E.2d 523, 525, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (1977).
og See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(a)(1).
o9 See id. 5206(e).
1100 See id. 5203(a).
1101 See id. 5225(b).
1102 201 B.R. 865 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
110' Otherwise, it is a preference under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
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Prior to the CPLR, the Court of Appeals, in Wickwire
Spencer Steel Co. v. Kemkit Scientific Corp.,1104 held that service
of a subpoena on JD or third party constituted commencing a
supplementary proceeding, thereby creating a lien on the
debtor's assets. 1 0 5 Wickwire was controversial because the only
reference to subpoenas was in section 808 of the former Civil
Practice Act, which presupposed the appointment of a
receiver.11 °6 Section 808(1) and (2) provided that the title of a
receiver to the debtor's property related back to the service of a
subpoena either on the debtor or on a third party. 07 Yet there
was no receiver in Wickwire."0 8 The Wickwire court drew from
the receivership statute a state policy that commencement of a
supplementary proceeding should be associated with the creation
of a lien and that serving a subpoena on JD or AD was
tantamount to starting a supplementary proceeding." 9 After the
enactment of the CPLR, however, it has not proved possible to
claim that the subpoena is a lien-significant event."1 0
III. EXEMPT PROPERTY
A. Monetary Exemptions
Like all states, New York exempts certain personal property
"from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment."'1 '
Most items of exempt tangible property are of negligible value.
The real money is in the intangibles-pensions, trust funds, and
the like. Almost all the reported cases involve, in effect, cash.
The courts have had little occasion to address exemptions of
tangible property such as the family bible, a team of oxen, or
other items the CPLR deems worthy of exemption.
When it comes to the monetary exemptions, the debtor may
not only protect exempt cash flow but may also exempt proceeds
1104 292 N.Y. 139, 54 N.E.2d 336 (1944).
1101 See id. at 142-43, 54 N.E.2d at 337-38.
1106 See id. at 142, 54 N.E.2d at 337.
1107 See Distler & Shubin, supra note 8, at 484-91.
1108 See generally Wickwire, 292 N.Y. 139, 54 N.E.2d 336.
1109 See id. at 142, 54 N.E.2d at 337.
110 See Montovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 24 A.D.2d 487, 487, 260 N.Y.S.2d 814,
815 (2d Dep't 1965); City of N.Y. v. Panzirer, 23 A.D.2d 158, 160, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d
284, 286, 288 (1st Dep't 1965).
1111 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a) (McKinney 2008).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the cash. In Yates County National Bank v. Carpenter,1112 the
debtor used an exempt military pension" 3 to buy a house. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the source of the purchase money
made the house exempt
where the receipts from a pension can be directly traced to the
purchase of property, necessary or convenient for the support
and maintenance of the pensioner and his family, such property
is exempt under the provisions of this statute. Where such
moneys can be clearly identified and are used in the purchase of
necessary articles, or are loaned or invested for purposes of
increase or safety, in such form as to secure their available use
for the benefit of the pensioner in time of need, we do not doubt
but that they come within the meaning of the statute; but where
they have been embarked in trade, commerce, or speculation,
and become mingled with other funds so as to be incapable of
identification, or separation, we do not doubt but that the
pensioner loses the benefit of the statutory exemption.1' 4
Consistent with this sentiment, courts agree that the income
exemptions survive at least when deposited in checking
accounts," even commingled bank accounts." 6
If monetary exemptions can be traced into non-exempt
assets, may tangible exemptions be traced into money? There is
a good argument that the answer is no. CPLR 5205(b) exempts
choses in action stemming from the destruction of exempt
property."" The exemption continues for one year after
1112 119 N.Y. 550, 23 N.E. 1108 (1890).
1113 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(e).
1114 Yates, 119 N.Y. at 555-56, 23 N.E. at 1109.
1115 In re Wrobel, 268 B.R. 342, 344-45 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001).
1116 See In re Coolbaugh, 250 B.R. 162, 166-67 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
that the tracing rule presumed that all withdrawals within sixty days of bankruptcy
were withdrawals of exempt wages; the leftovers are presumed to be non-exempt
cash).
1117 This provision foresees that the sheriff might levy exempt property
wrongfully, in which case she is guilty of the tort of conversion. See Conklin v.
McCauley, 41 A.D. 452, 452, 58 N.Y.S. 879, 880 (2d Dep't 1899) (marshal levied
piano). The exemption does not apply, however, if a non-debtor sustained the loss
and then assigned the insurance proceeds to a debtor. See In re Kleinman, 172 B.R.
764, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). It does not apply to New York's bankruptcy-only
exemptions. CPLR 5205(b) requires the injured property to be "exempt from
application to the satisfaction of a money judgment." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(b). Since
cars are bankruptcy-only exempt but fully subject to money judgments, CPLR
5205(b) did not technically apply. See In re De Vries, 76 B.R. 917, 918-19 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Lauterbach, 74 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
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collection.1 118 Similarly, the real estate exemption safeguards the
cash proceeds of real estate for one year after a judicial sale.11 1 9
The fact that a proceeds theory was expressly provided in these
instances suggests that it exists nowhere else but these
instances. But if this were true, then Carpenter would seem to be
overruled by the enactment of the CPLR. Yet courts routinely
protect bank accounts and the like if exempt funds are deposited
in them. At least where money exemptions are concerned, the
rule of tracing still holds sway.
1. Trusts
Spendthrift trusts are exempt in New York, so long as they
are not self-settled. 120 But the CPLR extends protection of even
self-settled spendthrift trusts if they qualify as tax deferred
retirement accounts within the meaning of ERISA.1 12' In this
respect, the legislature need not have bothered, as federal law
1118 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(b) (last sentence).
1119 See id. 5206(e).
1120 See id. 5205(c)(1). Where a partnership contributes the funds to a trust for
the benefit of a debtor-partner, the trust is not exempt because it is self-settled. See
Lerner v. Williamsburg Savs. Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 685, 689, 386 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976). The trust in Lerner was a Keough Plan, which since
1987 is exempt even if self-settled. Governor's Approval Memorandum, Bill Jacket,
ch. 108, L. 1987. Not all trusts are spendthrift trusts. Anti-alienation language must
appear in the trust instrument before it can be considered spendthrifted. E.g., In re
McNeil, 193 B.R. 654, 659 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996). "Structured settlements" of
personal injury claims are considered self-settled, and therefore, not exempt under
CPLR 5205(c). In re Lyons, 381 B.R. 444, 450 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
1121 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(2). Profit sharing plans that are not related to
"illness, disability, death, age, or length of service" do not fall under CPLR
5205(c)(2). In re Lowe, 252 B.R. 614, 623-25 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting N.Y
DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(2) (McKinney 2008)) (self-settled spendthrift trust not
exempt). Canadian ERISA-like accounts are not exempt. See In re Ondrey, 227 B.R.
211, 216 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). ERISA qualification can be lost for highly
technical reasons. In In re Feldman, 171 B.R. 731, 734 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994), a
self-employed person with no employees wrote a "top heavy" plan-a plan that
granted non-key employees too few benefits. Even though the debtor had no
employees at all, the purely hypothetical terms of the plan prevented the ERISA
plan from being exempt. The court nevertheless granted the debtor some time to
amend the plan and regain the exemption. See id. at 739. But would not the trustee's
hypothetical judicial lien on the day of the bankruptcy petition guarantee that the
lien had attached to the pension already? CPLR 5205(c)(2) does not address whether
pensions can be disencumbered after the fact by qualifying amendments. Nowhere
else in the CPLR is there a provision for dissolving existing liens in order to honor
an exemption. Meanwhile, a debtor's violation of ERISA in administering funds does
not entail forfeiture of the exemption. See In re Handel, 301 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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preempts the justified hostility of state law to self-settled trusts
of this sort.1122 New York also follows the federal lead by making
ERISA property accessible if JC holds a "qualified domestic
relations order.'112 3 Undoubtedly, New York would have found
itself preempted if it dared to legislate otherwise."24
CPLR 5202(c) exempts the principal of trusts.125  Income
from an exempt trust can be reached under CPLR 5205(d), which
suggests that creditors may obtain at least ten percent-plus
greater amounts, if "unnecessary for the reasonable
requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents.""26
Therefore, whereas the corpus of a spendthrift trust is entirely
exempt, the income is garnishable in the amount of at least ten
percent or more, as described below.
1122 See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). A profit-sharing plan was
held to be self-settled in In re Lowe, 252 B.R. 614, 623 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000),
where the plan was funded by wages otherwise payable to the worker and where the
plan did not qualify for ERISA or other tax-deferring legislation. Profit sharing is
mentioned in New York's bankruptcy-only exemption, N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW
§ 282(2)(e), but such a plan must be related to "illness, disability, death, age or
length of service." In re Lowe, 252 B.R. at 623.
1123 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(4). The term is defined in 26 U.S.C.A § 4 14 (p) (West
2007). A spendthrift trust is subject to a "qualified domestic relations order." N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(3)-(4). Since principal can be invaded on behalf of such orders,
likewise income can be obtained without any inquiry into the reasonable
requirements of the debtor. See In re Smith v. ABC Co., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3467, at *7 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County Sept. 29, 2005). Section 7-3.4 of the Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law provides:
Where a trust is created to receive the income from property and no valid
direction for accumulation is given, the income in excess of the sum
necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary is subject to the
claims of his creditors in the same manner as other property which cannot
be reached by execution.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.4 (McKinney 2008). In In re Smith, the court
concluded that CPLR 5205(c)(4) simply overrides section 7-3.4 of the EPTL, when it
comes to qualified domestic relations orders. In re Smith, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3467, at *11-12.
I1" See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830
(1988) (holding that states cannot exempt welfare plan proceeds because ERISA
does not similarly exempt them).
125 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c).
1126 Id. 5205(d). See generally Nat'l Bank v. Pension Fund of Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters & Chauffeurs, 463 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Individual retirement accounts, after 1994, are exempt,1127
even if created by the judgment debtor. According to CPLR
5205(c)(2), an IRA or Keough plan
shall be considered a trust which has been created by or which
has proceeded from a person other than the judgment debtor,
even though such judgment debtor is (i) in the case of an
individual retirement account plan, an individual who is the
settlor of and depositor to such account plan, or (ii) a self-
employed individual, or (iii) a partner of the entity sponsoring
the Keough (HR-10) plan, or (iv) a shareholder of the
corporation sponsoring the retirement or other plan, or (v) a
participant in a section 457 plan."
28
By deeming the IRA to be a trust (even though it is not one), the
New York legislature has avoided pitfalls faced by debtors in
other states, where courts have refused to find an ordinary
custodial account to be a trust. 1 29
Can a debtor simply stuff extra funds into an ERISA or IRA
account, beyond what tax law permits to be tax-deferred,
claiming that the entire account is spendthrifted? In Tompkins
County Trust Co. v. Gowin,130 a retiree deposited $100,000 into
his retirement account. Although the entire account was
protected by a spendthrift clause as required by ERISA, the
1127 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(2). "Either by statute or case law virtually every
type of retirement plan is exempt from the claims of the decedent's creditors." In re
Estate of King, 196 Misc. 2d 250, 255, 764 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523 (Sur. Ct. Broome
County 2003).
1128 See Pauk v. Pauk, 232 A.D.2d 392, 394, 648 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (2d Dep't
1996) ("The [1994] amendment does not differentiate between IRAs created as a
result of rollovers from an exempt plan, or those created directly by the judgment
debtor.").
1129 See C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and
State Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65,
79-83 (2003). Prior to 1994, New York law expressly made IRAs a bankruptcy-only
exemption under section 282 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. See In re
Dubroff v. First Nat'l Bank of Glens Falls, 119 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1997). In 1994,
the IRA was added to CPLR 5205(c)(2). Similarly, deferred employment plans
offered by local governments pursuant to section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code
were interpreted as falling under section 282(2)(e) of the Debtor and Creditor Law
but, after 2001, are now directly protected by CPLR 5205(c)(2). Compare In re Ruffo,
261 B.R. 580, 584-85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that such plans fell under
section 282(2)(e)) with In re Johnson, 254 B.R. 786, 796 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding otherwise). On the nature of New York's bankruptcy-only exemptions, see
infra text accompanying notes 1172-1193.
110 163 Misc. 2d 418, 419, 621 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1994).
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debtor was made to disgorge this amount, as it was not tax
deferred under the Internal Revenue Code. 1131 Only that part of
the ERISA account which is tax deferred is actually exempt.
New York also has exceptions for ERISA or IRA
contributions that are fraudulent conveyances. 132  More
unusually, a judgment creditor can reach any ERISA
contribution made ninety days before "the interposition of the
claim on which such judgment was entered." 1 33  This latter
phrase-interposition of a claim-has been interpreted to mean
the service of a summons or complaint that commences a civil
action. 1 34 At least one court has declared that CPLR 5205(c)(5)
is preempted by ERISA 1135 under the broad preemption principle
articulated in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service,
Inc.1 36 In Mackey, the Supreme Court smacked down Georgia for
exempting an ERISA welfare plan. Since ERISA requires
retirement plans to be spendthrifted but not welfare plans, the
state exemption provision impermissibly intruded on the federal
prerogative to govern retirement and welfare matters.
There is a contrary argument in favor of CPLR 5202(c)(5),
however. If the debtor has made a fraudulent conveyance to an
ERISA plan, the ERISA plan never received the beneficial
interest in the funds. Rather, the ERISA plan holds the funds in
trust for the creditors of the debtor. And given that the ERISA
plan never owned the funds, the ERISA preemption rule rests
unoffended.1 37  This should equally apply to transfers within
1131 See id. at 419, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
1132 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(5)(ii). Where the employer's contribution is a
fraudulent conveyance, the employer's judgment creditor can reach the employee's
ERISA account. See Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d
442, 445, 522 N.E.2d 30, 32, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1988).
1133 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(5)(i).
1134 See Baker v. Dorfman, No. 99 Civ. 9485, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10142, at
*25 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000); Tompkins County Trust Co., 163 Misc. 2d at 419, 621
N.Y.S.2d at 478.
1135 See FDIC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. M-18-302, 1992
Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1992).
1136 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988).
1137 See Lisa M. Smith, Note, ERISA Qualified Pension Plans as Part of the
Bankruptcy Estate After Patterson v. Shumate, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 2119, 2143
(2000).
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ninety days of the "interposition of the claim."1138  CPLR
5205(c)(5) creates for such payments the same status as does




New York provides various income exemptions. These differ
from the exemption of trust principle in that "such part as a court
determines to be unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of
the judgment debtor and his dependents"1 139 is not exempt after
all. The debtor has the burden to show that the income is indeed
necessary for the debtor's reasonable requirements. 14
Where the debtor is receiving such exempt income, and
where the creditor serves a restraining notice, the debtor does
not violate the injunction by spending any of the income. l
Rather, the creditor must seek an installment payment order
pursuant to CPLR 5226.1142 Such an order is subject to the
following admonition: "In fixing the amount of the payments, the
court shall take into consideration the reasonable requirements
of the judgment debtor and his dependents...." This has been
declared the proper venue for a court to consider just how much
income under CPLR 5202(d) is necessary for the reasonable
1138 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c)(5)(i).
1139 Id. 5205(d)(1); see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3212(d)(2) ("[With regard to exempt
annuities,] the court may order the annuitant to pay to a judgment creditor or apply
on the judgment in installments, a portion of such benefits that appears just and
proper to the court, with due regard for the reasonable requirements of the judgment
debtor and his family, if dependent upon him, as well as any payments required to
be made by the annuitant to other creditors under prior court orders."). Although
CPLR 3212(d)(2) refers to "judgment creditors," at least one court has ruled that, in
the bankruptcy context, an unsecured creditor can invoke CPLR 3212(d)(2) for the
benefit of all unsecured creditors, provided it is the bankruptcy estate, not the
objector, who profits. See In re Lyons, 381 B.R. 444, 452 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). This
accords with the idea that the bankruptcy trustee is deemed a judgment creditor as
of the day of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2) (2000).
1140 See In re Balanoffv. Niosi, 16 A.D.3d 53, 56, 791 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (2d Dep't
2005).
1141 See id. at 63-64, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61.
1142 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5226.
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requirements of the judgment debtor and dependents.1 14 3 In such
a hearing, the debtor has the burden of proving necessity.
1144
According to CPLR 5205(d)(1), ninety percent of income from
spendthrift trusts is exempt. 1145  Oddly, the exemption can be
defeated if a court finds that the income is "unnecessary for the
reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his
dependents."1146 What this implies is that, if all the income is
absolutely necessary for support, the creditors can still get ten
percent.1 147 On the other hand, if none of the income is necessary,
creditors can get it all.
Different rules apply if the spendthrift trust falls under
ERISA. ERISA income is entirely exempt, and it is not subject to
the "unnecessary" clause that undoes the exemption for non-
ERISA trusts.1 4' The suspension of the "unnecessary" clause is
undoubtedly required by the broad preemption rule of Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc. 1149
b. Wages
Ninety percent of income derived from personal services is
exempt. 1150  This dovetails nicely with the statutes governing
income executions, which are tied to obtaining ten percent of
income. 151 Technically, the ten percent limit is suspended if the
income is "unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of the
1143 See In re Balanoff, 16 A.D. at 56, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
1144 See Camphill Special Schs., Inc. v. Prentice, 126 Misc. 2d 707, 708, 483
N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1984). Nevertheless, where JD makes
no showing, courts have discretion not to award one-hundred percent of salary to JC.
See In re Dickens v. Dir. of Fin., 45 Misc. 2d 882, 883, 258 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
1141 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(1).
1146 Id.
1147 See In re Smith v. ABC Co., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3467, at *6-7 (Fam. Ct.
Nassau County Sept. 29, 2005). In In re Hilsen, No. 05-30-850-ees 2009 Bankr.
LEXIS 669 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2009), the court approved a ninety percent
exemption from the income of a spendthrift trust. It should have conditioned the
exemption on such income as is necessary for JD's "reasonable requirements." That
would have permitted creditors, after the bankruptcy, to litigate whether any of the
income is exempt from creditors. This could be done in the ocntext of an installment
payment order under CPLR 5226.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 1120-1138.
1149 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988).
1150 Law firm draws are earnings for personal services, not profits, and hence are
exempt. See FDIC v. Wirth, No. M18-302, 1991 Dist. LEXIS 13706, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 3, 1991).
1151 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(b).
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judgment debtor and his dependents."1152 Nevertheless, the
income execution rules do not permit the judgment creditor to
exceed ten percent. How can a creditor gain excess to a surplus
over ten percent? The answer is that the creditor can dip into the
ninety percent by means of an installment payment order
pursuant to CPLR 5226.1153
It is possible that a creditor might pursue income, but not
via an income execution. In Cadle Co. v. Newhouse, 54 JD had
all his wages deposited in his wife's checking account.
15 5 JC
claimed these deposits were fraudulent conveyances and
(presumably) filed a turnover proceeding against AD in order to
recover the proceeds of the checking account. JC tried to argue
that, since it did not proceed by income execution, it was not
subject to the ten percent limit, but the court found that CPLR
5205(d)(2) gives an independent reason to limit JC to ten
percent. 1 6 What the court failed to note, however, is that CPLR
5202(d)(2) exempts earnings for "personal services rendered
within sixty days before ... an income execution is delivered to
the sheriff. '" 57 Where no income execution is delivered to the
sheriff, no earnings are exempt, and JC is entitled to one
hundred percent of earnings, if we read CPLR 5202(d)(2)
literally.
In spite of the literal words of the CPLR, the court remanded
to discover how much of the wages were spent on necessaries.
1158
Undoubtedly, the spouse of JD would have personal liability for
expenditures "unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of
the judgment debtor and [her] dependents.""59 The transfer of
the "necessary" portion of the wages was a transfer of exempt
property and, therefore, not susceptible of recovery as a
fraudulent conveyance. 1
160
The wage exemption applies to wages already in a bank
account when the bank account is levied," 61 but translating this
1152 Id. 5205(d).
115 See id. 5226.
"s 20 F. App'x 69 (2d Cir. 2001).
"5 See id. at 70.
1156 See id. at 72-73.
115 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2).
1158 See Cadle Co., 20 F. App'x at 74.
1159 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d).
116 See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 277 (2002).
1161 See In re Wrobel, 268 B.R. 342, 344 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001).
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to a bankruptcy case is awkward. The problem is that the
exemption is limited to "services rendered within sixty days
before, and at any time after, an income execution is delivered to
the sheriff."1162 In a typical bankruptcy case, no income execution
has ever been delivered when the debtor files a voluntary
bankruptcy petition. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy trustee, as of
the day of the bankruptcy petition, is deemed to have the "rights
and powers of ... a creditor.. . that obtains ... a judicial lien on
all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have
obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists."163 So if we imagine that the trustee has served an
ordinary execution to the sheriff on the day of the bankruptcy
petition, we can see that the bank account survives the trustee's
execution to the extent of the exemption in CPLR 5205(d)(2).
In In re Maidman,164 the debtor claimed over $50,000 in
cash (presumably in a bank account) because it represented
ninety percent of the amount of wages earned within sixty
days. 1115  This implies that the debtor's take-home pay for the
year was about $333,333. The court allowed the debtor to
exempt this amount under CPLR 5205(d)(2)." 66  Overlooked,
however, is the fact that the exemption does not cover amounts
that "a court determines to be unnecessary for the reasonable
requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents." 67
The Maidman court should have required the debtor to prove 168
that the $50,000 was necessary to the debtor's reasonable
requirements, a daunting task where the debtor's prodigious
wallet was enlarged by $300,000 a year in post-bankruptcy
1162 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2). Technically, this implies that wages in a bank
account are never exempt if no creditor has served an income execution on the
sheriff. Courts have ignored this feature of the statute. See supra text accompanying
notes 785-787.
1163 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
141 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
' See id. at 572.
" See id. at 572, 574.
1167 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d) pmbl.
168 The court in In re Coolbaugh stated:
Although Rule 4003(c) places the burden of proof on an objecting party to
demonstrate that an exemption has not been properly claimed, Courts have
uniformly held that once the objecting party presents a prima facie case
that the exemption has been improperly claimed, the burden then shifts
back to the debtor to come forward with evidence to demonstrate that the
exemption is proper.
250 B.R. 162, 166 n.9 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000).
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earnings." Incidentally, if we imagine that the bankruptcy
trustee serves an income execution (on an employer), the trustee
could reach only ten percent of wages, not the extra amount
unnecessary to the debtor's requirements. 1170 But the wages have
typically been deposited into a bank account. Therefore, in
administering the hypothetical lien creditor test, the trustee
hypothetically garnishes by serving an ordinary execution on the
bank account, and from this garnishment the trustee obtains any
amount not traceable to sixty days of wages, ten percent of the
sixty-day amount, and any additional amount not necessary to
the debtor's requirements.1 7
1169 In the 2005 bankruptcy amendments, Congress pointed toward IRS
standards to determine the reasonable expenses of a debtor's household. See David
Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 268-69 (2007). These guidelines, designed by the IRS to
squeeze debtors out of back taxes, presume that very modest expenses are necessary
to sustain existence. It will certainly be tempting to a bankruptcy court, and perhaps
even state courts, to borrow these guidelines for determining how much in pre-
petition wages is exemptible.
1170 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(1).
1171 In In re Coolbaugh, Chief Judge Ninfo issued the following instruction for
debtors wishing to claim bank accounts exempt to the extent of the wages they
contain:
[Tihis Court will: (1) require a debtor claiming an Earnings Exemption to:
(a) provide proof of all earnings from personal services rendered within
sixty days of the filing of the petition; and (b) if the Earnings Exemption is
claimed in amounts on deposit in a financial institution, provide proof:
(i) that the earnings were deposited into the account; and (ii) of the balance
on deposit in the account on day sixty-one before the filing of the petition;
(2) presume that any amount on deposit in the account at day sixty-one
before the filing of the petition are the last amounts out of the account;
(3) presume that ten percent of the debtor's earnings for services rendered
within sixty days of the filing of the petition are the second to the last
amounts out of the account; and (4) presume that any amounts deposited
into the account within the sixty days before the filing of the petition from
sources other than earnings for personal services rendered within sixty
days of the filing of the petition are the third to last amounts out of the
account. As a result, the Trustee and a debtor's estate will generally be
entitled to the lesser of: (1) the amounts on deposit in the account on day
sixty-one, ten percent of the debtor's earnings for services rendered within
sixty days of the date of the filing of the petition and all non-earnings
deposited into the account within sixty days of the filing of the petition; or
(2) the amount on deposit in the account as of the date of filing.
250 B.R. at 166-67 (footnote omitted). Missing from this procedure is any
acknowledgement that unnecessary funds belong to the trustee.
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c. Bankruptcy-Only Exemptions
Trustees have tried to argue that, in bankruptcy cases, any
monetary exemption mentioned in CPLR 5205 is limited by
sections 282 through 284 of the New York Debtor and Creditor
Law. To understand this claim, a brief tour of this legislation is
necessary.
According to section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
debtors may choose either exemptions under non-bankruptcy law
or, alternatively, the miserly federal exemptions set forth in
section 522(d)." 72 Yet section 522(d)(2) invites state legislators to
deprive their citizens of the federal exemption. 1 73 New York is
among the states that have "opted out" of the federal
exemptions. 1174  Its citizens may only choose the exemptions
provided by non-bankruptcy law, including New York statutory
law.
1175
New York's opt-out legislation goes on to authorize bankrupt
debtors to take any exemption under CPLR 5205 (personal
property) and CPLR 5206 (real property). 76 It also permits the
insurance exemptions described in section 3212 of the New York
Insurance Law. 1 77 And finally, it authorizes "bankruptcy only
exemptions."""8  These exemptions are no good against the
sheriff because they are not listed in CPLR 5205 or CPLR
5206.117' They include an automobile worth $2,400 or less (after
liens are considered) l1 0 or certain choses in action not mentioned
in CPLR 5205.1181 Whether states are authorized to create
bankruptcy-only exemptions not good against the sheriff has
1172 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1), (d) (West 2007).
1173 See id. § 522(b)(2).
1174 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (McKinney 2008).
1175 See id.
1178 See id. § 282.
1177 See id.
1178 Id. § 282(1)-(3).
1179 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205, 5206 (McKinney 2008).
"so See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(1). According to subsection (2), various
pensions may be exempted, but these are separately exempt in CPLR 5205(c) and (d)
and under federal law. See id. § 282(2); 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(E) (West 2007).
1181 These include awards under a crime victim's reparation law, wrongful death
actions belonging to dependents of a deceased person (to the extent necessary for the
support of the debtor), personal injury actions (to the extent of $7,500, if not related
to pain and suffering), and actions for the loss of future earnings (to the extent
necessary for support). See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(3).
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been questioned with some cause. 1112 A recent New York case
has upheld the constitutionality of it. l18" This constitutional
question, however, is beyond our scope. So far, federal courts
interpreting New York law are permitting debtors to claim
bankruptcy-only exemptions pursuant to sections 282 and 283 of
the New York Debtor and Creditor Law.18 4
Not only does New York purport to create bankruptcy-only
exemptions, but it denies bankrupt New Yorkers some
exemptions that would be good against the sheriff. According to
section 283(1) of the Debtor and Creditor Law, a debtor must
aggregate the exemptions of CPLR 5205(a) and certain annuity
contracts under section 3212 of the Insurance Law.1 185 The items
in CPLR 5205(a) are tangible items, such as wearing apparel and
tools of the trade.1 186 The annuities to be aggregated are those
purchased by the debtor within six months of bankruptcy." 7 Of
these items, the debtor may have only $5,000 in total (or $10,000,
in joint cases). 188
Having limited debtors to $5,000 of the above items, section
283(2) of the Debtor and Creditor Law goes on to state that,
where the debtor does not claim real estate, where the debtor has
fully utilized the exemptions in CPLR 5205(a) and annuities
subject to the $5,000 limit, and where the value of personal
property is less than $5,000, the debtor may have a bankruptcy-
1182 See In re Regevig, 394 B.R. 498, 499 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008); In re Wallace,
347 B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (declaring Michigan's bankruptcy-only
exemptions unconstitutional); Joseph Lamport, Note, The Preemption of Bankruptcy-
Only Exemptions, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 583, 608 (1985) (suggesting that section 283 of
the New York Debtor and Creditor Law is unconstitutional).
1183 See In re Brown, No. 06-30199, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2486, at *46 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007).
1" See Dubroffv. First Nat'l Bank of Glens Falls (In re Dubroff), 119 F.3d 75, 80
(2d Cir. 1997).
115 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 283(1).
1186 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a) (McKinney 2008).
1I7 See In re Lyons, 381 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). If, however, the
annuity is described in section 805(d) of the Internal Revenue Code or is purchased
with proceeds of an annuity bought prior to the six-month period, it is not subject to
the limitation in question. Alas, section 805(d) of the Internal Revenue Code is no
longer in effect. See In re Moore, 177 B.R. 437, 440 n.3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1994). As
for the protection of rollover, In re Moore involved an eve-of-bankruptcy annuity
purchased in part by rollover funds, part not. The court permitted the rollover
portion to be entirely exempt. Only the non-rollover portion was subject to the
$5,000 limit. See id. at 441. Furthermore, the $5,000 cap refers to the principal
amount of the annuity, not to income distributions going forward.
118 See In re Sherman, 237 B.R. 551, 554 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999).
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only exemption of cash to bring the total exemption up to
$5,000.1189 But the cash exemption described must not exceed
$2,500. 1 ° This confusing provision has spawned the claim of
bankruptcy trustees that the bankruptcy-only cash exemption
preempts any other claim to cash arising under CPLR 5205.
These claims have been rejected, however. If, for example, the
debtor claims a bank account as proceeds of exempt wages,
the claim is made under CPLR 5205(d)(2)." 9' The $2,500
bankruptcy-only exemption is calculated by reference to CPLR
5205(a) and annuities. 1192 It does not preempt the ability of the
debtor to claim the bank account.1 93
d. Miscellaneous Income Exemptions
Payment to JD for support pursuant to an award in a
matrimonial action is exempt. 1194 Payment under a separation
agreement is not,"95 but if the agreement is incorporated in a
judgment of divorce, it becomes exempt."96
Proceeds of milk are ninety percent exempt if JD owns the
farm on which the milk was produced and if the milk was sold to
a licensed dealer." 9' But where milk is sold through a
cooperative and where the cooperative holds back proceeds as a
kind of capital contribution eventually refundable, the capital
contribution loses its exempt status.1 98
Security deposits payable to a landlord or to a utility
company are exempt."99 So is the right of JD to accelerate life
insurance payments or have the surrender value or to enter into
-9 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 283(2).
'190 See id.
1191 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2).
19 See In re Maidman, 141 B.R. 571, 573-74 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992).
1193 See id. at 573.
1194 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(3).
1195 See Korol v. Korol, 111 Misc. 2d 650, 652-53, 444 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1981).
1196 See Wagner v. Wagner, 143 Misc. 2d 1044, 1047, 544 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1989).
'197 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(f).
1199 See In re Stinson, 59 B.R. 914, 915-16 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986).
'19 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(g). The exemption is lost if the security deposit has
been returned. See In re Kleinman, 172 B.R. 764, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(dictum).
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a viatical settlement. 120 0  After 1997, New York's state college
choice tuition savings program is exempt.
120 1
Not all exemptions appear in the CPLR. For instance,
sections 137 and 137-a of the Social Services Law exempt all
public assistance awards from execution. 120 2  There are also
federal exemptions, such as veteran1 20 3 and social security
1 20 4
benefits.1205
e. Son of Sam
Military pay of a non-commissioned officer, musician, or
private in the armed forces is entirely exempt, unless the
judgment creditor is suing for support in a matrimonial action. 2 6
Nevertheless, in New York State Crime Victims Board ex rel.
KA.S. v. Wendell, ' . 7 the court held that New York's Son of Sam
Law120 8 overrides this exemption in the case of retired
sergeants. 120 9 In this case, JD, imprisoned for a violent crime,
was nevertheless entitled to retirement pay, which was viewed as
not a pension or veteran's benefit (these would have been
federally exempt), but rather payment deferred for past
services. 121  Military pay can be garnished, insofar as federal
law is concerned. 121  JD, however, claimed that the pay
was exempt under CPLR 5205(e). 12 1 2 The Wendell court found
that CPLR 5205(e) is overruled by the Son of Sam Law. 1213 That
1200 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(i). A viatical settlement is
an agreement in which a terminally ill person sells to an investor the
rights to the death benefits payable under his or her life insurance policy.
The terminally ill person, or viator, assigns the benefits to the investor in
exchange for a cash payment that is something less than the total amount
payable under the policy.
Mazzola v. United States, No. 99 Cr. 935, 02 Civ. 7320, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2004).
1201 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(j).
1202 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 137, 137-a(1) (McKinney 2008).
1203 See 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000).
1204 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
1205 A list of these non-CPLR exemptions can be found in WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 35, 5205.03.
1206 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(e).
1207 12 Misc. 3d 801, 815 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2006).
1208 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 2008).
1209 See Wendell, 12 Misc. 3d at 806, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
1210 See id. at 803-05, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 439-41.
1211 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 5520a(b) (West 2006).
1212 See Wendell, 12 Misc. 3d at 803, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
1211 See id. at 806, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
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law defines "funds" as "all funds and property received from
any source... excluding... earned income." 214  The retired
sergeant's pay, however, was not earned income. Earned income
is defined as "income derived from one's own labor."121  The
Wendell court ruled that retirement pay was not earned income
because it was "not derived from any current labor.''
Meanwhile, the court ruled that the Son of Sam Law simply
repealed all exemptions under CPLR 5205, since the legislative
history said, in general, that criminals should pay the victims of
their crimes.121 7 While noting that CPLR 5205 was designed to
keep debtors from being paupers, the court observed that, since
JD was in prison, the state would be covering the living costs of
JD for some decades. 2'5 Therefore, depriving JD of his pay was
thought to be the intent of the legislature.
This result can certainly be questioned. The Son of Sam Law
achieves two basic purposes. First, it requires those who pay
convicts to report that fact to the Crime Victims Board. 1 9
Second, it gives an extended statute of limitations to victims in
order to pursue these funds. 220  It says nothing at all about
exemptions. In contrast, CPLR 5205 states that, where the
prisoner obtains a money judgment for any reason, $1,000 of the
judgment is exempt from Son of Sam judgments. 221 Does not
this provision show that CPLR 5205 applies to convicts
generally? Perhaps the Wendell decision testifies more to a
vigorous hatred of convicted criminals than to legal reasoning
according to neutral principles.
1214 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c). The law had originally been limited to income
derived from depictions of the crime. But this was broadened after the Supreme
Court struck down the law for discriminating against unpopular speech. See Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crim. Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123
(1991).
1215 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1)(f).
1216 Wendell, 12 Misc. 3d at 805, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 441. Currency is not a concept
that appears in the statute.
1217 See id. at 805-06, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42.
1218 See id. at 806, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
1219 See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(2)(a).
1220 See Robinson v. Cusack, No. 05-CV-5318, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50073, at
*4-6 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2007).
1221 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(k). This exemption does not apply to mere
settlements of a civil suit. See N.Y. State Crime Victims Board ex rel. Hernon v.
Zaffuto, 196 Misc. 2d 602, 604-06, 763 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444-45 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 2003).
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B. Non-Monetary Exemptions
Of less concern to litigants are the non-monetary exemptions
in tangible things. Many of the items listed are quaint: a church
pew, 1222 the family bible, 12 3 a wedding ring,12" an exhibition
at a world's fair, 1225 family pictures, and school books. 12 6  Some
are gruesome: dental accessions, 1227 wheelchairs, 1228 a seeing-eye
dog. 1229 Would any JC be so mean and base as to execute on such
things?123' Television, of course, is "a practical necessity of
modern living.1 2 31  Yet as late as 1976, it was not exempt
property in New York. 2 32  Today, the impecunious debtor may
choose which of his many television sets shall be considered
exempt. 123
3
Some of the items listed must be "necessary" to the debtor.
These include fuel for the stove, 234 food'235 for pets 236 and
1222 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(3). The leading treatise proclaims, "the provision
is of dubious utility." WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, 1 5205.15.
1223 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(2).
1224 See id. 5205(a)(6). Engagement rings, however, are not exempt. See In re
Tiberia, 227 B.R. 26, 28-29 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). Jewelry in general is not
exempt. See In re Sherman, 237 B.R. 551, 554 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999).
1225 See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 250 (McKinney 2008).
1226 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(2).
1221 See id. 5205(h)(1).
1228 See id.; Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Pope, 124 Misc. 2d 681, 681, 477
N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1984) (holding that a car could not be
considered a wheelchair).
1229 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(h)(2).
1210 See Allan Axelrod, Was Shylock v. Antonio Properly Decided?, 39 RUTGERS L.
REV. 143, 144-145 (1986) (finding no instances).
121 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 142, 423
N.E.2d 320, 329, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 851 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
1212 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(5) (adding television set to list of exemptions); In
re De Martini, 414 F. Supp. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
123 See In re Wattson, No. 79-B-1034, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 4460, at *6 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1980).
1214 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(1).
123'5 Food is also limited to what can be used in sixty days.
126 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(4). There is a separate exemption for the food
necessary for a "team" (presumably of oxen or water buffalo). Id. 5205(a)(7). The
Advisory Committee waxed indignant over the fact that pre-CPLR law allocated
ninety days of food for the team but only sixty for the family. It angrily demanded
that the team be deprived of thirty days worth of hay. See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 35, at 91. Other than this one reform, negatively impacting oxen, the drafters of
article 52 of the CPLR felt uncomfortable making substantive recommendations as
to what property deserves to be exempt. See id. at 89-90.
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family,1237 working tools, professional libraries, and professional
furniture. 1238 Wearing apparel and household furniture1239 must
be necessary, 121 complicating the ability JD has to preserve the
sable wrap and Louis XIV furniture.
Some of the items are subject to a monetary limit. Only
books not exceeding fifty dollars are exempt, and even these must
be kept and used as part of the family library. 1241 Only watches
less than $35 are exempt. 1242 Tools cannot be worth more than
$600.1243 Domestic animals and their food for sixty days cannot
exceed $450 in value. 1244
Suppose Fido is levied by the sheriff together with his pet
food and yields $500 at an execution sale. Does JD get to keep
$450 of the proceeds? We have seen that, for monetary
exemptions, courts have indeed permitted JD to have the
proceeds thereof.1245 There is a dictum to suggest that proceeds
theory should be honored in general. In Sailors' Snug Harbor in
the City of New York v. Tax Commission of New York, 246 the
court, in a case involving real estate exempt from taxes, said:
The basic problem is not different in tax cases from other forms
of partial exemption, e.g., the exemption from execution
afforded a homestead; or household furniture (CPLR 5205,
5206). The usual rule in those situations is that the lien is
1237 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(4); McCarthy v. McCabe, 131 A.D. 396, 398; 115
N.Y.S. 829, 832 (3d Dep't 1909) ("It is not all the meat, groceries and vegetables
provided for family use, but so much as a prudent man would ordinarily keep on
hand for family use.").
1238 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(7). A "team" is exempt. This includes a wagon for
the oxen to pull. A wagon is still "necessary" if it is awaiting repair for six weeks. See
Wolf v. Farley, 16 N.Y.S. 168, 170 (N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1891); see
N.N.Y. Trust Co. v. Bano, 151 Misc. 684, 687, 273 N.Y.S. 695, 698-99 (Jefferson
County Ct. 1934) (motorized truck is not a "team").
1239 Hobby equipment, however, is not furniture at all. See In re Sherman, 237
B.R. 551, 554 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999).
1240 Compare Conklin v. McCauley, 41 A.D. 452, 453, 58 N.Y.S. 879, 880, (2d
Dep't 1899) (in replevin action against marshal, jury could decide pianos were
necessary) with Lader v. Gordon, 88 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759, (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't
1949) (debtor must prove piano is necessary); see also In re Wattson, No. 79-B-1034,
1980 Bankr. LEXIS 4460, *8-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (wine vault, throw rug not
"necessary" household furniture).
1241 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(2).
1242 See id. 5205(a)(6).
1243 See id. 5205(a)(7).
124 See id. 5205(a)(4).
1245 See supra text accompanying notes 1112-1116.
1246 26 N.Y.2d 444, 259 N.E.2d 910, 311 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1970).
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enforceable to the extent the value of property to which the lien
attaches exceeds the exemption.
If there is sale the owner is entitled to the amount of the
exemption. 124
7
Perhaps this dictum is enough to establish a general proceeds
principle in New York law, at least when a judicial sale generates
the proceeds.
Generally, cars are not exempt from execution in New
York,12 41 though we have seen that New York purports to grant a
bankruptcy-only exemption for cars.1 249 Possibly cars are tools of
the trade, which are exempt under CPLR 5205(a)(7).1 250 But the
car must be entirely central to the trade, such as a taxi to a taxi
driver.1 251 Mere usefulness of a car to the trade is not enough.
1252
The exempt property listed in CPLR 5205(a) is nevertheless
not exempt against a creditor claiming the purchase price of the
item. 1253 So, for example, if JD buys a family bible 1254 on credit
from JC, the sheriff can levy the bible on behalf of JC but not on
behalf of any other creditor. In contrast, there is no similar
exception with regard to the tangible property listed in CPLR 1215
5205(h)-wheelchairs, seeing-eye dogs, and the like.
The meaning of the purchase money exception has never
been explored in the New York courts. One potent question is
whether a credit card debt represents the purchase price of
property bought with the card. Here, the answer must be no.
Credit card debt is not debt for the price of an item. Rather, it is
a debt to pay back an advance of credit by the credit card issuer.
A comparison of CPLR 5205(a) to article 9 of the UCC drives
1247 Id. at 449, 259 N.E.2d at 912, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
124 See Cais v. Pichler, 123 Misc. 2d 275, 278, 473 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722, (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
1249 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(1) (McKinney 2008); supra text
accompanying notes 1172-1193.
1250 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a)(7) (McKinney 2008).
1251 See Thorpe Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Deitz, 104 Misc. 2d 994, 995, 429 N.Y.S.2d
386, 386 (Albany County Ct. 1980).
1252 See id.; In re Kleinman, 172 B.R. 764, 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding
that stock in company that had a brokerage license was not a tool of the trade).
125, See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a) ("The following personal property... is exempt
from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment except where the judgment
is for the purchase price of the exempt property... .
124 See id. 5205(a)(2).
1255 See id. 5205(h).
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home this point. Article 9 defines a "purchase-money obligation"
as "an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the price
of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used."1256
The CPLR exception invokes only "price of the collateral," not the
"enabling loan" portion of the UCC definition.1 25 7 Credit card
debt is strictly on the enabling loan side of the UCC definition.
Only credit extended by the seller is immune from the
exemptions listed in CPLR 5205(a).
Of course, the merchant who sells the family bible on credit
could take a security interest in the bible under article 9. So
could an enabling lender, including a credit card issuer. In either
case, the security interest is, of course, good against any of the
property listed in CPLR 5205.1258 But where the merchant takes
no security interest, the merchant has no lien until the execution
is served on the sheriff following a money judgment. Once the
lien comes into existence, it is a unique lien that attaches to the
family bible, to which no other execution lien could attach.
In addition to the purchase money exception, there is also an
exception for judgments obtained by "a domestic, laboring person
or mechanic."1259 So the plumber or the gardener, if she gets a
money judgment, could execute on the family bible, the pet dog,
or the wedding ring (though not on the wheelchair or dental
work).
These exceptions raise a conceptual difficulty in bankruptcy
cases. In bankruptcy, exempt property initially goes into the
bankruptcy estate, but the debtor is invited to reclaim exempt
property. 1260  What if a purchase money claim or a plumber's
claim exists, which the property listed in CPLR 5205(a) could
satisfy? Does this interfere with a debtor's right to take
exemptions from the bankruptcy estate?
The answer is probably no. Although the bankruptcy trustee
could increase the general dividend if she could liquidate the
1256 U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2007).
1257 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a).
125 The Court of Appeals has ruled that the exemption statutes do not imply
that security interest on exempt items are against public policy. See In re New York
v. Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 389-90, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1077-79,
429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185-86 (1980).
1259 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(a).
126 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l) (West 2007).
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exempt property in order to pay the purchase money lender or
the mechanic, there seems to be no provision for it in the
Bankruptcy Code. For example, a trustee "may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ... that is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim.' 1 261 But JD has never transferred the family bible. She
has merely claimed it as an exemption. So there is no prospect
for "avoiding" the exemption.12
62
Meanwhile, the automatic stay of bankruptcy prevents the
mechanic from executing on the family bible. 1263 Once the
exemption is actually granted, the automatic stay still applies to
the exempt property.2 4 The mechanic's claim may well be
dischargeable. One of the effects of discharge is that the
mechanic's money judgment is voided. 265 Another is that the
mechanic is enjoined against ever enforcing the debt following
the discharge. 266  As a result of bankruptcy discharge, the
mechanic completely forfeits her CPLR privilege to pursue the
family bible.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
In this Article, I have surveyed the New York judicial lien on
personal property. What is revealed is a cacophony of medieval
law and bad policy choices made worse by illogical and
unthoughtful case law and incompetent legislative drafting.
It is probably not in the interest of institutional creditors,
who know how to take security interests under article 9 of the
UCC, to sponsor reform of enforcement of money judgments. So
there is not much profit in speculating on a system that evens
the playing field between secured lenders and unsecured
creditors who need to obtain judicial liens. Were such a reform
possible, one would do well to follow California's lead, which has
largely integrated judicial liens into the article 9 filing system.
In California, creditors may file notice of judgments with the
1261 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2000).
1262 See In re Covington, 368 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (allowing family
creditor to reach exempt asset, but trustee could not use this as a pretext to avoid
the exemption).
1263 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2),(5)-(6) (West 2006).
126 See id. § 362(a)(5)-(6).
1261 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
126 See id. § 524(a)(2).
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secretary of state. If they do, they have what amount to article 9
security interests on various categories of personal property of
the debtor-the very categories that article 9 describes for
secured lenders.
1267
Assuming this kind of sensible conceptual reform is out of
the question, there are some minor things that could simplify
matters within the scope and compass of the current system.
Here are some modest, realizable reforms as to which
institutional lenders could not object.
Currently, liens on personal property are defeasible. No
doubt this was legislated because the execution lien as
established by the statute of frauds creates an invisible lien. But
if, instead, we made the levy the moment of lien creation, we
could dispense with invisible liens altogether and abolish the
senseless complexity involving defeasibility. Such a reform
would actually help secured lenders, who currently fail to get the
benefits of defeasance, because of mal-coordination between
article 9 and the CPLR.
I see no great reason why the return of an execution should
be connected with the duration of the lien. The main argument
for it is the danger that JC1, having served an execution on the
sheriff, takes a free ride off JC 2's research if JC 2 is second to
serve the execution. This free ride already exists, however, for
sixty days and longer (since JC1 can extend the life of the
execution unilaterally). Why not have a rule that executions
have a much longer life? Orders of attachment, for example, last
as long as the judicial proceeding lasts in which the order was
retained.
I would also propose abolishing the distinction between
property capable and property not capable of delivery. For order
of attachments, paper levies suffice. Why shouldn't they also
suffice for the post-judgment environment? Of course, to prevent
JD misbehavior, the sheriff should have the duty to take tangible
property into possession whenever JC requests it. In this same
connection, the definition of debt as payment intangibles certain
to become due is ill-advised. Since the courts have all but
obliterated the difference between debt and property (which can
be contingent), the distinction serves no good purpose. Of course,
1267 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.510(a) (West 2008).
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it will be necessary to preserve a contingent letter of credit from
being levied.
The sale procedure is also out of date. The requirement that
property be on display suggests that the sheriff may not sell
intangibles. To allay that implication, the CPLR should require
the sheriff to display the property only "if possible."
Furthermore, in the case of securities, the sheriff should have the
access to recognized securities markets without any need to
advertise the sale in advance.
Finally, the CPLR should restore the rule that
commencement of an equity proceeding creates a lien on personal
property-not actually obtaining the order. The current rule
penalizes JC for law's delay and the insolence of office. It invites
other creditors to swipe priority with a late levy pursuant to
execution.
The current system cannot be defended. At best it can be
tolerated. The CPLR is now forty-five years old. It may not be
admirable or elegant, but it is not so bad that commercial
lawyers are unable to muddle through it. And this is precisely
why the CPLR, in its absurdity, has survived. The best that can
be said of the clanking, unsightly machinery of money judgment
enforcement in New York is that it has not entirely broken down.
But the above-mentioned reforms would at least abolish some of
the absurdities produced by an indefensible system.
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